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The Supreme Court’s “Federalist Revival” is now a decade old.1  We have seen 
neither the revolution that partisans of states’ rights might have wished nor the deluge 
that many nationalists feared.2  What we have witnessed is the incremental expansion, 
across a variety of fronts, of judicially-enforced limitations on national authority.  While 
it remains far too early to attempt a definitive assessment, we have enough decisions now 
to evaluate the Court’s project as a developing stream of doctrine rather than as isolated 
data points.  We can fruitfully ask whether the Court’s federalism doctrine successfully 
protects what is important about federalism or, more fundamentally, what “success” 
would look like.
Much of the debate about federalism doctrine has centered on the text and history 
of the Constitution.3  But it seems fair to say that while those sources of law have been 
highly relevant to the Court’s enterprise, neither text nor history has dictated the resulting 
doctrines.  Consider, for example, the rule that the federal government may not 
“commandeer” state legislatures or executive officers.4  Nothing in the constitutional text 
mandates such a rule.5  And while the relevant history supports the notion that the 
Framers intended the new national government to act directly on individuals rather than 
through state governmental institutions, that history is hardly so clear as to be 
dispositive.6  The more persuasive justifications for this and other rules, in my view, rest 
1
 Actually a little more or a little less old, depending on when you start counting.  Most people noticed a 
change in the Court’s direction in 1995, when the Court struck down an act of Congress as outside the 
commerce power for the first time since 1937.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  But the 
Court’s renewed interest in limited national power can be traced further back to New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).  For the term “federalist revival,” see 
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 HARV. L. REV. 
2180, 2213 (1998); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995) (preferring “antifederalist revival”).
2
 Charles Ares, for example, opined that “Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez has . . . opened the floodgates 
just by saying that there are limits on the commerce power, draping the opinion in references to things 
traditionally local, and then leaving it to the lower courts to begin the process of dismantling what they 
regard as offending intrusions on "our federalism." Charles E. Ares, Lopez and the Future Constitutional 
Crisis, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 825-26 (1996).  The lower courts, perhaps not surprisingly, have done no 
such thing.  See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the 
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came? 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369.
3 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (big textual and historical debate about 
the meaning of the Qualifications Clauses in Article I, §§ 2 & 3); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L. J. 
267 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 
(2001).
4 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at ___.
5 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (acknowledging as much).
6 See id. at 918 (“The constitutional practice we have examined . . . tends to negate the existence of the 
congressional power asserted here, but is not conclusive.”).  See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Field Office 
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (finding historical support for a rule barring commandeering of 
state legislatures, but not for one barring commandeering state officers); Evan H. Caminker, State 
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1042-50 (___) (concluding that the historical record suggests the Framers intended 
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on their functional roles in protecting state autonomy.7  In any event, the important point 
is that the Court has been operating in a context where text and history suggest important 
directions but do not mandate particular doctrinal formulations.  Instead, the Court has 
constructed doctrine to meet the needs of the federal system as it sees them.  Federalism 
doctrine has been made, not found.
Many of the Rehnquist majority’s critics, both on the Court and in the academy, 
have taken the failure of text and history to compel particular federalism doctrines as 
proof that the enterprise is illegitimate.8  This is a curious reaction – although perhaps not 
a surprising one – given that many of the same people favor judicial creativity in other 
contexts.9  My own view is that doctrinal creativity is essential if the Constitution’s 
original mandate of a federal balance is to be maintained in a world where many of the 
Founders’ presuppositions about the structure of society and government have profoundly 
changed.  Text and history tell us that our Constitution established a creative tension 
between national and state governments.  I will argue, however, that those same sources 
can tell us relatively little about how that tension should be maintained in today’s world.  
And while adaptation of the original structure to present circumstances is not exclusively, 
or perhaps even primarily, a task for courts, I contend that they must nonetheless play an 
important role.
If I am right that the Constitution both permits and requires substantial judicial 
creativity in enforcing federalism, then the central task becomes to develop a coherent 
vision of how such enforcement ought to proceed.  Here, too, the Court’s critics have 
been many and loud.  Much of this criticism seems overblown; courts sit to decide cases, 
not develop general theories – and certainly not to articulate them in broad dictum
unnecessary to the decision.  But the Court’s emerging pattern of decisions does indicate 
a certain vision of what is important about federalism and how it should be enforced.  
There is, of course, the obvious pattern:  Five justices are generally for imposing 
constitutional limits on federal authority in a number of different contexts, while four 
have consistently opposed such limits.10  Less obvious is the particular nature of the 
to permit commandeering of state executive officers and that the record is too sparse to support a rule 
against commandeering state legislatures).
7 Accord H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) 
(rejecting the historical arguments against commandeering, but approving New York’s rule on “prudential” 
grounds).  I am not as skeptical of the historical justification for the rule as Professor Powell, but I agree 
that the functional arguments are stronger.
8 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Are We To Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. States’ Rights in Foreign Affairs, 
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1286-96 (1999) (attacking the textual and historical bases for the anti-
commandeering doctrine).
9 Compare, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy 
and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 369-70 (2002) (comparing the Rehnquist Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence to Lochner) with Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional 
Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. L. REV. 292 (1996) (urging recognition of a substantive due process right to 
physician-assisted suicide).
10
 Because the current incarnation of the Rehnquist Court has served together for ___ years, the voting 
blocs on most federalism issues have been remarkably stable over virtually the entire period of the 
“federalist revival.”  Five justices – Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
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constraints imposed.  Those constraints embody a rather narrow version of state 
“sovereignty,” defined here as the notion that state governments should be unaccountable 
for violations of federal norms.  The many decisions upholding state sovereign immunity 
in federal lawsuits are simply the most obvious manifestation of this trend.  Not all of the 
Court’s efforts have focused on the value of sovereignty, but it is fair to say that it has 
received considerably greater emphasis than other aspects of federalism.  The Court’s 
dissenters, by contrast, have opposed these decisions with unusual vehemence11 and, on 
several occasions, urged virtually complete judicial abdication of federalism 
enforcement.12
The broader pattern, however, is more complicated.  By expanding the universe of 
what counts as a “federalism case” – in particular, by taking in cases about federal 
statutory preemption of state law – one discovers that the supposedly anti-federalism 
justices have their own theory of state autonomy, instead of simply favoring national 
power at every turn.  The dissenters in cases like Lopez or Seminole Tribe13 have often –
but not always – emphasized state “autonomy,” defined somewhat narrowly here as the 
ability of states to govern, as opposed to simply their immunity from accountability.14
Thomas – have generally favored limits on federal power.  Four – Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer – have generally opposed such limits.  Nonetheless, it is hard to know exactly what to call these two 
groups.  Many have dubbed them “conservative” and “liberal” factions, respectively, but attaching a strong 
political valence to federalism issues is highly problematic.  See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, 
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L. J.  75, ___ (2001); Ernest A. Young, 
Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, ___ 
BROOKLYN L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004).  I will occasionally use “pro-states” and “nationalist,” but one 
of the principal points of this essay is to say that the putatively nationalist four do, in fact, have their own 
important vision of state autonomy.  See infra Section ___.  I will also occasionally refer to the Court’s 
“majority” and “dissenting” factions on federalism, but it is important to understand that members of the 
four have sometimes been able to form majorities around their own view of federalism.
11 See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina St. Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1889 (2002) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today's decision reaffirms the need for continued dissent - unless the 
consequences of the Court's approach prove anodyne, as I hope, rather than randomly destructive, as I 
fear.”);  Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[t]he 
kind of judicial activism manifested in [the Court’s 11th Amendment cases] represents such a radical 
departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.”); 
see also Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 178 
(2002) (observing that “[s]uch explicit commitments to keep dissenting until the dissent becomes the 
doctrine of the Court are rare”).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“As with 
"conflicts of economic interest," so with supposed conflicts of sovereign political interests implicated by 
the Commerce Clause: the Constitution remits them to politics.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“The importance of respecting the Framers' decision to assign the business of lawmaking to the 
Congress dictates firm resistance to the present majority's repeated substitution of its own views of 
federalism for those expressed in statutes enacted by the Congress and signed by the President.”). 
13
 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate the sovereign 
immunity of the states from private damages suits when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers).
14 See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(complaining that by preempting state tort suits, the majority was “us[ing] federal law as a means of 
imposing their own ideas of tort reform on the States”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 
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The dissenters, for example, vote to uphold state regulatory measures against claims of 
federal preemption considerably more frequently than their colleagues.15  These cases 
likewise reflect a different approach to judicial review of federalism issues, relying on 
“softer” checks on Congress such as “clear statement” rules of statutory construction.  
Comparing the two competing visions of federalism on the Rehnquist Court can, 
in itself, tell us a great deal about the choices involved in making federalism doctrine.  I 
want to argue, however, that both these visions are incomplete.  The majority’s view 
neglects concerns for state regulatory autonomy and overlooks the potential of “process” 
limits on federal authority.  The dissenting vision, on the other hand, improperly 
discounts the need for some substantive constraint on federal power while missing the 
support in “process federalism” for more aggressive judicial doctrines.  Instead, I argue 
for a “strong autonomy” model of federalism doctrine that combines many of the features 
of the other two. 
The case for this model rests on two sets of arguments.  The first has to do with 
the preference for “autonomy” over “sovereignty.”  I contend that virtually all the values 
that federalism is supposed to promote – such as regulatory diversity, political 
participation, or restraints on tyranny – turn on the capacity of the states to exercise self-
government, not on their institutional immunity from federal norms.  This capacity for 
self-government also turns out to be critical for the states’ ability to maintain their own 
place in the federal balance without relying primarily on judicial protection.  
The latter point moves toward a second set of arguments, revolving around the 
nature of judicial enforcement for federalism issues.  Such enforcement, I argue, ought to 
be shaped by comparing the institutional competence of the courts with the other 
branches of government, as informed by the courts’ historical experience in enforcing 
federalism doctrine.  That comparison argues for doctrines that focus on correcting 
defects in the political process’s own protection for federalism, as well as doctrines that 
avoid direct confrontations with the political branches.  But because the Framers’ own 
theory of self-enforcement rests on enduring areas of state regulatory autonomy, judicial 
federalism doctrine cannot be entirely indifferent to substantive restrictions on federal 
power.
At least one caveat is in order.  This essay will not be of much use for those who 
believe that legal doctrine has little or no bearing on the actual decision of cases.16  I have 
never had much sympathy for that view, but addressing it would take this essay far afield 
indeed.  In any event, as long as doctrine has some purchase – and the extreme positions 
427 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s decision to preempt state regulatory authority 
over local telephone markets “deprive[d] the States of practically significant power”).
15 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 369-70 
[hereinafter Meltzer, Judicial Passivity]; Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”:  Federal 
Preemption and State Autonomy (forthcoming who knows when) [hereinafter Young, Preemption].
16 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
(1993); see also Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1140 (1994) (observing 
that the assumption “that there are rules of principles of constitutional law . . . that are capable of statement 
and that generally guide the decisions of courts . . . . has been controversial at least since the advent of legal 
realism”).
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that insist doctrine is either irrelevant or the whole ballgame seem unlikely to be true –
then it will make sense to inquire how to design and improve doctrinal rules.
Part I of this essay explores the use of judicial doctrine as a tool for resolving 
disputes about federalism.  I begin with the observation that doctrine and the Constitution 
are not the same; hence, the use of doctrine requires justification beyond the traditional 
arguments about judicial authority to interpret the Constitution itself.  Doctrine also 
presupposes that courts should have some role in federalism disputes, a question that 
implicates an emerging literature on comparative institutional choice.  I argue, however, 
that courts are generally not free to ignore issues of federalism and that institutional 
issues are best addressed in the context of interpretive choice – that is, the enterprise of 
choosing particular federalism doctrines that are more or less deferential to other 
institutional actors.
Part II identifies three different models of federalism doctrine:  the “strong 
sovereignty” model often followed by the Rehnquist Court majority; the “weak 
autonomy” model sometimes advanced by the Court’s dissenters, and a “strong 
autonomy” model developed and defended here.  Part III turns to the role that text and 
history play in defining and constraining federalism doctrine in the courts.  My 
conclusion is that these sources require us to have federalism doctrine – that is, they 
impose an obligation on courts to enforce the federal balance – but that they tell us 
relatively little about the precise balance to be struck or the forms that federalism doctrine 
should take.  
In Part IV, I consider how the underlying values of federalism bear on the choice 
between “sovereignty” and “autonomy.”  Those values, I contend, strongly support 
emphasizing the regulatory autonomy of state governments rather than shielding them 
from accountability for violations of federal norms.  Parts V and VI then turn to the 
structure of doctrine protecting state autonomy.  Part V treats the notion that federalism 
should be “self-enforcing,” advanced by Professor Herbert Wechsler’s theory of the 
“political safeguards of federalism”17 as well as James Madison’s essays in the 
Federalist.18  While both versions suggest that courts should focus on “process” failures 
that undermine state representation at the federal level and institutional checks on federal 
action, both Madison and Wechsler also – albeit in quite different ways – support a 
continued judicial obligation to enforce the “substance” of enumerated limits on federal 
action.  Part VI then addresses the form that doctrinal limits should take, based on the 
institutional experience of the Court in enforcing federalism during prior eras.  That 
experience preaches caution in assaying direct confrontations with Congress, avoidance 
of categorical subject-matter distinctions, and exploration of “softer checks” – such as 
“clear statement” rules of statutory interpretation – on federal authority.
Part VII, finally, offers a preliminary sketch of the doctrines that might make up a 
“strong autonomy” approach.  The most important is a strong emphasis on limiting 
federal preemption of state regulatory authority.  On this point, the present essay is a 
17
 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
18 See Federalist No. 45 & 46 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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companion to another work which undertakes a much more comprehensive look at 
federal preemption.19   Part VII also discusses other process-forcing doctrines, such as the 
various “clear statement” rules, the anti-commandeering principle, and stricter 
enforcement of the constitutionally-prescribed procedures for making federal law.  In the 
end, I suggest that certain more substantive doctrines – such as enforcement of commerce 
clause limits on federal authority – should retain a significant place in federalism 
doctrine, while others – such as the constitutionalization of state sovereign immunity –
should not.  
I. Federalism and Doctrine
Take a look at any first-year casebook in constitutional law, and you will see the 
importance of doctrine to the subject.  The widely-used Sullivan and Gunther casebook20
places the Constitution itself – the text drafted at Philadelphia in 1787 and ratified in 
1789, as well as its subsequent amendments – in an appendix at the end of the book, 
immediately following page 1537.   Much of the rest is doctrine, encompassing “not only 
the holdings of cases, but also the analytical frameworks and tests that the Court’s cases 
establish.”21
My subject is the creation of federalism doctrine, and that subject requires some 
inquiry into the nature of doctrine per se and its relationship to other components of 
constitutional law.  I take up that inquiry in Section A of this Part.  Because doctrine is 
created by courts, moreover, the enterprise of doctrinal construction presupposes an 
institutional choice allocating at least some authority over federalism questions to the 
judiciary rather than to some other institution.  Institutional choice cannot be taken for 
granted, however, and I discuss why courts should have at least some authority over 
federalism questions in Section B.  The more difficult issues, however, concern the 
interpretive choice of particular federalism doctrines that is the subject of Section C.  
That Section sets out a series of issues that courts must confront in developing particular 
doctrines that will help maintain our federal balance.
A. Doctrine, Constitution, and Deep Structure
Doctrine is not the same as the Constitution.22  Sometimes it bears very little 
relation to the document itself, such as when the Court holds that states may not 
discriminate against interstate commerce23 or that Congress may not “commandeer” state 
19 See Young, Preemption, supra note 15.
20 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14th ed. 2001).
21
 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term – Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword]; see also McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: 
A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1639 (1995) 
(defining doctrine as “the set of rules and methods to be used to decide a particular class of cases”).
22 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 62-65 (1993) (giving reasons why judicial decisions should not be read as 
“incorporated” in the enactments they interpret); [others].
23 Compare, e.g., , U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (conferring power on Congress “to regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States”) with Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996) (observing that courts 
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legislatures or executive officials.24  Other times, the doctrine elaborates upon the text, 
rendering its directives more specific in their application to particular cases.  In
considering the scope of Congress’s affirmative commerce power, for instance, the Court 
has held that the power extends to “channels” and “instrumentalities” of commerce, as 
well as to activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.25  In either case, 
however, the doctrine may permit or require things that the document, standing alone, 
might not.  Any account of the courts’ power to craft federalism doctrine must begin by 
exploring the justifications for “supplementing” the Constitution in this way.  Those 
justifications play an important role in determining how far federalism doctrine can go.
1. The Problem of Doctrine and Structure
We might initially define constitutional “doctrine” as the residue of interpretation 
that accumulates over time.  Constitutional interpretation is seldom easy.  Judicial 
interpretations of the document are often contestable and sometimes wrong.  Yet we often 
accept those interpretations as settled and move on, taking them as given and building 
upon them in the resolution of future questions.  Doctrine in this sense is equivalent to 
precedent; it represents our unwillingness to reopen interpretive questions resolved in the 
past.
Even taken in this comparatively narrow sense, doctrine is moderately 
controversial in constitutional law.  Gary Lawson, for example, has argued that it is 
unconstitutional to subordinate the Constitution itself to what the judges have said about 
it in the past.26  The argument has a strong intuitive appeal:  If a judge deciding today’s 
case truly thinks – using all the tools of interpretation at his disposal – that the 
Constitution requires rule X, then by what authority does he discount that interpretation 
and adhere to rule Y, simply because rule Y was adopted in a prior decision?  Surely the 
Constitution itself trumps any authority the prior court might have enjoyed.27
have long interpreted the Commerce Clause “as a limitation on state regulatory powers” that “‘prohibits 
economic protectionism’”) (quoting Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647 (1994)).
24 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (acknowledging that “there is no 
constitutional text speaking to this precise question” whether state executive officers may be required to 
implement fe deral law).
25
 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
26
 Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 23-24 
(1994); see also [Paulsen?].  A counter-current holds that it is unconstitutional not to allow courts to 
produce binding doctrine.  See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (striking 
down circuit rule barring citation of unpublished opinions on the ground that the Article III “judicial 
power” necessarily encompasses the power to create binding precedent), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 887 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Ripple, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)’s confinement of the grounds for federal habeas corpus 
relief to situations where state courts have violated “clearly established law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States” unconstitutionally denies lower courts authority to create binding precedent) 
(emphasis added). That debate is well beyond the scope of my discussion here.
27
 One might take John Marshall’s famous statement in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
___ (1819), out of context to say that “we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding” –
not a set of legal precedents.
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As long as we take precedent and doctrine to entail simply deference to past 
interpretations, however, two answers to the argument seem readily available.  One is that 
adherence to interpretive precedent simply represents humility on the part of present 
interpreter – a recognition that his own interpretation may be wrong and, more 
fundamentally, that prior readings are in fact one of the most important “tools of 
interpretation” to be employed in resolving present controversies.28  A second answer 
rests on the practical – but basic – impossibility of treating all interpretive questions as 
open in resolving each new case.  Some questions must be considered settled if we are to 
move forward.  As Charles Fried points out, “[w]e want to avoid being like the man who 
cannot get to work in the morning because he must keep returning home to make quite 
sure that he has turned off the gas.”29
Doctrine has an additional component, however.30  In many instances, the activity 
of interpretation per se may not produce closure on a choice among doctrinal options, 
leaving the choice to be made on other grounds.  Those grounds may include independent 
moral principle, pragmatic concerns about the workability of particular rules, or 
institutional issues about the court’s legitimacy.  As Richard Fallon has observed, 
Frequently, a perfect correspondence could not, even in principle, exist 
between the meaning of constitutional norms and the doctrinal tests by 
which those norms are implemented. . . .  [S]ome constitutional norms 
may be too vague to serve directly as effective rules of law.  In addition, in 
shaping constitutional tests, the Supreme Court must take account of 
empirical, predictive, and institutional considerations that may vary from 
time to time.31
Doctrine thus entails the choices that judges must make “to implement the Constitutional 
successfully.  In service of this mission, the Court often must craft doctrine that is driven 
by the Constitution, but does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”32
This aspect of doctrine frankly acknowledges that it supplements the Constitution 
rather than simply amounting to past interpretations of the document.  As such, it seems 
28 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald 
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1997) (“[A]n essential 
element of responsible judging is a respect for the opinions and judgments of others, and a willingness to 
suspend belief, at least provisionally, in the correctness of one's own opinions, especially when they 
conflict with the decisions of others who have, no less than judges, sworn an oath to uphold and defend the 
Constitution.”).
29
 Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1144.  See also Anthony Kronman, Precedent and 
Tradition, 99 YALE L. J. 1029 (1990) (making a similar, but more foundational, argument for precedent).
30 See Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1141 (“Doctrine and precedent are related, not 
identical.  In civil law countries, doctrine plays a great role in giving the law its substance and texture, but 
treatise writers and academic discourse, not the opinions nor even the decisions of courts, are the dominant 
organs of the growth and statement of doctrine there.”).  
31
 Fallon, Foreword, supra note ___,at 62.
32 Id. at 57. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-16, at 81-82 (3d ed. 
2000) (“[T]he bare words of the Constitution’s text, and the skeletal structure on which those words were 
hung, only begin to fill out the Constitution as a mature, ongoing system of constitutional law.”).
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more vulnerable to Professor Lawson’s critique.  Doctrine in this aspect is not simply 
privileging one court’s interpretation (the earlier one) over another; it instead amounts to 
the use of something not quite the same as the Constitution as a vehicle for implementing 
the Constitution’s provisions.  That still seems relatively unproblematic where doctrine 
simply makes open-ended provisions more concrete, as with Lopez’s trichotomy of 
“channels,” “instrumentalities,” and activities “substantially affecting” commerce.33  In 
these instances, the doctrinalist can plead necessity:  Courts simply cannot decide cases 
under the Commerce Clause – and in particular the Supreme Court cannot guide future 
decisions by lower courts – without specifying what “commerce among the several 
states” means.34  The implementing doctrine is necessary in such instances to ensure that 
like cases applying the constitutional provision in question are, in fact, treated alike.
Some doctrine, however, exists at a further remove from the implementation of 
particular constitutional provisions.  This is particularly true of much federalism doctrine.  
The anti-commandeering principle, for example, does not implement any particular 
constitutional provision;35 likewise, the dormant commerce notion hardly serves to 
implement the Commerce Clause’s text, which quite plainly operates only to confer 
power on Congress.36  These sorts of doctrine require a more elaborate justification than 
the need to specify the meaning of particular constitutional text.
It may help to begin by adding a third category of constitutional “law” alongside 
the text and the doctrine.  That category would include fundamental structural principles, 
33 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
34 [cite Fallon]  A related necessity occurs when a textual provision is relatively determinate but practically 
unworkable in that form.  The Free Speech Clause, for instance, could hardly be more specific:  “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  But aside from Justice 
Black, we have never been able to live with a right of free speech in this absolute form.  The provision thus 
cannot be effectively implemented without doctrine specifying exceptions and qualifications, such as the 
“clear and present danger” test for restrictions on incitement to unlawful activity.  See, e.g., Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, ___ (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, ___ (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
35
 Language in New York suggests that the Court believes the anti-commandeering rule to be an implicit 
limit on every enumerated power.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (“[J]ust as a 
cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in these 
cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the 
affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States 
under the Tenth Amendment.”).  But that limit is not necessary to implement these powers in the way, for 
example, that some sort of doctrinal test of equality is necessary to implement the Equal Protection Clause.  
One can imagine a Commerce Clause without an anti-commandeering limit; one cannot apply Equal 
Protection without defining what is meant by equality.
36 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 796 n.12 (1995) (acknowledging that “the 
Constitution is clearly silent on the subject of state legislation that discriminates against interstate 
commerce”).  Similarly, the broad sovereign immunity accorded to state governments in cases like 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), hardly implements the text of the Eleventh Amendment; on 
the contrary, the Court often describes the rather narrow text of that Amendment as implementing a pre-
existing (and much broader) notion of sovereign immunity in a particular instance where Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), had rejected such immunity.  See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723 
(1999).  As I discuss further infra TAN ___, my own view is that current doctrine goes well beyond what is 
necessary to implement the most plausible account of the Founders’ views on state sovereign immunity.
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like “federalism” or “separation of powers.”  Those words do not appear in the 
constitutional text, and yet they have long been understood as bedrock ideas undergirding 
the textual provisions in the document and tying them together into a coherent structure.  
Nor are these sorts of principles properly classified as “doctrine,” at least if we 
understand that term to encompass relatively specific rules and principles that implement 
the textual provisions.  On the contrary, textual provisions such as the vesting clauses of 
Articles I, II, and III and the Tenth Amendment “implement” broader ideas of separation 
of powers and federalism, respectively.  The text thus exists at an intermediate level of 
generality, implementing broader ideas and yet requiring further implementation through 
judicial doctrine.37
The critical question for present purposes is the relationship between these 
fundamental structural principles and the doctrine made by courts.  Sometimes, courts 
will want to justify doctrine on the ground that it directly implements structural 
principles, even though the doctrine has little support in the text itself.  The anti-
commandeering doctrine is an example.  Other times, courts will fashion doctrine to 
implement text, yet recur to the text’s underlying principles to influence the form that the 
implementing doctrine takes.  In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,38 for example, both 
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence resorted to the 
Founders’ underlying theory of representation to support a doctrine that the 
Qualifications Clauses in Article I supply the exclusive limitations on who can be a 
federal representative.39  In each case, it is hard to say that the text itself is doing the 
work.  
The power of judicial review itself is generally justified in terms of the 
Constitution’s written-ness; John Marshall, for instance, wrote in Marbury that the theory 
“that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void” is “essentially 
attached to a written constitution.”40  Compared to more traditional forms of judicial 
review, then, the argument that courts may formulate constitutional doctrine driven not so 
much by text as by fundamental structural principles cannot be as easily grounded in the 
judiciary’s obligation “to say what the law is.”41  I offer two justifications here for 
doctrine derived from structure.  The first is that the Constitution should not be taken as a 
complete description of the federal system; that text is devoted to establishing and 
empowering one component of that system – the national government – rather than with 
comprehensively ordering the system as a whole.  The second argument arises out of the 
37 See generally Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1601 (2000) [hereinafter Young, Jurisprudence of Structure] (discussing the role of the political 
theory underlying structural provisions of the Constitution).
38
 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
39
 See id. at ___; id. at 838, 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Young, Jurisprudence of Structure, 
supra note 37, at 1644-45 (discussing this aspect of Term Limits).
40
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, ___ (1803); see also id. at ___ (“The powers of the 
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution 
is written.”) (emphasis added).
41 Id. at ___.
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need to “translate” the text’s original strategies for maintaining the structure envisioned 
by its Framers into a world much changed from the one those Framers knew.
2. The Constitution’s Incompleteness on Federalism
Federalism has many meanings, but the basic one in our system is that we have 
two levels of government – the Nation and the States – and that power is divided between 
them as a matter of constitutional principle.42  Whether or not the States are “prior” to the 
Federal Government as a matter of political theory – a question that tends to center on 
whether the federal Constitution was ratified by the People as a whole or the People of 
the States43 – there is no dispute that the original state governments were already up and 
running when the Constitution was drafted in 1787.  The new constitution thus had no 
need to constitute them, but rather simply to carve out a place for a new, stronger central 
government.44 As Chief Justice Marshall explained early on, “it was neither necessary 
nor proper to define the powers retained by the States. These powers proceed, not from 
the people of America, but from the people of the several States; and remain, after the 
adoption of the constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may be 
abridged by that instrument.”45
To be sure, this carving-out addressed many of the important and contested issues 
of federalism.  But others were left unaddressed, especially in the original, un-amended 
document.  Most importantly, the federal Constitution did not empower state 
governments; rather, it left to the state constitutions the task of constituting state 
governments and delegating to them some portion of the popular sovereignty.46   The 
Constitution’s agnosticism on the powers delegated to state governments initially went 
unremarked in the text; it would later be made explicit by the Tenth Amendment’s 
proclamation that powers “not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”47
In other words, the sovereign people were free to delegate particular reserved powers to 
their state governments or simply not to empower their governments to act in those ways.
The original Constitution likewise did not address the question of sovereign 
immunity, either for the new national government or its state counterparts.  Debate at 
Philadelphia and in the ratifying conventions focused on whether Article III would itself 
override the traditional immunities of state governments, with the apparent resolution that 
42 See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary 
Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1641-42 (2002) [hereinafter Young, European 
Union] (discussing various definitions).
43 Compare, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, ___ (1995), with id. at ___ (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); see also FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION:  IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 
1776-1876 at 7-22 (2000).
44
 Indeed, some states kept operating under their pre-1789 constitutions (or even their pre-revolutionary 
royal charters) well into the Nineteenth Century.  [cites]
45
 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).
46 See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at ___ (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
47 U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
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it would not.48  But whether one thinks that the states’ preexisting immunity itself had 
constitutional status (the position of the Rehnquist Court majority) or that it was a form 
of common law subject to statutory override (the view of the Court’s dissenters), the 
present point is simply that the constitutional text did not address the question.  This was 
a significant omission given widespread concerns during the founding era about crippling 
lawsuits against state governments.49  Sovereign immunity thus provides further evidence 
of the Framers’ willingness to allow major issues of federal structure to be worked out 
through processes – judicial development, statutory enactments, norms of practice – other 
than constitutional drafting.50
Nor did the federal Constitution, for the most part, define the rights of individuals 
vis-à-vis their state governments.  This is true despite the fact that many of the Founders 
in Philadelphia were strongly motivated by a perception that State governments needed to 
be reined in.51  The Constitution did state that the national government would be 
responsible for enforcing a basic commitment to republicanism,52 and it forbade the 
States to do certain things, such as to grant titles of nobility or to impair the obligation of 
contracts.53  But this handful of restrictions hardly purported to be a complete description 
of the rights of citizens vis-à-vis their state governments, and when a more inclusive 
catalog of individual liberties was added in the Bill of Rights, those liberties bound only 
the national government.54  The scope of individual rights enforceable against the state
governments was left to rest on state constitutions.  As cloudy as the meaning of the
48 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 142-44 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding some 
disagreement on the issue, but acknowledging that “James Madison, John Marshall, and Alexander 
Hamilton all appear to have believed that the common-law immunity from suit would survive the 
ratification of Article III”); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (J.E. Cooke ed. 1961) (Alexander 
Hamilton); but see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (reaching the opposite conclusion).  
Chisholm was of course promptly overruled by the Eleventh Amendment. 
49 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (“It is a part of our history, that, at the 
adoption of the constitution, all the states were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts 
might be prosecuted in the federal courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument.”).
50
 One might think that the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment shortly after Chisholm was an attempt to 
move the question of sovereign immunity back into the realm of constitutional text.  But the Amendment’s 
text could not have been intended as a complete statement on the subject:  It left too many questions, like 
the immunity of states in federal question or admiralty cases, unresolved.  (It said nothing about federal
immunities, moreover.)  And indeed the Amendment’s text has played a much less important role in the 
development of our law of state sovereign immunity than one might have expected.  See Young, 
Jurisprudence of Structure, supra note 37, at ___.  
51 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 47 (1996) (concluding that Madison intended for the Constitutional Convention “to seize 
the occasion of reforming the national government to treat the internal defects of the states”); MCDONALD, 
supra note 43, at 17-18.
52 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
53 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
54 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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Ninth Amendment is,55 it seems at the least to disavow any suggestion that the federal 
Bill of Rights should be a complete description of a citizen’s rights against government. 
As Forrest McDonald has observed, “[t]he Ninth was understood as integral to a system 
of divided sovereignty.  By refusing to nationalize unenumerated rights, the Ninth left the 
question of the protection of such rights to the states or to the people of the states.”56
The national constitution thus did not establish a complete government.  It 
essayed neither a comprehensive list of governmental powers nor an exhaustive list of 
individual rights.  Sovereignty remained in the People, who gave life to their system of 
federalism by delegating that sovereignty to their several governments.57  The system can 
be fully appreciated only by viewing the whole, that is, the federal constitution, the state 
constitutions, and – most important for present purposes – the web of practices that has 
grown up to mediate potential conflicts between these two levels of government.  
Each of our various institutions has contributed to this web.  Congress, for 
example, has enacted statutes staking an exclusive claim to some areas,58 denying the 
existence of federal power in others,59 providing for cooperation in still others,60 and 
occasionally regulating the lawmaking procedures themselves by which federal law 
impacts the states.61  The President promulgates Executive Orders on federalism issues,62
consults with states and represents their interests in supranational organizations,63 and 
issues interpretive rulings on the preemptive effect of federal statutes.64  State 
55 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
56 MCDONALD, supra note 43, at 24.
57 See generally GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 530 (1969) 
(discussing James Wilson’s influential theory of popular sovereignty).
58 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (providing 
that federal law “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan”).
59 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (providing that “nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed to apply or to give the [Federal Communications] Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . 
intrastate communication service”).
60 See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990) (observing that the Clean Air 
Act makes “the States and the Federal Government partners in the struggle against air pollution”).
61 See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C.) (imposing certain procedural restrictions on the enactment of federal legislation 
imposing financial burdens on the states).
62 See, e.g., Executive Order 13132, Federalism, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (“Agencies shall 
construe . . . a Federal statute to preempt State law only where the statute contains an express preemption 
provision or there is some other clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or 
where the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal 
statute.”).
63 See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C) (1997) (establishing a consultation 
mechanism where state law is challenged before the World Trade Organization).
64 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Final Rule, Air Pollution Control; Preemption of State 
Regulation for Nonroad Engine and Vehicle Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 36969, 36974 (July 20, 1994) 
(construing the preemptive effect of federal environmental law on state standards).
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governments implement some federal statutes,65 lobby Congress and the Executive on 
structural issues,66 and work together on issues of shared concern through interstate 
compacts,67 uniform state laws,68 and collective litigation.69  And courts, of course, have 
contributed their own web of doctrine.  It is important to understand, however, that 
judicial doctrine implementing the federal system includes not only such familiar 
constitutional issues as the scope of the affirmative and negative Commerce Clause or the 
scope of state sovereign immunity, but also the whole corpus of conflict of laws,70 judge-
made abstention doctrines,71 and interpretations of foundational statutes like the habeas 
corpus statute,72 Section 1983,73 or laws governing the scope of federal jurisdiction.74
65 See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from 
Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1997) (describing the states’ role in 
implementing federal environmental laws).
66 See, e.g., National Governors’ Assn., Principles for State-Federal Relations (Feb. 4, 2000) (statement of 
proposals for reform on structural federalism issues) (available at 
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_ISSUE_BRIEF^D_3164,00.html) (visited Oct. 12, 
2003); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1557, 1566-67 (2003) (discussing the role 
of the National Association of Attorneys General in lobbying for the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which 
restricted the powers of federal courts to interfere with the administration of state prison systems).
67 See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) (upholding compact 
among 21 states coordinating taxation of businesses, notwithstanding failure to secure Congressional 
consent); see generally 1 TRIBE, supra note 32, § 6-35, at 1238-42 (discussing interstate compacts).
68 See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code [cite]; Model Business Corporation Act [cite].
69 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (joint antitrust action against various 
insurance companies by nineteen state attorneys general); Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, 
In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOKLYN 
L. REV. 549, 552-55 (2000) (describing state cooperation in litigation against tobacco companies).
70 See, e.g., Philipps Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that a forum state may not 
constitutionally apply its own law to civil claims with which it has no significant contacts); Douglas 
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (discussing the relation between choice of law rules and the federal 
system).
71 See, e.g., Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37 (1971); Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
72
 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55.  See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that federal courts 
generally may not grant habeas relief based on “new rules” that were announced after the petitioner’s state 
conviction became final); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (restricting federal courts’ ability to 
grant habeas relief where the petitioner has procedurally defaulted in state court).
73
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a cause of action for violations of federal law by persons acting “under color 
of state law”).  See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (holding that § 1983 creates an exception 
to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which ordinarily bars injunctions against state court 
proceedings); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that § 1983 provides a cause of action 
against state officials for violations of at least some federal statutes).
74 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. 
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, ___ (1986) (holding that federal courts have significant discretion in determining 
the scope of § 1331).  See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ___ [preface] (1st ed. 1953) (suggesting that “[f]or every case in which a court 
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This web of statute, practice, and doctrine is considerably more complicated than 
anything the Founders could have envisioned in 1789.  Their initial strategy for dividing 
powers through enumeration and reservation gave rise to the regime of “dual federalism,” 
predicated on the “maintenance of the independent integrity of federal powers and state 
powers through separations of national and state spheres of action.”75  Dual federalism 
seemed to promise a fairly straightforward role for courts, which could evaluate the 
constitutionality of both state and federal measures simply by asking whether the right 
government was acting in the right sphere.  For most of the Nineteenth Century, this 
chiefly entailed limiting state power under the judge-made doctrine of the negative 
commerce power;76 later on, the Court also began to enforce the textual limits of the 
Commerce Clause itself as a limit on national power.77  As I discuss further in Part VI,78
policing separate state and federal spheres ultimately turned out to be a highly complex 
and ultimately unsustainable task.  The important point for present purposes, however, is 
that from the beginning courts have used not just the federal constitutional text but a 
vision of the structure of the whole as a basis for constitutional federalism doctrine.  
3. Translating Federalism
The courts have always derived doctrine from both the text of the Constitution 
and the underlying structure of our federal system, but the need to rely upon the latter 
may have increased over time.79  This is not surprising:  The critique of written 
constitutions has long been that they incapable of foreseeing and adapting the future 
circumstances and needs of the polities they constitute.80  Most acknowledge that our 
own Constitution has accommodated this difficulty chiefly by being open to adaptation 
without formal amendment, through the evolving practices of the political branches and 
the incremental doctrinal development of courts.81  As Larry Lessig has explained, this 
is asked to invalidate a square assertion of state or federal legislative authority, there are many more in 
which the allocation of control does not involve questions of ultimate power”).
75 John Kincaid, From Dual to Coercive Federalism in American Intergovernmental Relations, in
GLOBALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS, POLICY ISSUES, AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 29 (Jong S. Jun & Deil S. Wright 
eds., 1996).
76 See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (holding that a state could not require a 
foreign importer to be licensed by the state prior to selling imported goods).
77 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 246 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down federal law restricting interstate 
shipment of goods made by child labor as an effort to regulate labor conditions internal to a state).
78 See infra Section VI.B.
79
 I say “may” because it is not clear that any foreseeable version of the modern Supreme Court would 
develop structure-based doctrines to limit federal power that are comparable in aggressiveness to the 
negative commerce jurisprudence that developed in the Nineteenth Century and survives to this day.  In 
other words, the most radical use of doctrine to order the federal relationship has existed without serious 
jurisprudential challenge for over a century and a half.
80 See, e.g., Joseph de Maistre, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions (1810), in THE 
WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 147 (Jack Lively trans., 1971); see also Ernest Young, Rediscovering 
Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 666-68 
(1994) [hereinafter Young, Rediscovering Conservatism].
81 [Levinson?]
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adaptive enterprise can – and should – be a means of fidelity to the original document and 
structure, rather than a departure from them.82  The “response of fidelity” to changed
circumstances, he argues, “is to articulate these previously understood conventions, and 
apply them today to assure that the constitutional structure original[ly] established is, so 
far as possible, preserved.”83  This effort – “to translate that original structure into the 
context of today” – must at least in part be a judicial effort of “implying limits on the 
growth of federal power.”84
Translation involves changed readings of the constitutional text and structure in 
response to changes in the context in which the text and structure must operate.  With 
respect to federalism, three related sets of changes are central.  The first involves changes 
of fact – for example, the integration of the national economy, the explosion of 
communication and transportation among the several states, changes in the Nation’s 
external and internal security environment, and the advent of comparatively new 
problems, such as environmental pollution, that often seem to defy state-by-state 
solutions.  These sorts of factual changes have been central to the evolution of federal 
power in our system.  As Professor Lessig observes, “[t]he scope of the [federal] power 
clause is seen to turn upon facts in the world, and as these facts change, the scope of the 
power too is seen to change.”85  To focus on just one example, the notion of what counts 
as “commerce among the several states” cannot help but change in response to the 
nationalization (and globalization) of the economy.  
The question is not whether constitutional doctrine should change in response to 
these factual changes in the world; it already has.  Consider the “dormant Commerce 
Clause” doctrine.  That doctrine started out with at least some tie to the constitutional 
text; it simply read Article I’s grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
as exclusive, thereby forbidding state regulation of commerce “among the several 
States.”86  As the national economy became more integrated, however, it became 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between interstate and intrastate commerce.  That 
made it impossible to enforce a rule that the states could not regulate in ways that 
impacted interstate commerce, much as it made it equally difficult to enforce a rule that 
Congress could not regulate in-state activities.  The dormant commerce doctrine 
accordingly morphed into a quite different rule that simply barred the states from 
discriminating against out of staters.87
82 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter 
Lessig, Fidelity]; Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
125 [hereinafter Lessig, Translating Federalism].
83 Id. at 127.
84 Id. at 127, 145.
85
 Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 132.
86 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824).
87 [Cite Lessig]  Vestiges of a second rule – that the states may not impose undue burdens on interstate 
commerce, even if they are non-discriminatory – may also survive.  [cite Pike]  But like the anti-
discrimination rule, the Pike balancing test bears almost no relation to the constitutional text.  In any event, 
the balancing test now seems all but abandoned.  [cite]
13-Jul-04 draft
19
This rule makes a fair amount of functional sense, and it has a formal quality that 
makes it relatively easy for courts to enforce.88  But the doctrine no longer bears any 
recognizable relationship to constitutional text.  Once one abandons the rule that at least 
some Article I powers are simply exclusive, there is no longer any warrant to read the 
Commerce Clause as limiting state powers.  Certainly the Clause says nothing about 
discrimination, and the presence of other constitutional provisions that do – the Privileges 
and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses – suggests that textualist attention is best 
directed elsewhere.  Better to understand modern dormant Commerce Clause as a 
doctrinal construction meant to facilitate the structural needs of the federal system as a 
whole.
A similar transition has occurred in “affirmative” Commerce Clause doctrine.  
Prior to 1937, the courts focused on whether an act of Congress addressed inter- or 
intrastate commerce.  Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons had insisted that “[t]he 
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the 
language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a 
State.”89 Lopez and its progeny, however, focus simply on whether the regulated activity 
is “commercial” at all.  The Court has said that the effects of such “commercial” 
activi ties will be aggregated across the range of similar activity occurring nationwide, 
thus virtually guaranteeing a finding that the activity “substantially affects” interstate 
commerce.90  This concession to the integrated national market arguably departs from the 
text by effectively reading “among the several states” out of Article I.  The new doctrine 
thus represents a doctrinal compromise meant to balance the system’s need for some line 
of demarcation between Congress’s broadest power and the States’ reserved authority 
with the recognition that the old line – the textual line – simply didn’t prove coherent or 
workable in actual application.  Current doctrine nods to the text by carrying over the 
88 [consider critiques of DCC]
89
 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.  See also [cites]
90
 The classic “aggregation” case is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, ___ (1942), which held that 
Congress could regulate even the wheat crop of a single farmer on a substantial effects theory, because the 
aggregate effects of the activities of all similarly-situated farmers would affect the national economy.  But 
Lopez made clear that the underlying activity must be commercial in nature to support this move:
Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority 
over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a 
school zone does not. . . .  Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do 
with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms. n3 Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It 
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of 
or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially 
affects interstate commerce.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61.
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insistence that regulated activity be “commercial,” but Lopez’s looser standard amounts 
to “fidelity” only in the adaptive sense that Professor Lessig has described.91
As the examples just discussed suggest, changes in the factual context of 
federalism have been accompanied by changes amounting to failure of the original 
enforcement strategies.  I have already described how the Constitution’s original strategy 
for allocating and balancing federal and state powers relied on enumeration of federal 
powers and reservation of the remainder to the States.  “Dual federalism” was the most 
natural form for this strategy to take, and it counted heavily on the feasibility of drawing 
a sharp line between exclusive spheres of state and federal authority.  That line-drawing 
effort ultimately failed, both because of changes in the factual world – the increasing 
integration of the economy, which blurred lines between inter- and intra-state commerce 
– and because the Founders may simply have underestimated the indeterminacy of 
Article I’s enumerative language and the doctrinal rules that courts developed to 
implement it.  I doubt whether the factual change can wholly account for the failure; after 
all, it seems likely that the economy was sufficiently integrated to link inter- and intra-
state markets (e.g., the price of wheat in New Jersey and the price of bread in New York) 
even in the Founders’ day.  Rather, I suspect that the failure was in substantial part a 
failure of doctrine – the failure of courts to develop doctrinal tests that could command 
widespread acceptance and support for separating state and federal power.92
Whatever the cause, the failure of the original enforcement strategy requires either 
that we accept a basic alteration in the character of our federal system or that new 
doctrines be constructed to preserve the original norm of balance.  In reality, the choice is 
probably between a stark version of the former and some combination of the two.  No 
doctrinal proposal on the table today would come close to restoring the particular balance 
struck in 1789; an expanded federal role is simply a fact of modern life.93  By balance, 
then, I mean simply that some meaningful measure of state autonomy is constitutionally 
guaranteed.  Fidelity to even this more modest objective, however, will require some 
measure of doctrinal innovation in lieu of a strong doctrine of enumerated powers.  That 
is not to say that a reconstructed enumerated powers doctrine – one that does not depend 
on defining mutually-exclusive state and federal spheres – cannot play some role.94  But 
that sort of constraint seems likely to be relatively weak.  If that is correct, then 
91 [cite]  More rigorous fidelity to the text would no doubt look much like Justice Thomas’s concurrence in 
Lopez, which recommended uprooting a much broader swath of jurisprudence and returning to a far 
narrower view of federal power.  [cites]
92 See infra TAN ___ (discussing the “Frankfurter constraint”).  Whether we should even call this a 
“failure” is itself a question.  After all, dual federalism endured for over a hundred years.  It may be a 
mistake to expect greater permanence from any doctrinal construct.  Nor was the failure necessarily 
unanticipated by at least some of the Founders.  See RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 176-77; see also infra TAN 
___ (discussing Madison’s misgivings about the enumerated powers strategy). 
93 [Thomas acknowledgment of precedent in Lopez]
94 See, e.g., [Kramer, Understanding Federalism]; Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent 
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 157-61 (2001) [hereinafter 
Young, Dual Federalism]. (arguing that post -Lopez commerce jurisprudence plays a useful role without 
returning to the assumptions of dual federalism).
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“translation” of the federal balance will likely require doctrinal innovation that is less 
directly grounded in constitutional text.     
A third aspect of change in the Constitution’s institutional context has to do with 
the maturation of the system itself.  By “maturation,” I mean the tendency of successful 
constitutional systems to outlive the immediate set of problems that gave rise to them.  
Structural provisions are often drafted against a historical and institutional background in 
which particular problems loom large.  Gordon Wood has recounted, for example, how 
the first wave of state constitutions after Independence were designed to compensate for 
the experience of unchecked executive authority under George III and his royal 
governors.95  By 1787, however, the powerful state legislatures that those initial 
constitutions created had themselves come to be perceived as a threat to liberty – a threat 
with which the original documents, with their focus on cabining executive power, were 
ill-equipped to deal.96  This sort of change presents two obvious alternative responses:  
The constitution can be amended again, reorienting its structural provisions against the 
new threat, or the constitution’s current interpreters can work to adapt the structure more 
incrementally.  The latter option would include not only doctrinal innovation by courts 
but also subconstitutional changes to statutory law or institutional practice by the political 
branches.    
Our own national constitution has moved in a number of ways beyond the original 
set of problems that inspired the Philadelphia drafters, and these changes have important 
implications for federalism.  With good reason, the Founders perceived the central 
problem in moving from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution as one of re-
establishing and strengthening the central government.97  James Madison insisted, for 
example, “that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of 
the [State Governments] than of the [federal Government].”98  The original document 
thus includes a ringing statement of national supremacy in Article VI; the considerably 
more ambiguous affirmation of state sovereignty in the Tenth Amendment comes in as a 
response to post-Philadelphia criticism.  And judicial review of federalism issues was 
initially conceived99 – and implemented by the Marshall Court100 – primarily as a tool for 
reining in centrifugal impulses in the States.101  As late as the early Twentieth Century, 
95 [cite Gordon Wood]
96 Id. at ___.
97 [cites]  I discuss this point further infra in Section ___.
98
 Federalist No. 45, supra note ___, at 310 [Cooke].
99 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 81-82 (recounting that judicial review was endorsed early on at 
Philadelphia as an alternative to Madison’s proposal for a general congressional negative on state laws); 
[others].
100
 The Marshall Court struck down only one federal statute – the minor provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act 
at issue in Marbury v. Madison.  On the other side of the ledger, it invalidated ___ state laws.
101 See generally [Kramer, Politics].
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes could contemplate dispensing with judicial review of 
Acts of Congress while insisting on the need to check state legislation.102
The pendulum of federalism has swung far indeed since then.  The Federal 
Government is here to stay, and its supremacy over the States is largely unquestioned.  
This is not to say that centrifugal forces have disappeared.  The Supreme Court still sees 
a need to rein in state protectionism under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,103 and
it has increasingly asserted authority to close off state forays into foreign affairs.104  The 
system has “matured,” however, in the sense that threats to the federal balance are at least 
as likely to come from the national direction.  These threats take any number of forms, 
including federal forays into traditional fields of state regulation like education105 or local 
telephone service,106 congressional imposition of unfunded mandates107 and the 
increasing dependence of state governments on federal funding grants,108 the 
federalization of crime,109 and federal efforts to quash state positions on social and moral 
issues that differ from the national majority view.110  The extent to which any of these 
developments is a bad thing is, not surprisingly, both contestable and contested; what 
seems clear, however, is that centralizing pressures are considerably stronger now than 
they were in the early Republic.
The constitutional structure was created with a second problem in mind alongside 
the weakness of the central authority.  That problem was the “tyranny of the majority,” 
102 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (Harcourt 1920) (“I do not think the 
United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the 
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”).
103 [Camps Newfound; Fulton v. Faulkner]
104 See American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003) (invalidating California’s Holocaust 
Vic tim Insurance Relief Act on the ground it interfered with national foreign policy); Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (finding Massachusetts’ program disadvantaging would-be 
state contractors that did business in Burma to be impliedly preempted by federal legislation); see generally
Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 177-85 (arguing that Crosby was overly aggressive in 
squelching state policy bearing on foreign affairs).
105 [No Child Left Behind Act]; Kate Zernike, Attacks on Education Law Leave Democrats in a Bind, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at ___ (reporting Democratic presidential candidates’ criticism of the Act, in 
part on grounds that it usurps local control of education); Political Battle Surges over Bush Education 
Policy, CNN.com, Jan. 8, 2004 (reporting criticisms that federal law imposes mandates without adequate 
funding) (available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/08/elec.04.prez.bush.education/index.html) (last visited Jan. 
11, 2004).
106
 [Breyer dissent in Iowa Utilities Bd.]
107 [cite on problem of mandates]  The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, [cite], was supposed to alleviate 
this problem, but the Act simply imposes a fairly loose procedural constraint on such mandates.  [cite 
Harvard Law Rev recent legislation piece].   Since UMRA’s enactment, at least ___ additional mandates 
have been enacted.  [cite]  One of the most important is the No Child Left Behind Act, see supra note 105.
108 [cites]
109 [cites]
110 [medical mariujuana in CA (Kozinski concurrence); right to die in OR (Alex Kaplan note); gay 
marriage in VT]
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which plays a central role in the Founders’ analysis of the problem of faction.  In 
Federalist 10, for example, Madison rather blithely states that “[i]f a faction consists of 
less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the 
majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote”; the difficult problem arises “[w]hen 
a majority is included in a faction.”111  This focus on majority tyranny colors some of the 
Founders’ most important views on federalism; in particular, it gives rise to their 
assumption that the national government will be less vulnerable to faction than the 
governments of the several states.112
Here, too, the passage of time requires us to expand the universe of potential 
threats to the integrity of the system.  Certainly there are areas and issues concerning 
which Madison’s analysis still seems to hold true, and the national government may 
enjoy significant advantages over state governments in protecting local minorities from 
local majorities.113  But as the scope, institutions, and responsibilities of government at all 
levels has expanded over time, more recent political science has also produced a strong 
counter-current critical of Madison’s “failure to appreciate the disproportionate influence 
that can be wielded on a national level by certain groups that may be relatively small in 
numbers but that are cohesive and can avoid the problem of too many free riders.”114
This literature suggests that “the diffusion of power among a multiplicity of governments 
may increase the difficulties such groups experience in realizing their objectives.”115  Our 
contemporary structure must thus guard against two kinds of factions – majorities and
cohesive minorities – and Madison’s assumption of national superiority at combating 
faction can no longer be taken for granted.116
The third and possibly most basic way in which our institutions have “matured” 
involves a transformation in the range of functions and responsibilities ascribed to 
government.  The Founders seem to have presupposed a rather minimalist vision of 
government responsibilities.  This vision enabled them to rest much of the vertical and 
horizontal separation of powers on institutional mechanisms that also tended to hamstring 
111
 Federalist No. 10, supra note ___, at 60 [Cooke].
112 See, e.g., id. at 64 (“Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you 
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other 
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own 
strength, and to act in unison with each other.”) (emphasis added); id. (asserting that “the same advantage, 
which a Republic has over a Democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a 
small Republic – is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it”). 
113 See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 45 (1995); [others]
114 SHAPIRO, supra note 113, at 79; see also [others].
115 SHAPIRO, supra note 113, at 80; see also [others].
116
 Madison’s argument has also been undermined by the maturation of the States themselves into large 
political communities by the standards of Madison’s day.  The total United States population in 1790 was 
around 3.9 million.  See TIME ALMANAC 2003, at 120.  In 2000, the State of California alone boasted 33.8 
million inhabitants.  Id.  The United States in 1790 had slightly more people than the State of Oregon (the 
28th most populous state) today.  Id.  The largest state in 1790 – Madison’s own Virginia, with 
approximately three-quarters of a million people – was about the size of the city of San Francisco or 
Indianapolis today.  See 2000 Census: US Municipalities Over 50,000: Ranked by 2000 (available at 
http://www.demographia.com/db-uscity98.htm) (visited Oct. 12, 2003).
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governmental action.  The division of the legislature through bicameralism, for example, 
as well as the provision for Presidential veto, makes federal statutes hard to enact.  Brad 
Clark and others have demonstrated that the proliferation of “veto gates” throughout our 
national lawmaking institutions – that is, mechanisms that allow particular actors to derail 
or delay national action – is central not only to the separation of powers but also to 
federalism.117  A national government that can act only with difficulty, after all, will tend 
to leave considerable scope for state autonomy.118
Over time, however, the People have demanded that government take on a wider 
and more activist role, and the constitutional separation of powers has come under 
pressure as a result.  In particular, the nondelegation doctrine has slipped from being a 
potentially important constitutional rule assigning lawmaking authority outside the 
constitutionally-prescribed process to a less pervasive canon of construction limiting 
delegations that implicate particular constitutional values.119  It is now fair to say that 
most federal law is made not through the cumbersome method prescribed by Article I but 
through administrative procedures in executive agencies.120  The effect of this shift – and 
the resulting vast expansion in federal lawmaking capacity and output – on federalism 
has only recently become a subject of study.121  It is true that state governments have also 
become far more activist governments than their early Republic counterparts.122
Nonetheless, it would be surprising if the small-government mechanisms that the 
Founders assumed would protect state autonomy work as well in a big-government age.
117 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 
1341-42 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers]; see also [others?].
118 See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117, at 1325 (“[E]ven when national power is quite 
unquestioned in a given situation, constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures frequently operate to 
screen out attempts by the federal government to exercise such authority. The states are the direct 
beneficiaries of this screening mechanism because the federal government's inability to adopt ‘the supreme 
Law of the Land’ leaves states free to govern.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Young, Two Cheers, 
supra note ___, at 1361-64 (making a similar argument).
119 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000) (“Federal courts 
commonly vindicate not a general nondelegation doctrine, but a series of more specific and smaller, though 
quite important, nondelegation doctrines. Rather than invalidating federal legislation as excessively open-
ended, courts hold that federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities unless and until 
Congress has expressly authorized them to do so.”).  Professor Sunstein appears to view these canons as 
more pervasive and effective limits on the federal regulatory state than I do, but that disagreement is a 
subject for another article.  We share the view that the delegation doctrine has not disappeared but has 
changed in form. 
120 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“For some time, the sheer 
amount of law -- the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the operation of government -
- made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional 
process.”); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The rise of 
administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century. . . . They have 
become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories . . 
. .”).
121 See, e.g., Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117; [others].
122 See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 483, ___ (1997) [hereinafter Gardbaum, New Deal].
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These sorts of changes, like the others I have discussed, require corresponding 
changes in federalism doctrine if the original commitment to balance is to survive.  
Indeed, one can understand a number of important doctrinal innovations as responsive to 
the maturing of our institutions.  For example, the Federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights 
has evolved, through constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation, from a set of 
provisions narrowly directed at the national government to a charter of basic guarantees 
comprehensively directed at all American governments.123  Although this shift brought a 
number of important changes, one was an expansion of the sort of federalism concerns 
that courts must enforce.  The potential of individual rights decisions to restrict the 
autonomy of state governments is well understood.124  Prior to incorporation, this was not 
a concern of the federal courts.  While state courts might restrict the autonomy of state 
governments by broadly construing individual rights provisions of their own state 
constitutions, this raised no issue of federalism; these restrictions were imposed by the 
states on themselves.  The autonomy of state political systems in rights situations was 
guaranteed by the federal structure itself, which simply did not apply federal rights 
provisions to state governments.  There was no need for judicially- created federalism 
doctrines to add to that safeguard.
After incorporation, however, state policies (including, perhaps most importantly, 
state criminal convictions) became subject to override by federal rights provisions.  It is 
now commonplace to think of a case like Lawrence v. Texas,125 which recognized a right 
to engage in gay sex under the Due Process Clause, as raising significant issues of 
federalism:  In effect, Lawrence nationalized a core issue of gay rights by articulating a 
federal right binding on the States.126 While the Supreme Court tended to reject 
federalism-based opposition to the notion of incorporation per se,127 it responded to the 
threat to state autonomy by crafting a number of doctrines that protected state autonomy 
in other ways.  In particular, it created a number of remedial doctrines, including the 
abstention doctrines128 and judge-made limits on federal habeas corpus relief,129 which 
limit the practical impact of federal rights on state autonomy.130  Incorporation brought 
123 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, ___ (1968) (noting that nearly all the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights have now been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to 
bind the States).
124 [cites]; see also Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 157-59 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of a broad right of association in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), 
constrained state autonomy to regulate discrimination).
125
 [cite]
126
 Whether the Court will take the further step of nationalizing the related – but far more controversial –
question of gay marriage remains to be seen.
127 [cite Harlan dissents]
128 [cites]
129 [cites]
130
 I do not claim that these doctrines were exclusively a response to incorporation.  Some, such as Pullman
abstention, originated in response to claims under provisions like the Equal Protection Clause that had 
always applied to the States.  [cite]  I do think, however, that incorporation gave substantial impetus to 
these sorts of doctrines by proliferating the federal rights with potential to undermine state autonomy.
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the Federal Constitution close to being a complete charter of rights, with the consequence 
that federalism safeguards against over-expansive interpretations of rights had to be 
created within federal constitutional law.
Likewise, the fading of the doctrine of enumerated powers has brought the 
Constitution much closer to describing a comprehensive government.  In such a 
comprehensive system, state autonomy cannot adequately be protected simply by relying 
on the jurisdictional limitations of federal institutions.  Instead, limits on federal power 
must be developed within the purview of the federal constitution itself – despite the fact 
that that constitution could not have originally been intended as a complete description of 
the federal relationship.  The Rehnquist Court has been struggling with this doctrinal task 
since 1991, when it stepped back from the brink of total judicial abdication in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft.131    Justifying that effort and suggesting how it ought to proceed is the principle 
burden of this essay.
The notion that courts should formulate doctrinal constraints on federal power in 
order to “translate” the Founders’ notion of a federal balance into modern circumstances 
seems more controversial than many other contemporary instances of translation.132 The 
controversy derives from a variety of sources, including the painful history of the Court’s 
effort to impose similar limits prior to 1937133 and the perception of many current legal 
academics, who came of age in the 1960s, that state governments are a retrograde force in 
American society.134  The depth of this opposition requires careful consideration of the 
appropriate role of courts in translating the federal balance.  Section B of this Part 
addresses this issue as a matter of institutional choice, comparing the suitability of the 
judiciary to decide federalism questions with that of other institutions.  Concluding that at 
least some judicial role is warranted, I take up in Section C the question of interpretive
choice.  That section sketches an approach to choosing federalism doctrines that I then 
flesh out in the balance of the essay.
Throughout the course of the discussion that follows, however, it is important to 
remember that “translating federalism” is not a proposal in a law review article – it is an 
activity in which courts have been engaged, with varying degrees of success, since the 
founding of the Republic.  The relevant questions are whether they have done it 
adequately, and what criteria they might employ to do it better.    
131
 510 U.S. 452 (1991) (imposing a clear statement rule of statutory construction to limit Congress’s ability 
to regulate state institutions).  The Court had flirted with such abdication in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 549 (1995).
132 See, e.g., Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 132-35 (describing the evolution of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to cope with technological changes that threatened individual privacy).
133 See, e.g., [Souter dissent in Lopez comparing majority opinion to Lochner]
134 See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 67 
(2001) (“In my formative years as a lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s and 1970s, [federalism] 
was regularly invoked as a bulwark against federal efforts to prevent racial oppression, political 
persecution, and police misconduct.”); but see Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 133-62 (arguing that the 
equation of federalism with a particular political orientation is a fundamental mistake).
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B. Institutional Choice
A discussion of federalism doctrine necessarily assumes that courts should have a 
role in federalism disputes.  For some, the very notion of “federalism” presupposes a 
judicial umpire to settle controversies between the center and the periphery.  One oft-
quoted European formulation, for example, holds that “[f]ederalism is present whenever a 
divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired 
by the supreme court of the common legal order.”135  But the proper role of courts in 
disputes over allocation of authority in our own federal system has been deeply 
controversial.136  Prominent commentators – and some Supreme Court justices – have 
argued that courts should not “intervene” in federalism disputes; rather, those 
controversies should be left entirely to politics.137  The participation of courts in 
federalism disputes, and thus the relevance of judicial doctrine to such disputes, cannot 
be taken for granted.
The question is, at bottom, one of institutional choice.  Federalism posits a goal –
balancing national and state authority – but, as Neil Komesar has insisted, we must still 
ask which institutions are best positioned to pursue that goal.138  This analysis, moreover, 
135
 Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263 
(1990).   See also  Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 321 
(Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999) (observing that most divided power systems envision a 
bound ary-policing role for courts); PAUL JACKSON & PATRICIA LEOPOLD, O. HOOD PHILLIPS AND 
JACKSON: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (8th ed. 2001) (British textbook, observing that 
judicial power to invalidate legislation “is comparatively rare . . . except in federal states . . . where some 
check is necessary to preserve the rights of the federation and its component members”).
136 Compare, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing for little or no judicial role), with Lynn A. Baker, Putting the 
Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001) (responding to 
Kramer); Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46 
VILL. L. REV. 1069 (2001) (same).
137 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT ___ (1980); [Blackmun in Garcia; Souter in 
Morrison]. Putting the question this way – and it usually is put this way, see, e.g., William Marshall, 
American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 153 
(1998) (describing the core debate as one over “judicial intervention to enforce federalism”) – is itself 
somewhat misleading.  Consider a case like United States v. Lopez, involving the constitutionality of the 
federal Gun Free School Zones Act as an exercise of the Commerce Power.  Refusing to “intervene” in that 
dispute would have meant declaring Mr. Lopez’s defense to his criminal prosecution – that the law he was 
charged with violating exceeded Congress’s power – nonjusticiable.  While some commentators have 
suggested that courts should do exactly that in federalism disputes, see [Choper]; it is not what the Federal 
Government or the dissenters urged; rather, they asked the Court to validate the federal statute.  The 
question in most cases is thus not whether the courts will intervene – a decision on the merits either way 
constitutes a (usually decisive) intervention – but rather whether the courts will second-guess the judgment 
of the federal political branches that the action they have taken is valid and/or supersedes state policy.
As I discuss further in Part ___, I think the justices who are often read as urging courts to stay out of 
federalism disputes are really making a much narrower argument.
138 See generally NEIL H. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994) (“Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law 
and public policy.  They are inextricably related.”).
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must be comparative in nature.  It is not enough to say that this or that institution is well-
or ill-suited to handle a certain set of questions.  Instead, the likely performance of each 
institution must be compared with that of the alternatives.  “Issues at which an institution, 
in the abstract, may be good may not need that institution because one of the alternative 
institutions may be even better.  In turn, tasks that strain the abilities of an institution may 
wisely be assigned to it anyway if the alternatives are even worse.”139
Comparative institutional analysis is relevant to federalism questions in at least 
two ways.  There are what we might call “first order” questions that involve allocating 
decisionmaking authority between federal and state institutions.  For example, should we 
entrust the states with primary responsibility to resolve the issues of physician-assisted 
suicide or gay marriage, or should those questions be resolved at the federal level?  Then 
there are the “second order” questions, which involve choosing institutions to decide the 
first order questions.  In other words, should the allocation of authority over physician-
assisted suicide or gay marriage be settled by Congress, the Executive, or a court 
deciding the matter as a question of constitutional law?  The first order questions are 
important and interesting, but my concern here is with the second order issue:  Which 
institution should draw and police the boundary between state and federal authority?
This turns out to be a very complex question.  I want to make two points about it 
in this section.  The first is that once we start thinking about the factors involved in 
comparative institutional analysis, the “question” turns out be incredibly multifarious.  It 
seems highly unlikely that all the various incarnations of the boundary-drawing question 
will have the same answer, or that the answer to many of them will involve a categorical 
choice of one institution over all the others.  The second point is that comparative 
institutional analysis functions most comfortably at the level of institutional design.  
Once we shift to the perspective of participants within the legal system as it is presently 
constituted, opportunities to shift decisionmaking authority altogether in response to 
comparative institutional analysis narrow considerably.  Institutional analysis is more 
likely to influence how decisions are made by the institutions involved; for courts, this 
means that institutional analysis may be most important in shaping doctrine rather than in 
determining whether courts may decide federalism issues at all.
1. One Issue, Many Questions
The debate in the federalism literature – and in judicial opinions in federalism 
cases – is whether courts should decide federalism issues.  The same arguments are 
routinely imported from one doctrinal context to another.  For example, Herbert 
Wechsler’s notion that the political process generally protects federalism better than 
courts140 was transformed by Justice Blackmun into an argument for judicial abdication 
in the Garcia case,141 which involved judge-made restraints on Congressional action that 
admittedly fell within the commerce power.  Then Justice Stevens invoked it in Kimel, a 
case about state sovereign immunity from suits by private litigants.142  Finally, Justice 
139 KOMESAR, supra note 138, at 6.
140 See Wechsler, supra note 17.
141
 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 549 (1995).
142
 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93-95 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Souter took up the same notion in Morrison, a case about whether courts should enforce 
the limits of the commerce power itself.143  We frequently treat the who-should-draw-the-
boundary issue, in other words, as a unitary question.
That strikes me as a mistake.  Thinking about the question from the perspective of 
comparative institutional analysis can help us start to see why.  This perspective typically 
considers such factors as the distribution of stakes that various actors have in an issue, the 
costs of information about the issue, the costs of participating in the alternative 
institutions, and the expertise and scale of those institutions.144  But surely these factors 
will vary considerably depending on the particular aspect of federalism under discussion.  
The costs of information about issues of basic legislative power, such as the scope of the 
Commerce Clause, may be quite different from the costs of understanding the ins and 
outs of the relationships between state and federal courts.  Likewise, the likelihood that 
state institutional actors will intervene to protect their own structural interests may be 
considerably greater when we are talking about suits by private actors than limits on 
Congress’s spending power.  The point is simply that if we run the comparative 
institutional analysis on each of the various federalism questions currently in dispute, we 
have little reason to think that the results will point uniformly in one direction.
A second problem is that issues of federalism generally arise in the context of a 
particular policy that either the federal or a state government seeks to implement.  
Congress, for example, may wish to ban possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school, 
thereby raising an issue whether such legislation falls within the scope of the Commerce 
Clause.145  The participation of and positions taken by various actors are likely to be 
driven at least as much by the particular policy at stake (How do you feel about gun 
control?) as by the issue of allocating authority between the Nation and the States.  Even 
a casual observer of recent debates about federalism in Congress will recall instances in 
which one political party or the other has championed state autonomy depending on its 
views on the underlying policy issue.  Republicans – the supposed party of state 
autonomy – have pressed for national uniformity on physician-assisted suicide and 
partial-birth abortions;146 Democrats have rediscovered the virtues of state autonomy on 
tort reform and regulation of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).147
A really sound comparative institutional analysis would have to assess the various 
key factors in terms of both the federalism issue and the underlying policy issue.  That 
would likely be awfully hard to do, and the results would not be broadly applicable to all 
cases of the same federalism question.  After all, the dynamics of institutional 
participation on the basic federalism question (Who decides how broad the Commerce 
Clause is?) might be quite different in a context involving a different underlying policy 
issue.  All of the factors crucial to comparative institutional analysis – the distribution of 
143
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
144 See generally KOMESAR, supra note 138, at 7-8.
145 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
146 [cites]
147 See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., States’ Rights Isn’t the Issue, WASH. POST, June 22, 2001, at A25.
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stakes, the costs of information, etc. – are likely to vary depending on whether the 
question is Congress’s authority to legislate on, for instance, tort reform, abortion, or 
physician-assisted suicide.  
There may well be an important place for comparative institutional analysis of 
federalism questions, but it will have to be done retail rather than wholesale.  That 
suggests that categorical polar positions on judicial review – courts should always have 
the final say on federalism issues, or courts should stay away from such questions 
entirely – are misguided, at least from the pragmatic perspective of institutional analysis.  
My argument here would not answer the quite different claim that the Constitution itself 
mandates a categorical institutional choice.148   But to the extent that functional 
considerations guide the choice of institutions, a categorical choice of either judicial or 
political channels for resolution of federalism disputes seems out of place.
2. The Obligation to Decide
As Neil Komesar has observed, institutional choice “is about deciding who 
decides.”149  Institutional analysts generally seem to assume that the institutions being 
compared – say, courts and legislatures – are equally free to decide or not to decide the 
issue in question.  Critics of a judicial role on federalism questions often seem to make 
the same assumption that courts are free not to decide when such questions are put to 
them.  But the issue of when a court may decide not to decide an issue presented to it is 
itself a complicated, doctrine-intensive question, and I argue that this question severely 
limits the ability of courts to forego decision simply because another institution might 
have comparative advantages relevant to the issue.  This does not make institutional 
choice considerations irrelevant to courts; rather, those considerations are chiefly relevant 
to the types of doctrines that courts should employ in particular kinds of cases, which will 
in turn control the extent of judicial involvement with particular sorts of issues.  
Practitioners of institutional choice must distinguish between two perspectives:  
the perspective of institutional design, and the perspective of participants in the system 
that exists.  Institutional analyses seem generally to proceed from the former perspective; 
they ask, If we were setting up a system to resolve a particular kind of issue, what sort of 
institutions would we choose?150  My primary interest here, by contrast, is in what real 
courts should do when confronted with real federalism cases.  Comparative institutional 
analysis thus ought to inform their choice among the options that the legal system 
provides but cannot supply a basis for radical alterations in the system itself.  
The most obvious instance of institutional design occurs in the drafting or 
amendment of the Constitution.  But other opportunities exist outside the confines of 
explicit constitutional change.  If Congress is convinced that federal courts are not well-
suited to decide particular federalism questions, for example, it may be able to restrict 
148 [cites]  My arguments about the political question doctrine in the next subsection are at least partially 
responsive to such claims.  See infra TAN ___. 
149 KOMESAR, supra note 138, at 3.
150
 As my friend Adrian Vermeule likes to say, “Once you’ve drunk from the heady waters of institutional 
design, you never go back.”
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their jurisdiction over such questions.151  Likewise, courts have some occasion to make 
design decisions by defining the contours of the political question doctrine, which might 
take certain federalism issues out of the judicial purview altogether.152  Neither of these 
approaches, however, has played a major role with respect to federalism.  Congress did 
strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to decide a case involving the constitutionality of 
Reconstruction – certainly a federalism issue of the first magnitude.153  But since that 
time there has been no significant effort to confine the Court’s jurisdiction over 
federalism questions.154
Nor has the political question doctrine played a significant role in federalism 
disputes, at least since the Court declared a Guaranty Clause claim non-justiciable in 
1849.155  Prior to Baker v. Carr,156 the Court might have chosen to make the political 
151
 The issue of constitutional limitations on Congress’s power to restrict federal jurisdiction is one of the 
most famously murky issues in constitutional law.  See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to 
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); 
Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the 
Jurisdiction of the federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).  The most important practical limit is that 
wherever Congress seeks to use federal courts to enforce federal law, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (federal criminal prosecution in federal court), the federal courts necessarily will have the 
opportunity to consider the defense that the federal law in question falls outside Congress’s power.
152 See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (rejecting as nonjusticiable a request to settle the 
locus of state governmental authority under the Guarantee Clause).
153 See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (upholding Congress’s action as valid under the 
Exceptions Clause of Article III); but see Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) (reading Congress’s 
action very narrowly to permit Supreme Court review of a similar case).
154 The only clear instance of jurisdiction-stripping since Reconstruction did bear some relation to 
federalism concerns, but its practical significance seems relatively minor.  One provision in the 1996 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), barred Supreme 
Court review of federal court of appeals decisions granting or denying leave to state prisoners to file a 
second or successive petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus.  See generally Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 
651 (1996) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to this provision).  Restricting Supreme Court jurisdiction 
in habeas cases effectively denies the Court the opportunity itself to decide the proper allocation of 
authority between federal and state courts in state criminal litigation; in that sense, the 1996 Act raised an 
institutional design issue of the sort I have been discussing.  But the 1996 Act restricted only the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction (not the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary as a whole) over a small set of court of 
appeals decisions concerning a small subset of federal habeas petitions – appellate “gatekeeper” decisions 
denying the right to file a successive habeas petition.  AEDPA thus seems the exception proving the rule 
that jurisdiction-stripping has not been a favored vehicle for Congress to redesign the Constitution’s 
allocation of institutional authority to decide federalism disputes.
     Issues of federalism also helped prompt one of the major institutional re-design proposals of the last 
century:  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.  See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE 
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 133 (1995) 
(describing how the Old Court’s federalism and economic substantive due process cases together moved 
FDR to try and change the structure of the Court).  Interestingly, however, that plan did not seek to 
reallocate authority to decide federalism issues; instead, it simply sought to change the result in such cases 
by appointing justices friendly to the President’s broad view of federal legislative authority.
155 See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, ___ (“Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to 
decide what government is the established one in a State.”).
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question doctrine into a general vehicle for comparative institutional analysis.   But Baker
began a process of transforming a general prudential inquiry into a basically rule-bound, 
narrow exception to a general principle of judicial review.157  The Court’s most recent 
pronouncement, in Nixon v. United States,158 makes clear that non-justiciability turns on 
two of the factors identified in Baker:  a textual commitment of the issue in question to 
the political branches, and a lack of judicially manageable standards for deciding the 
issue.159 Neither of these factors fit comfortably with the notion that courts may decline 
to decide federalism issues if, based on a comparative institutional analysis, they find 
some other institution better suited to the task.  The first factor – textual commitment –
obviously substitutes a text-based inquiry for institutional analysis.160  The second –
judicially manageable standards – does seem more consonant with an inquiry into judicial 
competence.161  It is, however, single-institutional in that so long as courts have 
manageable standards to decide, we do not ask whether some other institution could 
decide even better.  More important, it makes institutional analysis subservient to 
doctrine; only if doctrinal tools are wholly lacking can a court choose some other 
institution to decide.162
156
 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection claims for equal apportionment of state legislative 
districts are justiciable).
157 [cites]  A more prudential and broadly applicable version of the political question doctrine may survive 
in foreign affairs cases, [cites] although the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on such a case in 
several decades.  But even here, the most recent decisions tend to get rid of foreign affairs issues on other 
grounds, such as standing or ripeness.  See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003) (dismissing 
claim that war in Iraq was unconstitutional primarily on ripeness grounds; second ground suggested simple 
absence of a constitutional question on the merits). My own view is that Louis Henkin was largely correct 
to suggest that there is no such thing as a political question doctrine.  See generally Louis Henkin, Is There 
a Political Question Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (arguing that all political question cases amount to 
either the Court’s decision to “accept decisions by the political branches [as being] within their 
constitutional authority” or to “refuse some (or all) remedies for reasons of equity”).
158
 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
159 Id. at 228-33.
160 Id. at 228 (observing that under the first prong, “the courts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in 
question and determine whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed”); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-48 (1969) (conducting a detailed inquiry into the original understanding of 
the Qualifications Clauses of Article I, in order to determine whether those clauses were a “textual 
commitment” of qualifications controversies to Congress).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1990) (undertaking a limited inquiry 
into the judiciary’s institutional competence in rejecting argument for nonjusticiability under this prong).
162
 Moreover, I am not aware of any cases in which the Supreme Court has held an issue nonjusticiable 
based solely on a lack of judicially manageable standards, without also relying on a textual commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate branch.  That is certainly understandable:  As I note infra note ___, one sees 
claims that doctrinal standards are incoherent and unmanageable in virtually every area of constitutional 
law.  If that were itself a basis for declaring the cases non-justiciable, we could do away with much 
constitutional law altogether.  See Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 104-05.  Moreover, courts generally 
decide whether a particular sort of case raises a non-justiciable political question at the point in time that 
courts are first asked to venture into that area.  It will often be hard to predict at that stage whether the 
courts will prove able to formulate workable doctrine. The manageable standards prong thus may itself be 
13-Jul-04 draft
33
I am unaware of any serious argument that the text of the Constitution commits 
federalism issues generally to Congress, and few even seem to argue more narrowly that 
particular federalism questions can meet the high standard for non-justiciability set out in 
Baker and Nixon.163  Jesse Choper has called for courts to hold federalism issues non-
justiciable, but he relies on a prudential notion of non-justiciability that has little 
connection to the political question doctrine in its present form.164  The problem with that 
proposal, however, is that the political question doctrine exhausts the set of circumstances 
in which federal courts may refuse to decide a constitutional issue based on the 
characteristics of the issue itself.  Courts may decline decision on grounds of standing or 
ripeness or abstention, for example, but these principles turn on the characteristics of the 
parties, the timing of the claim, or the equitable nature of the relief requested.165  There is 
no general “out” for courts on the ground that some other institution may do a better 
job.166
From the perspective of institutional design, of course, we might choose to have a 
broader political question doctrine.167  At the level of ordinary practice, however, courts 
will generally be bound by John Marshall’s insistence that “[w]e have no more right to 
decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.  
The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.”168  That is emphatically not to 
say, however, that comparative institutional questions are irrelevant to issues of 
federalism.  Rather, they remain highly relevant – even central – to the decisions that 
particular institutions make as to how to handle these issues.  Institutions frequently 
decide, after all, to defer to other institutions in the decision of particular questions.  
unmanageable. It seems likely that textual commitment is a necessary – although probably not sufficient –
condition for nonjusticiability under current law.
163
 John Yoo notes, for example, that the majority opinion in Garcia – generally regarded as the high water 
mark of the notion that courts should not decide federalism issues – “did not resort to the political question 
doctrine.”  John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1332 (1997) 
[hereinafter Yoo, Judicial Safeguards]. 
164 See CHOPER, supra note 137, at 193.
165 [cites]
166
 To be sure, a fair amount of such comparative institutional analysis goes on in shaping justiciability 
doctrine.  Justice Scalia, for instance, has argued that the aspect of standing doctrine barring adjudication of 
“generalized grievances” stems from a judgment that widely-shared harms are best addressed through the 
political process, while focused injuries are better suited for courts.   See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 891 (1983).  The important 
point, though, is that the institutional analysis is internal to standing doctrine and must be accommodated to 
other, non-institutional aspects of standing doctrine.  One does not do comparative institutional analysis in 
its pure form in that context.
167
 A broad doctrine that held constitutional issues non-justiciable whenever comparative institutional 
analysis suggested that some other institution might perform better would, of course, throw much of 
constitutional law open to question.  That does not make the possibility uninteresting, of course, but I have 
no occasion to pursue it here.
168
 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).  This rule has exceptions, but they are rarely 
wholly prudential.  See, e.g., [Quackenbush] (holding that federal courts’ ability to dismiss claims on 
abstention grounds generally depends on whether the plaintiff seeks only equitable relief).
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Congress, for example, ordinarily has the power to draw some boundaries between state 
and federal authority by deciding when to preempt state law.  It may decide, however, 
that an executive agency could perform this task better in certain circumstances and 
delegate its preemptive power to the agency.169  Likewise, courts may adopt highly 
deferential federalism doctrine based on the comparative institutional judgment that the 
boundary between state and national authority ought ordinarily to be drawn by the 
political process. 
The argument that courts should not enforce federalism principles has generally 
been part and parcel of the “double standard” in constitutional law that grew up after the 
Supreme Court’s “switch in time” in 1937.170  Just as the courts have generally been 
unwilling to enforce notions of economic substantive due process after 1937, so too they 
have been reluctant to enforce principles of federalism, such as limits on the national 
commerce power.171  This notion of a “double standard” has been criticized in general172
and with particular regard to federalism.173  The important point for present purposes, 
however, is that the double standard has not generally taken the form of a categorical rule 
that courts may not decide economic substantive due process or federalism cases.174
Rather, the courts have simply fashioned doctrines on the merits that defer in most cases 
to judgments by political actors.   
We might term these sorts of decisions “second order” institutional choices 
because the delegations in question are subject to recall by the delegating institution; 
Congress, for example, can always reassume its control over preemption decisions 
169 See, e.g., Symens v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
Congress implicitly delegated authority to the Department of Agriculture to preempt state laws on cattle 
vaccines).
170 See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 10 (4th ed. 1982) (describing “a double standard of judicial attitude of judicial attitude, whereby 
governmental economic experimentation is accorded all but carte blanche by the courts, but alleged 
violations of individual civil rights are given meticulous judicial attention”).
171 See Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 75-76 (noting that federalism principles have been linked with 
economic substantive due process in constitutional “exile” after 1937).
172 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 70, at 267 (“[W]e should take the whole Constitution seriously.  We 
cannot legitimately pick and choose the clauses we want enforced.”).
173 See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to 
Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 797 (1985) (“It is no less legitimate and proper for the 
Supreme Court to concern itself with assuring the health of federalism as it is for the Court to uphold 
individual liberties as such. In neither case is abdication of the Court's proper role consistent with the 
principles inhering in the Constitution.”); Baker & Young, supra note 10, passim (arguing that none of the 
plausible rationales for a “double standard” justify a refusal to enforce federalism principles).
174
 One possible exeception is Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), in which Justice Black’s majority 
opinion asserted that the Court had abandoned entirely “the use of the ‘vague contours’ of the Due Process 
Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise”; such arguments 
should be “addressed to the legislature, not to us.”  Id. at ___.  But Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence, 
which simply stated that “this state measure bears a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible 
objective,” id. at ___, probably better states the governing law.  The Court has continued to suggest that it 
is willing to assess economic regulation under the rational basis test [see Coal Act case; slot machine 
case], although it never strikes such legislation down.
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notwithstanding its prior delegation to an executive agency.  That, however, hardly 
makes these choices unimportant.  The balance of this essay is concerned with the sorts 
of doctrine that courts should employ when called upon to draw lines between state and 
federal authority.  The institutional capacities of courts and other actors in the system are 
critical to that issue.  Institutional choice thus folds into the interpretive choices required 
in making federalism doctrine. 
C. Interpretive Choice
If we can establish that courts must play at least some role in the enforcement of 
federalism, then how do courts choose doctrine to fulfill that role?  The problem is one of 
interpretive choice, and I explore it in the remainder of this essay.  This Section simply 
introduces the problem and proposes some criteria which are then defended in succeeding 
pages.  
Adrian Vermeule has explained that interpretive choice typically involves “the 
selection of one interpretive doctrine, from a group of candidate doctrines, in the service 
of a goal specified by a higher-level theory of interpretation.”175  For present purposes, 
however, that description must be qualified in three ways.  First, choosing federalism 
doctrine does not truly involve “a choice among possible means to attain stipulated 
ends.”176  We may agree on a very general end – preservation of some notion of balance 
between national and state authority – and yet have very different notions of what 
elements of that balance are actually important.  Part II distinguishes between state 
“sovereignty,” defined as the unaccountability of state governmental institutions to 
federal actors and to their citizens, and state “autonomy,” by which I mean the state 
government’s right to make certain decisions and perform certain functions for its 
citizens.  These concepts overlap to some extent but differ widely in emphasis, and the 
choice of which sort of federalism “end” to pursue has important implications for 
doctrine.  I argue in Part III that we ought to consider state autonomy more important, but 
the primary point for present purposes is that the ends of federalism doctrine are 
contested.
The second qualification is that we are not choosing “one interpretive doctrine” 
for federalism questions.  As I have already discussed, issues of federalism arise in a vast 
array of different contexts, and it would be highly surprising if one interpretive doctrine 
could address them all.  My aim is rather to propose a set of more general doctrinal 
strategies to help guide the development of doctrine in particular contexts.  Part VII 
provides some examples of the sorts of doctrines that these strategies would favor, but it 
is far from an exhaustive list.
Finally, the exercise of interpretive choice generally presupposes that the 
institutional choice questions are settled.  As Professor Vermeule points out, 
“[i]nterpretive choice is the intra-institutional parallel to Komesar’s conception of the 
allocation of responsibilities among institutions.”177  But the institutional question is not 
175
 Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000).
176 Id. (emphasis added).
177
 Vermeule, supra note 175, at 91.
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settled here; rather, I have argued that outside the setting of ex ante institutional design, 
courts must generally address institutional issues in the context of choosing particular 
doctrines that are more or less deferential to other institutional actors.  As Larry Kramer 
has noted, “there is no single doctrine of judicial review . . . . [C]onstitutional law is filled 
with doctrines that require the Justices to defer in varying degrees to other 
decisionmakers acting in the realm of ordinary politics.”178  Even though I have ruled out 
wholesale judicial abdication of federalism issues to the political process, the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of courts vis-à-vis other actors plays an 
important role in shaping federalism doctrine. 
The use of institutional factors as tools to shape doctrine both enhances and 
constrains ordinary institutional analysis.  The remainder of this section considers two 
senses in which this is true.  The first is that since we are no longer making a binary 
choice between institutions, judicial doctrine may be used to reinforce rather than 
supplant the political branches’ own institutional mechanisms for handling federalism 
issues.  The second point is that while institutional analysts typically seem to assume that 
different institutions approaching the same problem will ask basically the same questions, 
judicial decision-making is actually quite different from action by the political branches.  
In particular, courts’ obligation to decide cases according to law imposes important 
burdens of coherence on judicial action.  Those burdens have played – and will continue 
to play – an important role in shaping federalism doctrine. 
1. Collaborative Enforcement
Institutional analysis of the allocation of authority over federalism questions 
sometimes seems to proceed as if one institution or another will have sole authority over 
a particular sort of question.  Either the courts are to “establish areas of state control that 
are to remain immune from federal regulation”179 or those questions must be “remit[ted] . 
. . to politics.”180  Other applications of comparative institutional analysis often qualify 
this binary model, of course, but the qualifications often seem to assume that we are still 
simply allocating particular aspects of an issue to one institution or the other.181  I am 
suggesting here, however, that institutional analysis should primarily shape judicial 
doctrine, and doctrine is sufficiently flexible to open up a third possibility – that is, that 
one institution’s activity on a particular question might be tailored primarily to helping 
another institution decide that question in an optimal way.  
What I have in mind is the notion, prominent in the constitutional theory of our 
Founders, that structural constraints on federal political actors ought generally to be self-
enforcing.  As I have observed elsewhere, Madison’s famous account of separation of 
178
 Kramer, Politics, supra note 136, at 287. 
179
 Yoo, Judicial Safeguards, supra note 163, at 1312.
180
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
181
 Professor Komesar’s discussion of tort reform, for example, often seems to take this tack by suggesting 
that judicial decisionmaking should predominate on issues with a particular distribution of information and 
decision costs, while political institutions should control on other issues.  See generally KOMESAR, supra 
note 138, at 171-95. But he also occasionally qualifies that categorical view by noting techniques of shared 
responsibility, such as judicial narrowing constructions of legislative enactments.  See id. at 193.
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powers and federalism in Federalist 51 does not mention judicial review as an 
enforcement mechanism; rather, it depends primarily on the ambitions of the multifarious 
state and federal institutional actors to keep one another in check.182  Subsequent 
experience has shown, however, that these institutional mechanisms often function 
imperfectly.183  That, in turn, suggests an intermediate role for courts – not as alternative 
decision-makers, but as collaborators who sit to ensure that the essential checks and 
balances within the political branches remain in place.
This is the basic idea of “process federalism.”184 As will become clear, I doubt 
that process-based doctrine is a complete answer to the problem of enforcing federalism.  
I do believe, however, that critics of the process approach have missed the vast potential 
that this sort of collaborative enforcement has for redressing some of the current 
imbalances in the system.185  If that potential is largely unrealized at present, it may be in 
part because the notion of process-based doctrine has not yet adequately been explored.  
Part V of this essay tries to go some distance toward that goal by probing the 
prerequisites for a self-enforcing federalism and identifying the ways in which judicial 
doctrine can promote that goal.
2. Judicial Decision-making and the Frankfurter Constraint
A second problem with institutional analysis is that it often seems to assume that 
the basic character of the decision to be made, once we choose the right institution to 
make it, does not vary according to which institution is chosen.186   But courts, 
legislatures, executive officials, and markets decide questions quite differently due to the 
constraints imposed by their institutional roles.  To assume that when we commit a given 
problem to a court rather than a legislature, the court will nevertheless ask the same 
question that the legislature would ask, is to disregard many of the rich differences 
between institutions that lie at the heart of institutional choice.  Choosing who decides 
often fundamentally affects what question will be decided.
182 See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, ___ (2001) 
[hereinafter Young, Two Cheers]; Federalist No. 51 [cite].  This does not mean that judicial enforcement is 
inappropriate; as Federalist 78 makes clear, the Framers expected some judicial role in boundary-
enforcement.  See Federalist No. 78, supra note ___, at 524-25.  But it does suggest that courts were not 
envisioned as the primary line of defense.
183 See infra Section ___.
184 See generally Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism 
after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341; Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of 
Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21-25 [hereinafter Young, State Sovereign Immunity].
185 See infra text accompanying notes 225-235.
186 See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1266 (2000) (“Judges have the power to make policy by ruling in ways that 
determine the outcome of litigation. Judges in lawsuits against the gun industry have frequently exercised 
this power by granting defense motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, thereby rejecting 
plaintiffs' policy proposals.  Judges could, in future cases, rule in favor of plaintiffs, thereby supporting 
their policy proposals.”).  This assumption is somewhat more defensible – although still questionable – in 
contexts like tort law, the subject of the example cited, where judges have independent common lawmaking 
powers.
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The crucial thing about judicial decisionmaking – as opposed to executive or 
legislative action – is that courts must make decisions according to law.  We all know 
that courts make policy and value choices, but for most it is crucial that courts do not
have the same right to forthrightly choose policy and value as a legislature might.  
Rather, the value and policy choices that courts make arise from the inevitable 
indeterminacies in the law that courts must apply.187  Ideally those choices are themselves 
grounded in the applicable legal materials, broadly construed.188  Failing that, they are at 
least constrained in scope by those legal materials.189  One can, of course, argue endlessly 
about the nature of the difference between judicial and legislative decisions.  But most 
would agree that courts are more constrained in the sorts of choices they can make than 
legislative or executive actors.190
The nature of judicial decision-making imposes two strong constraints on 
interpretive choice.  The first is to privilege constitutional text and, to a lesser extent, 
history over other more functional or consequentialist sources of doctrine.   I argue in 
Part III that neither text nor history can provide many determinate answers to federalism 
questions.  Nonetheless, sometimes they do provide clear answers:  The text clearly 
guarantees, for example, each state the right to elect two senators absent some 
fundamental change in the structure.191  Few theories of constitutional interpretation 
allow departures when the text speaks clearly,192 and most also consider the historical 
understanding of that text to be relevant in some way.193  There will thus be some 
187 [Hart, Concept of Law]
188 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, ___ (1975) (arguing that where the 
directly applicable legal materials fail to determine an answer, judges should recur to the more basic 
principles and policies of the law).
189 See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 351-52 (Max Knight, trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 
1978) (1960) (arguing that “the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications 
are possible” and “there is no [legal] criterion by which one possibility within the frame is preferable to 
another”).
190
 They may be less constrained in other respects.  Individual legislators, of course, are highly constrained 
by the need to convince a majority of their colleagues and the procedural hurdles to lawmaking; in this 
respect, they can only envy the splendid isolation and broad remedial flexibility accorded to the single 
federal trial judge.
191 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate . . . shall be composed of two Senators from each State. . . .”); 
art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”).  I set to one 
side the more difficult question whether the requisite change would require something other than an 
ordinary amendment.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS ___ (1991) (discussing this 
issue).
192 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Constructivist Coherence] (“Arguments from 
text play a universally accepted role in constitutional debate. . . .  Where the text speaks clearly and 
unambiguously . . . its plain meaning is dispositive.”).
193 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 614-20 (1999) 
(arguing that some version of originalism has become widely-accepted throughout the community of 
constitutional lawyers); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to it), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 
1592 n.14 (1997) (“[I]n truth, the turn to originalism seems so general that citation is almost beside the 
point.”).
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instances in which clear text and/or history dictate particular doctrinal outcomes 
regardless of institutional factors.
 The second and probably more important constraint is that judicial decision-
making must be coherent in a way that decisions by the political branches need not 
always be.  Larry Lessig has observed that “[w]hatever else defines a successful judicial 
system, one dimension of its success is its ability to deliver consistent rulings in cases 
that appear to be the same.”194  Consistency is central to the legitimacy of the judicial 
role; as Professor Lessig explains,
To the extent that results of a particular rule appear consistent, it is easier 
for the legal culture to view this rule as properly judicial, and its results as 
properly judicial . . . .  To the extent, however, that the results appear 
inconsistent, this pedigree gets questioned; it becomes easier for observers 
to view these results as determined, or influenced, by factors external to 
the rule—in particular, factors considered political.195
This phenomenon gives rise to what Lessig calls “the Frankfurter constraint”:  “[A] rule 
is an inferior rule if, in its application, it appears to be political, in the sense of appearing 
to allow extra-legal factors to control its application.”196  Because we can expect the 
Court to try and minimize the political costs that arise when its results are perceived to be 
political, the Court will – and should – move away from rules that are not susceptible of 
determinate application.197
The “Frankfurter constraint” derives its name from Felix Frankfurter’s analysis of 
Commerce Clause decisions in the first part of the Nineteenth Century, which 
emphasized the Court’s desire to avoid the appearance of “judicial policy-making.”198
This constraint plays a crucial role with respect to contemporary doctrine.  Both the 
majority opinion in Garcia and Justice Souter’s dissents in Lopez and Morrison, for 
example, claimed that the Court should defer to the political branches on federalism 
questions because such questions cannot be resolved in a sufficiently determinate, law-
like way.199  Justice Souter has warned of “the portent of incoherence” hanging over any 
194
 Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 170-71; cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“[T]he main constituent of the judicial 
process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved 
in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”).
195
 Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 174.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 174-75.
198 See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 54 (1937); 
see also Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 174 n. 142 (invoking Frankfurter’s analysis).
199 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (complaining that prior 
doctrine, which tried to protect ‘traditional state functions’ “inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary 
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes”);  [Lopez dissent]; United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, ___ (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing “the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone—a set of 
comprehensible interpretive rules that courts might use to impose some meaningful limit, but not too great 
a limit, upon the scope of the legislative authority that the Commerce Clause delegates to Congress”).
13-Jul-04 draft
40
attempt to develop doctrinal limits on the commerce power200 and explicitly invoked the 
Court’s painful institutional memories of the Lochner period.201
These concerns are serious.  They do not, in my view, justify total judicial 
withdrawal from the field, but they do suggest that the Frankfurter constraint should have 
a powerful influence on the shape of doctrine.  Part VI of this essay is thus centrally 
concerned with uncovering the characteristics of federalism doctrine in the pre-1937 
period that caused that doctrine to fail the Frankfurter test.  That experience in turn 
suggests directions that contemporary doctrine might pursue in order to avoid similar 
problems in the future.
* * *
Choosing federalism doctrine requires consideration of a wide variety of disparate 
questions.  We do not begin in a vacuum, however.  Various factions on the Supreme 
Court have developed their own models of federalism doctrine – models that combine a 
particular view of the “ends” of such doctrine with a theory of the best means to get there.  
It will help to start with these competing models before I try to develop my own. 
II. Competing Visions 
It is customary to start by saying that the Supreme Court has failed to develop a 
coherent theory of federalism.202  Although the point is generally put forward as a telling 
200 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“And here once again history raises its objections 
that the Court's previous essays in overriding congressional policy choices under the Commerce Clause 
were ultimately seen to suffer two fatal weaknesses: when dealing with Acts of Congress . . . nothing in the 
Clause compelled the judicial activism, and nothing about the judiciary as an institution made it a superior 
source of policy on the subject Congress dealt with. There is no reason to expect the lesson would be 
different another time.”).  Academics have been equally quick to cry “Lochner!”  See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, 
In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 367, 369-70 (2002) (“The assumption that Lochner was wrong-that courts should not quash state or 
federal legislative judgments about social and economic regulation-was bedrock in our legal and political 
culture from 1937 to 1995.  Since 1995, the Supreme Court has rejected that assumption.  In effect, a bare 
majority of the Supreme Court seeks to reverse six decades of settled federalism jurisprudence.”). 
202
 The tone of much academic criticism faults the Court for not being more, well, academic.  See, e.g., 
Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial 
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1447 (1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court's . . . federalism 
jurisprudence might, uncharitably, be described as "a mess." . . . The decisions are inconsistent with 
constitutional text and with one another, and they lack a persuasive normative theory to justify the first 
inconsistency or to resolve the second.”); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: 
Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 330 (2003) (complaining that the Court has 
“failed to articulate an overarching vision of federal-state relations”); Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to 
the “Sounds of Sovereignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. 
REV. 11, 14 (1998) (accusing the court of having “failed to articulate a coherent theory of federalism that 
explains the discrete results reached in particular cases and that would facilitate reasonably accurate 
predictions regarding the probable results in future cases”).  I have argued elsewhere that this sort of 
criticism is neither fair nor realistic.  See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at 35-38.  
Unfortunately, it seems to be an occupational hazard of law-professoring; one is hard pressed to find an 
area of constitutional law where one does not observe legal academics pronouncing the prevailing doctrine 
“incoherent.” See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is So Abysmal, 57 
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criticism, articulating general theories is only tangentially related to the Court’s job 
description.  The Court sits to decide cases.  In order to decide like cases alike – more 
precisely, in order to tell which cases are “like” and which aren’t – it must develop 
doctrine.  But doctrine and theory are not the same thing.  Doctrine is the mechanism that 
translates legal theories into results, but doctrine can often capture theory only 
imperfectly.   That problem is compounded by the imperative to ground doctrine, where 
possible, in constitutional texts that themselves often represent political compromises 
among competing structural visions.  The fact that doctrine yields results that are often 
inconsistent with the dictates of theory should surprise no one.
The Court decides cases, moreover, under conditions that are hardly congenial to 
“coherent” theory.  The Court has quite limited control over its agenda, and cannot 
choose to develop its doctrine in an orderly progression; it must wait for cases to come to 
it.203  And it must do so while deciding many other cases on other issues in other fields, 
each raising their own imperatives to construct a coherent theory.  Years may pass before 
it can return to a particular issue to elaborate on what it said before.204  Worst of all, the 
writing justice – charged with articulating a coherent theory – must achieve consensus 
among at least five of his colleagues, and preferably more, all the while knowing that he 
or she may not have the opinion when the next twist on the same issue comes before the 
Court.  How many legal academics regularly try to write with at least four co-authors?
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989) (title says it all); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 
STAN. L. REV., 1249, 1249-50 (1995) (“Although the pattern of the Court's recent First Amendment 
decisions may well be (roughly) defensible, contemporary First Amendment doctrine is nevertheless 
striking chiefly for its superficiality, its internal incoherence, its distressing failure to facilitate constructive 
judicial engagement with significant contemporary social issues connected with freedom of speech.”); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 83, 91(observing that the Court’s race-based redistricting cases “the cases betoken a 
jurisprudence that is both incoherent and doctrinally unstable”).  The malady, moreover, is hardly confined 
to constitutional law.  See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and 
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997) (“More than any other field of 
public law, federal Indian law is characterized by doctrinal incoherence and doleful incidents.”).  Surely the 
fact that legal academics always say this ought to inspire some skepticism about the claim in each instance.
203
 Two famously-confusing cases about the scope of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
illustrate the problem posed by case order.  Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), came to the Court three years before Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), even though from a purely intellectual standpoint, it makes more sense 
to consider the Merrell Dow question first.  (The Hart & Wechsler casebook inverts the order for 
pedagogical purposes.  See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 915-46 (4th ed. 1996)).  The Court might 
have had a better chance of developing a more coherent theory of § 1331 if the cases had arisen in a more 
convenient order.
204
 On the issue of Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, for instance, thirteen years 
passed between the Court’s decision on abrogation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), and its parallel decision on abrogation under the Commerce 
Power, see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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As Adrian Vermeule and I have argued elsewhere, the Constitution resists grand 
unified theories.205  For good or ill, much judicial doctrine evolves in an incremental, 
common law fashion.  This is particularly true in an area like constitutional federalism, 
where the constitutional text provides relatively light constraint and judicial doctrine 
must respond to the actions of other governmental institutions that are themselves 
evolving in response to particular circumstances.  Nonetheless, more general theories 
surely influence the decision of individual cases,206 and theory can help lawyers and 
judges decide where to focus when they argue and decide cases about federalism.   As 
Richard Fallon has observed, “questions of constitutional theory are not optional; they 
cannot be put off as merely academic pre-occupations, which have no necessary role in 
the work of judges and lawyers.”207  Academics can provide a valuable office here in 
divining the theory implicit in doctrine, identifying and criticizing inconsistencies, or 
proposing alternative visions.  We should remember, however, that much of this value-
added derives from the fact that academics have very different jobs from judges.
The Supreme Court does have a theory of federalism – in fact, it has several.  
Much of this Part is concerned with identifying the different theoretical perspectives 
already extant in current doctrine, while proposing some important alterations in 
emphasis. I want to organize my discussion here around three different variables.  The 
first has to do with the ends of federalism doctrine – here, the aspect of federalism to be 
promoted.  The second two factors are about means – that is, the role of judicial review in 
promoting federalism.  Section A of this Part develops these variables.  With respect to 
the first, I want to focus on the tension between state “sovereignty,” which I define as the 
inviolability of state institutions, and state “autonomy,” defined as the ability of the states 
to govern themselves.  The second and third factors concern, respectively, the focus of 
judicial review on issues of substance or process and the rigidity of the doctrinal rules 
proposed vis a vis efforts by other branches of government to override them.  
Section B considers the doctrinal approach of the five justices that have formed 
the pro-states majority in the Rehnquist Court’s most prominent federalism cases.  While 
the Court has actually pursued a number of different approaches on different occasions, I 
argue that the general drift is toward a strong role for courts, involving “hard” 
constitutional rules focused on substance, and directed toward promoting state 
“sovereignty” rather than autonomy.  This approach manifests not only in the high-profile 
cases that have limited national power, such as Seminole Tribe or Lopez, but also in the 
less widely-marked preemption cases that have declined to protect state regulatory 
autonomy.
205 See Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with 
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 749-58 (2000); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. 
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1991) (warning against “hyper-integrationist” readings of 
the Constitution).
206 See, e.g., Young, Jurisprudence of Structure, supra note 37, at 1638 -51 (discussing the role of political 
theory in Lopez, Term Limits, New York, and Alden). 
207
 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 539 (1999) 
[hereinafter Fallon, How to Choose].
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I discuss a quite different vision in Section C.  That vision stresses state 
“autonomy” over “sovereignty,” and it stresses soft, process-based doctrines over hard, 
substantive constitutional limits on federal power.  Such an approach accords with the 
position taken – in some cases, but not all – by those justices who have generally 
dissented from the Rehnquist Court’s federalism rulings.  Although the pattern is sketchy, 
the evidence suggests that the dissenters do acknowledge the importance of federalism 
and the Court’s role in protecting it.  Their vision of federalism is different from the 
majority, but it is not the simple dismissal of federalism’s importance that one often sees 
in the academy.208
The dissenters’ notion of federalism is important, and current debates would be 
more edifying if they paid it greater attention.  But I doubt that it provides a complete 
answer to the problem of balance in our system.  I therefore sketch a somewhat different 
model in Section D.  That model – which I have labeled an “autonomy” model in 
opposition to the Rehnquist Court majority’s “sovereignty” model – shares many 
elements of the dissenting vision, but couples that vision with some concern for “hard” 
constitutional restraints on federal power and a somewhat more aggressive view of 
“process”-based protections.  The remainder of this essay develops and defends that 
model in substantially greater depth.
A. The Ends and Structure of Judicial Review
We might describe different models of federalism doctrine in any number of 
different ways, but for present purposes I think it best to focus on three dimensions in 
particular:  the aspect of federalism to be promoted, the focus of judicial review on issues 
of substance or process, and the rigidity of judicial review in terms of the ease with which 
other actors may override its results.  Choices along each of these dimensions combine in 
different ways to produce quite different models of federalism doctrine.  We rarely see 
the pure form of these models, of course, in the real world.  Individual justices and 
particular factions in the courts are likely to pursue a mix of these different approaches.  
Nonetheless, the models can help us identify and assess what real judges are doing and 
what effect proposed doctrines are likely to have.
1. Sovereignty vs. Autonomy
The first dimension involves a tension between state “sovereignty” and state 
“autonomy.”  These terms are often used interchangeably, and, in truth, there is 
considerable overlap in their definitions.  They also, however, have somewhat different 
connotations and, by focusing on the divergence, I want to adopt them as terms of art 
signifying a broader divide in federalism values.  If my usage here seems idiosyncratic, it 
nonetheless serves the purpose of putting names to tendencies that are usually identified 
much less precisely.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “sovereignty” as “[s]upremacy in respect 
of power, domination or rank; supreme dominion, authority, or rule.”209  This notion of 
208
 For an example of the latter, see, e.g., [Rubin & Feeley].
209 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2003) (available at 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/display/00231800?keytype=ref&ijkey=eAYgYT3cDbz9I) (visited July 12, 
2003).
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supreme power harkens back to the classical conception of unitary sovereignty, which 
held that “there must reside somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided, final 
power, higher in legal authority than any other power, subject to no law, a law unto 
itself.”210  Although our Framers “split the atom of sovereignty,”211 shattering the notion 
that political authority must remain undivided, this notion of unaccountability – that the 
sovereign is “subject to no law” – remains central.  Hence, the most common usage of the 
term in legal circles is sovereign immunity, that is, the legal unaccountability of 
governmental entities for their violations of the law.212
“Autonomy,” on the other hand, bears a different emphasis on the positive usage 
of governmental authority, rather than the unaccountability of the government itself.  The 
OED defines “autonomy” as “[t]he right of self-government, of making [a state’s] own 
laws and administering its own affairs.”213  This suggests a government doing things –
making policy and carrying it out, for the benefit of its citizens – not simply shielding 
itself from threats.  An autonomy-based federalism doctrine would be concerned, for 
example, with the States’ ability to make its own choices about protecting the 
environment, ensuring health coverage for citizens, or whether to have capital 
punishment.
As I have said, the two terms overlap.  Sovereignty’s notion of supreme power 
readily suggests the efficacy of rule, that is, the ability to do things with power, not just to 
be unaccountable for what has been done.   Thomas Hobbes, for instance, included in the 
rights of “sovereignty” not only the notion that “[w]hat soever the Soveraigne doth, is 
unpunishable by the Subject” but also that “[t]he Soveraigne is judge of what is necessary 
for the Peace and Defence of his Subjects.”214  And autonomy can mean “[t]he condition 
of being controlled only by its own laws, and not subject to any higher one.”215  One 
would hardly do violence to the English language if, for example, one identified 
sovereign immunity as an aspect of state autonomy.
For that reason, one cannot simply assume that references to “sovereignty” or 
“autonomy” in the Court’s decisions (much less in the academic literature) indicate the 
narrow meanings I have assigned them here.  Nevertheless, I find a significant analytic 
payoff to distinguishing between a state’s ability to take positive governmental action –
enacting laws and regulations, providing benefits to its citizens – and the same state’s 
210 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198 (2d ed. 1992).   See 
also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, (“[T]here is and must be in all [governments] a supreme, 
irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, 
reside.”). [find quote – try vol. 1, 49, 160-62 (Cooper ed. 1803)]
211
 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
212 See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, ___ (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the link between sovereign immunity and more general notions of sovereignty).
213 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2003) (available at 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/display/00015227?keytype=ref&ijkey=LNj7LUoOr5Q5o) (visited July 12, 
2003).
214 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 98 (Richard E. Flathman & David Johnston, eds. 1997) (1651).
215 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, supra note 213.  [cite Resnik?]
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unaccountability for illegal or unpopular actions.  As I argue in Part III, notions of 
sovereignty and autonomy – as I define them narrowly here – stand in quite different 
relation to federalism’s underlying values; the remainder of the present Part, moreover, 
suggests that the choice to emphasize one or the other can have strikingly different 
doctrinal implica tions.   
Having said all this, however, one must acknowledge that sovereignty and 
autonomy also overlap in a second, non-definitional sense.  Many actions that affect state 
“sovereignty” will also impinge on state “autonomy.”  Even the classic example of 
sovereignty jurisprudence – the Court’s constitutionalization of state sovereign immunity 
in cases like Seminole Tribe216 and Alden217 – purports to benefit state autonomy by 
preserving the States’ control over their internal budgetary policies.218  But I am not 
arguing that sovereignty and autonomy are unrelated.  I simply hope to demonstrate in 
the remainder of this Part that differences in emphasis have sufficiently important 
implications to make the distinction worth drawing.
2. Substance vs. Process
The remaining dimensions concentrate on the focus and shape of judicial review 
in federalism cases.   One is best captured by the notoriously vague distinction between 
“process” and “substance.”  The decision in Morrison, for example, invalidated the civil 
suit provision of the Violence Against Women Act based on the substantive character of 
the federal regulation – in particular, the non-commercial nature of the regulated activity 
– and largely without regard to the process of the law’s formation or the effect of that law 
on the broader political dynamic of federalism.  The majority was unimpressed, for 
example, by the fact that Congress had conducted extensive hearings of its own on the 
effects of violence against women on interstate commerce.219  A different strand of 
federalism jurisprudence, by contrast, insists that “the fundamental limitation that the 
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause” – and, by extension, all federal 
power – “is one of process rather than result.”220  Rules of “process federalism” thus 
derive their force and structure from the need to prevent malfunctions in the political and 
institutional mechanisms that ordinarily act to preserve the federal balance in the absence 
of judicial intervention.
216
 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate the states’ 
sovereign immunity from suits by private individuals when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers).
217
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress may not abrogate the states’ sovereign 
immunity from suits in state courts).
218 See id. at 750-51.
219 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  The Court’s decision in Lopez, by contrast, 
appeared to have both substantive and process-based components.  The Court noted that not only was the 
Gun Free School Zones Act aimed at non-commercial activity (substantive), but also that Congress had 
neither made findings of a substantial effect on interstate commerce nor included a jurisdictional element
requiring such findings to be made in individual trials.  See 514 U.S. 549, ___ (1995).  Morrison, however, 
rather firmly closed off these process-oriented lines of potential development in favor of a strong 
substantive emphasis on the character of the regulated activity.  See 529 U.S. at ___.
220
 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).  
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Many have confused process-oriented doctrine with a purely nationalist model of 
judicial abdication.221   The confusion is understandable, since many scholars have used 
Herbert Wechsler’s notion of “political safeguards” for federalism as a basis for just such 
abdication.  Larry Kramer’s influential attempt to revive Wechsler’s theory, for example, 
moves very quickly from a rejection of substantive limits to a rejection of judicial review 
altogether.  “Inflexible divisions between what is national and what is local,” he observes, 
“ceased long ago to make sense, a product of profound cultural, economic, and 
technological changes.”222  Professor Kramer also finds, however, that political 
mechanisms such as organized political parties and linkages among state and federal 
administrative bureaucracies have shorn up the institutional safeguards for state 
autonomy that Wechsler identified a half-century ago.223   From this, Kramer concludes 
that federalism questions should be remitted entirely to politics.  “For the Founders,” he 
says, “such arguments were to be addressed to the people, through politics. And the 
wisdom of their judgment in this respect has been ratified in practice throughout more 
than two centuries of American history - leaving as the real puzzle here just why these 
judges feel compelled to countermand that decision and substitute their own.”224
Proponents of substantive limits on federal power have likewise equated any shift 
in emphasis away from these sorts of limits with the abdication of judicial review in 
federalism cases.  Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo, for example, have attacked Brad 
Clark’s argument that separation of powers doctrines can protect state autonomy,225
calling it an “effort to prop up the deeply flawed political-safeguards theory” and “rather 
akin to reinforcing the walls of a sand castle as the tide returns.”226  These scholars seem 
generally optimistic that the relatively modest substantive limits on Congress’s authority 
imposed in decisions like Lopez and Morrison can be extended far enough to 
meaningfully protect the states from federal encroachments.  Given that expectation, they 
have little patience for the seemingly more modest guarantees offered by process 
doctrine.227
221 See infra Section II.A.5.
222
 Kramer, Politics, supra note 136, at 234-52.  Professor Kramer concedes that “theoretically” the Court 
might fashion more flexible substantive limits, but appears to discount this possibility in practice.  See text 
quoted in note 750, infra. 
223 See id. at ___.
224 Id. at 293.  Like most proponents of judicial abdication, however, Kramer does not urge the courts to 
hold these cases non-justiciable.  Rather, he simply proposes a very deferential standard of review.  See id.
at ___ [quote].
225 See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117.
226
 Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 
79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001).
227 See also Viet Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L. J. 2085, 2117 (2000) (“Redefining 
the proper balance of legislative powers between Congress and the states is better accomplished directly, 
through an insistence on the limits of Congress’s enumerated and limited powers under Article I, rather 
than circuitously and ineffectually through some vague and ill-conceived presumption against preemption 
under the Supremacy Clause.”).  As I discuss further in Part VII, the “presumption against preemption” is 
probably the most important of the process-oriented doctrines.  See infra Section ___.
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Other scholars, however, have long argued that “process federalism” has 
significant potential for limiting federal power.228  Vicki Jackson and Stephen Gardbaum 
have both proposed the courts should review the process by which Congress makes laws 
to make sure that Congress has itself considered the constitutional limits of its authority 
before acting.229  Brad Clark’s work on the “procedural” safeguards of federalism 
suggests that courts may serve state autonomy best by enforcing separation of powers 
requirements built into the federal lawmaking process.230  And the Court itself has been 
quite active in developing process-oriented checks on federal power.  The anti-
commandeering doctrines are the most prominent example:  They require Congress to 
internalize the financial and political costs of its actions by prohibiting it from requiring 
state institutions to enforce federal law.231  The Court’s less flashy clear statement rules 
may be an even more important set of examples.  Those rules enhance the political and 
procedural checks on federal lawmaking in a number of sensitive areas, including 
regulation of traditional state functions,232 abrogation of state sovereign immunity,233
imposition of conditions on federal funding,234 and preemption of state law.235
As with the sovereignty-autonomy divide, however, one would not want to draw 
the distinction between process and substance too sharply.  In particular, I will argue later 
on that the “political safeguards of federalism” lying at the heart of process federalism 
cannot be expected to work if the state governments have too few substantive 
responsibilities to be viable governments.236  Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to 
underestimate the independent constraining force of process doctrine.  To see why, we 
might compare process federalism with its cousin in the realm of individual rights, John 
Hart Ely’s notion of representation reinforcement.237  Dean Ely’s theory has been 
criticized on a number of grounds,238 but no one claims that it amounts to judicial 
surrender; it was constructed, after all, to explain and justify the work of the Warren 
228 See, e.g., Rapaczynski, supra note 184 (making such an argument shortly after the Court’s decision in 
Garcia).
229 See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2180, 2245 (1998); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795 
(1996) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Federalism].
230 See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117. [find a quote]
231 [cites]; Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1360-61.
232 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
233 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
234 See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
235 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
236 See infra TAN ___.
237 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
238 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 
YALE L. J. 1063 (1980) (arguing that process theory cannot avoid choosing values).
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Court.239  So, too, a “Democracy and Distrust” for federalism doctrine would offer a 
different focus for judicial review but not necessarily a decrease in rigor or efficacy.  
3. Hard vs.Soft
A third dimension focuses on the relationship between the rules formulated by 
courts and the actions of the federal political branches.  Judicial doctrines may be “hard” 
in the sense that they impose categorical restrictions on other actors that may be 
overridden only by constitutional amendments (or judicial overruling), or they may be 
“soft” to the extent that they can be overcome by less extreme measures.  Congress may 
have to re-enact a statute to clarify its intent, for example, or it may have to take a 
particular action itself rather than delegating it to others.  The important point is that 
“soft” limits return the ball to Congress’s court rather than trying to fix the boundary 
between state and federal power at a particular point.240
Two criminal law examples will help illustrate the distinction.  United States v. 
Lopez241 held that Congress simply lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
guns in local schools.  Despite some initial speculation to the contrary, it now seems clear 
that Congress can do nothing to supply this deficit of power.242 United States v. Jones,243
on the other hand, illustrates a less categorical approach to a similar problem.  The 
question in Jones was whether the federal arson statute could reach arson of a private 
residence.  Suggesting that the question was a difficult one, the Court construed the 
statute not to press the outer limits of the Commerce Power – that is, not to apply to 
private residences – absent a clear statement of Congress’s intent to do so.244  This 
approach left open the possibility that Congress might clarify its broad intent in a 
subsequent enactment, but avoided a more direct confrontation in the case before the 
Court.  
Jones was an instance of the familiar canon that courts will construe statutes to 
avoid constitutional doubts.245  I have argued elsewhere, however, that the avoidance 
239 [cite]
240 See generally Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive 
Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2002); [Friedman piece on dialogue].
241
 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
242
 Congress re-enacted the Gun Free School Zones Act shortly after Lopez with explicit findings that gun 
possession in schools has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  [cite]  These findings responded to 
language in the Lopez opinion suggesting that the lack of such findings might be important to the statute’s 
constitutionality.  See 514 U.S. at ___.  But the Court’s subsequent decision in Morrison makes clear that 
the presence of such findings cannot save a statute that does not regulate commercial activity.  See 529 U.S. 
598, ___ (2000).  Congress could possibly achieve the same result through conditional spending, see Lynn 
A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, [cite], but that would involved a different power 
altogether, not “fixing” the Commerce Clause problem.
243
 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
244 See id. at 859 (concluding that “§ 844(i) is not soundly read to make virtually every arson in the country 
a federal offense”).
245 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of 
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction 
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canon is best understood as a means of enforcing – not avoiding the enforcement of – the 
underlying constitutional norms that create the doubt in the first place.246  One might read 
Jones, for example, as a response to the difficulty of defining limits on Congress’s 
Commerce Power in a principled and workable way.  Given this difficulty, a court might 
despair of enforcing hard limits that constrain Congress within any but the broadest 
bounds; at the same time, it might seek to vindicate a more limiting vision of enumerated 
powers by effectively remanding statutes that press the outer boundary to Congress for a 
second look.247
The Jones principle – that Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to press the 
limits of its Commerce Clause authority – fits comfortably into a class of constitutional
rules that I have dubbed “resistance norms.”  These are “norms that may be more or less 
yielding to governmental action, depending on the strength of the government’s interest, 
the degree of institutional support for the challenged action, or the clarity of purpose that 
the legislature has expressed.”248  Federalism doctrine is rife with other “clear statement” 
rules covering any number of intrusions on state sovereignty or autonomy, including 
subjecting states to liability,249 imposing conditions on grants of federal funds,250
regulating traditional state government functions,251 and preempting state law.252  But 
other quite different federalism rules – such as the Pike balancing test requiring a 
substantial state interest to support regulation burdening interstate commerce253 – are also 
“soft” in that the structural principle will give way under certain circumstances.
of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”); Jones, 529 U.S. at 857-58 
(invoking the avoidance canon).
246 See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of 
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000) [hereinafter Young, Constitutional Avoidance].  For 
arguments that application of the avoidance canon amounts to a constitutional decision rather than 
avoidance of one, see Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 87; Richard A. 
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 
(1983).
247 See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 246, at 1603-09 (arguing that use of canons of 
construction in this way is most appropriate in areas plagued by these sorts of line-drawing problems).
248 Id. at 1552.
249
 Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to 
include state governments in the class of persons liable in suits under federal statutes); Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (Congress must speak clearly in 
order to authorize qui tam suits by private plaintiffs against state governments); Atascadero St. Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, ___ (1985) (Congress must speak clearly to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
when it legislates under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
250
 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, ___ (1981).
251
 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
252
 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip 
P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 593 (1992) (discussing the pro-federalism clear statement rules).
253
 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, ___ (1970); see also Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 
450 U.S. 662 (1981) (rare application of the Pike test to strike down a state law).
13-Jul-04 draft
50
“Soft” limits have some obvious advantages from the courts’ standpoint.  They 
avoid direct confrontations with Congress, and they encourage the political branches to 
take part in a dialogue about the proper balance of federalism.254  Less obviously, they 
may ease line-drawing difficulties and permit courts to impose some restraint in areas 
where constitutional norms would otherwise be “under-enforced.”255  On the other hand, 
such doctrines carry a pronounced risk:  National political actors may choose simply to 
override the constraints that the courts erect, leaving the federal balance potentially at 
risk.  It is, for example, difficult to predict reliably the ways in which Congress will 
respond to statutory interpretation decisions such as those involving “clear statement” 
rules.256  As a result, it is hard to know exactly how much faith to put in these “soft” 
constraints.
4. Combining Dimensions
Combining the dimensions I have discussed in various ways produces quite 
different models of federalism doctrine.  I discuss the leading models later in this Part; 
the present subsection is meant to clear up a few points related to the ways in which the 
various dimensions fit together.  
The first point is that the dimensions are not unrelated to one another.  It may be 
easier, for instance, to have strong, categorical rules protecting state sovereignty than to 
build similar fences around state autonomy.  The reason would be that sovereignty rules 
generally protect only the institutions of state governments themselves and need not 
interfere directly with the primary federal regulatory project of policing private conduct.  
The National League of Cities doctrine,257 for example, did not interfere with the Fair 
Labor Standards Act’s ability to govern employment conditions in the overwhelming 
majority of the economy.258  Likewise, the Court’s decisions holding state governments 
immune from suit under various federal statutes like the Americans with Disabilities Act 
or the Patent Act affect only a very small proportion of litigation under those statutes.259
It may thus be easier for the system to tolerate categorical sovereignty protections than, 
say, equally categorical efforts to protect state regulatory autonomy by holding 
significant sections of American life off limits to federal legislation.
254 See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993).
255 See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 246, at 1603-09.  On under-enforcement, see 
generally  Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
256 See, e.g., Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, supra note 175, at ___ (detailing the many empirical 
uncertainties plaguing this effort).
257 [cite]
258
 Critics of that doctrine have pointed out that state governments actually have a significant economic 
impact in their own right.  [cites]  But it is all a matter of comparative degree.
259 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese, & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for 
Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1037, 1077-79 (2001) (reporting only sporadic instances of copyright or patent litigation involving 
state governments); [cite on ADA]
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There is also an obvious affinity between process-based federalism doctrine and 
“soft” limits on federal power, particularly the “clear statement” canons of statutory 
construction.  Rules requiring that Congress speak clearly when it intrudes on state 
prerogatives help to enhance the political and institutional checks on such intrusions in at 
least two ways:  First, they give notice to the states’ federal representatives that an 
intrusion is afoot, and may thus serve to help rally opposition.260  Second, they increase 
the costs of drafting and securing support for federalism-threatening measures, simply by 
adding another hurdle through which such measures must jump.261  “Process federalism” 
thus often signifies not only an orientation for judicial review – to correct malfunctions of 
the political and institutional checks that are supposed to make federalism self-enforcing 
– but also a technique of constructing doctrines in such a way as to enhance those 
political and institutional checks.  Any model emphasizing process doctrine is thus likely 
to feature “soft” rules of this kind.
Nonetheless, the variables are independent enough to warrant separate conceptual 
treatment.  Simply because “soft” rules have certain process-oriented advantages, for 
example, does not mean that we never see “soft” rules targeting substance or “hard” rules 
oriented toward process.   If we organize these two variables in a matrix, we can identify 
examples of doctrinal approaches fitting each of the squares:
Judicial Review Substance Process
Hard Limits
1 
Subject-matter limit on 
Commerce Clause (Lopez).
Absolute rule against abrogation 
of state sovereign immunity 
(Seminole Tribe).
2
Absolute anti-commandeering 
rule based on concerns about 
political accountability (Printz).
Soft Limits
3
Clear statement rule against 
broad use of Commerce Power 
(Jones).
Clear statement rule against 
abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity (Union Gas).
4
Clear statement rule for 
conditions on federal funds, 
based on need for states to know 
what they’ve agreed to 
(Pennhurst).
260 See Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1359.
261 See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter 
or Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1994) (noting that anytime drafters must add “details to text 
increases the possibility for delay and obstruction even though the details themselves would command 
overwhelming support”); Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 246, at 1596-98.
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Box 2 indicates that although process federalism is often associated with weak or even 
non-existent judicial checks on Congress, for instance, the anti-commandeering rule 
represents a categorical restriction on congressional power most persuasively grounded in 
process justifications, e.g., the need to force Congress to internalize the monetary and 
political costs of its programs.262  Likewise, Box 3 recognizes that the Court has often 
chosen to enforce substance-based limits on congressional power through non-absolute 
techniques, such as clear statement requirements, notwithstanding conventional wisdom 
identifying substantive restrictions with more unyielding rules.263  I do not mean to argue 
at this point in the discussion that any particular combination is preferable to any other, 
only that the two variables are logically – and empirically – independent.
The same is true of the relationship described above between the 
sovereignty/autonomy variable and substance/process variables.  Some pairings may be 
more natural than others, but all appear at least occasionally in current doctrine:
Substance Process
Sovereignty
1 
State sovereign immunity 
broadly prohibits private 
lawsuits threatening state 
dignitary or budgetary interests 
(Ports Authority).
2
Congress must speak clearly in 
order to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity under § 5 of the 14th
Amendment (Atascadero).
Congress may not impose 
regulation on state governments 
that it is unwilling to impose on 
private actors as well (Cf. 
Condon264).
Congress may not delegate 
authority to sue states on behalf 
262 See Printz v. United States, 527 U.S. 898, 930 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 
(1992); see also Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at ___ (discussing the process justifications for the 
anti-commandeering rule).
263 See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 252, at ___; Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 
246, at 1596-98 (discussing use of clear statement rules to protect Article III values associated with judicial 
review).
264
 The Condon Court reserved the question whether Congress may impose regulatory burdens on states 
alone for decision in a future case.   See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
265
 The Court held in Stevens that Congress had not clearly subjected the states to liability under the False 
Claims Act and thus had no occasion to decide whether Congress could delegate the United States’ interest 
in such suits to private qui tam litigants.  See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000).
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of the U.S. to private litigants 
(Cf. Stevens265).
Autonomy
3
Congress may not regulate non-
commercial activities, leaving 
those activities open to state 
regulation without fear of 
preemption (Lopez; Morrison).
4
Congress must speak clearly in 
order to preempt state law 
(Rice).
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To complete the set, we can do a similar matrix comparing the 
sovereignty/autonomy and hard/soft variables:
Hard Limits Soft Limits
Sovereignty
1 
No abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity under Art. I powers 
(Seminole Tribe).
2
Congress may abrogate under 
Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment, but must state its 
intent very clearly  (Atascadero).
Autonomy
3
Congress may not regulate non-
commercial activities, leaving 
those activities open to state 
regulation without fear of 
preemption (Lopez; Morrison).
4
Congress must speak clearly in 
order to press the limits of its 
commerce power (Jones) and 
may not delegate that decision to 
others (Solid Waste).
Presumption against preemption 
in statutory construction (Rice).
Again, all the possibilities are present in current law.  This matrix also helps illustrate a
somewhat different point, which is that “soft” limits are not necessarily less constraining, 
on balance, than “hard” ones.  For instance, a broadly applicable soft rule like the 
presumption against preemption, which at least in theory applies in every preemption 
case, probably protects state autonomy to a greater degree than the very narrow “hard” 
prohibition articulated in Lopez and Morrison.266
266 See Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1384-86 (demonstrating that much more state autonomy has 
been at stake in recent preemption cases than in Commerce Clause litigation).
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The variables I have discussed – sovereignty/autonomy, substance/process, 
strong/weak rules – do not exhaust the choices to be made in formulating federalism 
doctrine.  There is, for example, the familiar dichotomy between rules and standards.267
We might plot that dichotomy against the substance/process variable, for instance, to 
yield the following examples:
Rule Standards
Substance
1 
Congress may regulate only 
commercial activity under the 
Commerce Clause (Morrison).
2
Congress must observe principle 
of subsidiarity – that is, it may 
regulate only those issues that 
cannot be better addressed at the 
state or local level (EU law).
Process
3
Super-strong clear statement rule 
for abrogating state sovereign 
immunity under Section 5 of the 
14th Amendment (Atascadero).
4
Presumption against preemption 
in statutory construction (Rice).
This particular matrix prompts several observations.  One is that in order to fill Box 2 we 
have to look to another federal constitutional system altogether – that is, to the principle 
of subsidiarity included in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.268  The National 
League of Cities doctrine was a standard – it incorporated several mushy factors and 
provided for balancing of the federal government’s interest in regulating against the 
state’s interest in sovereignty over the function at issue269 – but that doctrine is no longer 
267 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 
(1992).
268
 EC Treaty art. 5 (ex art. 3b).  See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: 
Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Young, 
European Union, supra note 42, at 1677 -82.
269 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 & n.29 (1981) 
(directing courts to consider whether the law in question (1) regulated the “states as States,” (2) dealt with 
issues that are “indisputably attributes of state sovereignty,” and (3) impaired states’ ability “to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental function,” as well as (4) whether “the nature of the 
federal interest advanced [is] such that it justifies state submission”).  The sheer fuzziness of this test may 
well explain why the Rehnquist Court’s current pro-states majority has never tried to revive National 
League of Cities.  Justice Scalia, for one, has been an extremely vocal critic of this sort of mushy standard.  
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
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with us.  I argue in Section ___ that this is largely as it should be, that is, that substantive 
federalism doctrines are probably best cast as formal (but narrow) rules.270
The second observation is that the rules/standards dichotomy can be applied to 
canons of statutory construction, like the clear statement rules in Boxes 3 and 4, as well 
as to more familiar forms of constitutional doctrine.  Here, a canon is standard-like to the 
extent that it allows the interpreter to consider a wide variety of sources of statutory 
meaning, such as legislative history, underlying policies, pragmatic concerns about 
implementing the statute, and the like.  A canon is rule-like, on the other hand, to the 
extend that it tends to narrow the range of considerations down toward a focus on the text 
alone.  The Eleventh Amendment clear statement rules, which insist on a clear statement 
of Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the text of the statute 
itself,271 fit this latter description.  The presumption against preemption, on the other 
hand, exemplifies the more common form of clear statement standard that simply urges 
courts to err on the side of state autonomy while still considering all potentially relevant 
sources of statutory meaning.272
The rules/standards choice will remain important whichever model of federalism 
doctrine one chooses.  But the three variables upon which I have focused here --
sovereignty/autonomy, substance/process, and strong/weak doctrine – seem to represent 
the defining choices that actually separate the models actually in play in our current 
debates about federalism.  Other choices, such as whether doctrines should be rule-like or 
standard-like, will remain important within these models.  For a similar reason, I do not 
try to define and explore a different model reflecting every permutation of the three 
variables that I have emphasized.  Rather, I use those variables to discuss the three 
models that emerge most naturally from the Court’s actual decisions and the criteria for 
interpretive and institutional choice that I have already identified. 
5. The Nationalist Alternative
Before discussing the models of federalism doctrine reflected in the Court’s 
decision, however, I should note that all of these models presume something that is in 
fact quite controversial:  That courts will construct doctrine to enforce principles of 
federalism.  I have already argued that courts generally cannot abstain from deciding the 
cases, and in fact no judges and relatively few commentators argue that federalism cases
should be non-justiciable.273  But one could also argue for a doctrinal model that would 
be so deferential to political actors as to simply not show up on the dimensions I have 
sketched.  There would, for example, be no choice between sovereignty and autonomy 
270 See infra TAN ___.
271 See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (“Legislative history generally will be irrelevant 
to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Congress' 
intention is ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,’ recourse to legislative history will be 
unnecessary; if Congress' intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative history will be futile, 
because by definition the [clear statement] rule . . . will not be met.”).
272 Eskridge & Frickey?
273 See supra TAN ___.
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because neither aspect of federalism would be protected; likewise, courts would impose 
neither “hard” nor “soft” limits on federal power.
Applied even-handedly, we might call this simply a “non-interventionist” model.  
But proponents of judicial non-intervention rarely argue for junking the dormant 
Commerce Clause limit on state legislation or various other doctrines of dormant 
preemption.274  And judges who occasionally suggest that courts should not adjudicate 
“conflicts of sovereign political interests implicated by the Commerce Clause” because 
“the Constitution remits them to politics”275 generally do not mean the dormant 
Commerce Clause.276  Rather, the argument is that courts should not protect states from 
federal encroachments.  The model is thus more appropriately termed “nationalist”; it 
holds that courts should defer to federal political actors but not states.  
Nationalists are basically uninterested in the distinction between state sovereignty 
and state autonomy, tending to see both as pernicious and outdated.  To the extent that 
this model sees any federalism requirement at all in the Constitution, it tends to take the 
form of a minimalist vision of sovereignty entailing the “separate and independent 
existence” of the States.  The example customarily cited is Coyle v. Oklahoma,277 which 
held that Congress may not tell a state where to put its capitol.  Beyond this, the 
nationalist model views state autonomy – that is, the degree to which the states are 
allowed to exercise meaningful responsibilities – as purely a policy choice.278
While this model is popular among academics, one of my most important 
descriptive claims is that no justice on the present Supreme Court actually takes this 
“pure nationalist” position.  The remaining sections of this Part consider the models that 
are in play, as well as a somewhat different alternative of my own.
B. The Strong Sovereignty Model
By and large, the five justices making up the Rehnquist Court’s usual majority on 
federalism issues – the Chief Justice and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Thomas – have tended to opt for federalism doctrines that aggressively protect state 
sovereignty.  At the same time, they have displayed relatively little sympathy for state 
autonomy, particularly in cases involving the preemption of state regulatory authority.  
These justices have also tended to opt for strong, substantive doctrines over rules that 
274 See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding that the federal foreign affairs power 
impliedly preempts state laws that affect foreign affairs).
275
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
276 See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (Souter, J.); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. 
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1997) (rejecting call to reconsider dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine) (Stevens, J., for majority including Souter and Breyer).  On the other side of the divide, some of 
the justices most intent on developing doctrines to limit national authority have called for junking the
Court’s negative commerce jurisprudence.  See id. at 610-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist 
and Scalia).  But the justices who hold the balance in federalism cases – Justices O’Connor and Kennedy –
have been willing to limit both state and federal power.
277
 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
278 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903, ___ (1994).
13-Jul-04 draft
58
focus on process or leave open a dialog with Congress.  The Court’s preferences on the 
judicial review variables are less pronounced, however, and one can find numerous 
counter-examples.  
1. Sovereignty over Autonomy
The Court’s preference for sovereignty over autonomy is the most obvious 
hallmark of the “federalist revival.”  In other work, I have grouped the pro-sovereignty 
cases under the heading of “immunity federalism” because they all “involve protecting 
the states from being held accountable, in their own activities, to federal norms.”279  All 
share, as a common theme, the assumption that the Court can best help the States by 
getting the Federal Government to leave them alone.
One can discern the intellectual roots of this approach in National League of 
Cities v. Usery,280 which shows up the distinction between sovereignty-based and 
autonomy-based federalism doctrines particularly well.  National League of Cities was 
one of a series of cases involving the constitutionality of federal wage and hour 
regulation under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Congress’s ability to regulate the wages 
and hours of private employers – and therefore to preempt contrary state regulation of the 
same subject – was established in the morning after the New Deal “revolution” in United 
States v. Darby.281  Two subsequent decisions involved the additional question whether 
such regulation could be extended to state governments themselves in their capacity as 
public employers.  Maryland v. Wirtz held that it could in 1968,282 but a new majority 
overruled that holding eight years later in National League of Cities. 283
Then-Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in the latter case viewed these two 
questions – whether Congress may supersede state regulation of private entities (Darby), 
and whether Congress may regulate the states themselves (Wirtz, National League of 
Cities) – as sharply different.   The Secretary of Labor pointed out that the Court had 
already “upheld sweeping exercises of authority by Congress, even though those 
exercises pre-empted state regulation of the private sector.”284  The Court, however, 
rejected the suggestion that such foreclosure of state regulation of third parties “curtailed 
the sovereignty of the States quite as much” as the challenged FLSA provisions, which 
regulated state institutions themselves.285   “It is one thing,” Justice Rehnquist wrote, “to 
recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses 
necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the 
State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional 
authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States.”286   Although the 
279
 Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at 29.
280
 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
281
 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
282
 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
283
 426 U.S. at 855.
284 Id. at 844-45.
285 Id.
286 Id.
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Court insisted that “there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government 
which may not be impaired by Congress,” those attributes conspicuously did not include 
the right to regulate within the States’ own jurisdiction free of federal interference.  
Rather, they were limited to the right to be free of federal regulation of state institutions 
themselves.  
The Court overruled National League of Cities just nine years later,287 and the 
justices driving the Federalist Revival have not chosen to revive this particular aspect of 
state sovereignty.  Nonetheless, a similar concern for state sovereignty over state 
regulatory autonomy pervades the Court’s recent decisions on state sovereign 
immunity.288  These cases represent neither the opening moves in the Federalist 
Revival289 nor its most dramatic departures from prior precedent.290  But they surpass all 
other areas of federalism doctrine in both number – there are simply more decisions – and 
in the Court’s willingness to push to the pro-states extreme on a continuum of doctrinal 
possibility.291  The Eleventh Amendment (and its background “postulates which limit and 
control,” which actually seem to drive most of the recent cases292) has become the poster 
child of federalism doctrine under the Rehnquist Court. 
Like the National League of Cities doctrine, state sovereign immunity limits 
Congress’s ability to bring federal law to bear on state institutions themselves.  This 
effort constantly invokes the rhetoric of state sovereignty.  Justice Thomas began his 
analysis in the Ports Authority case,293 for example, by noting that the States “entered the 
union ‘with their sovereignty intact,’” and that the States’ immunity from private suits is 
287 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
288 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 516 U.S. 44 (1996).  
Although the Court’s state sovereign immunity jurisprudence has had relatively few academic defenders, 
but see [Hill; Nelson; Hills], the earlier notion of protecting core state governmental functions from direct 
federal regulation has had more support.  See Deborah Jones Merritt, for instance, has urged that the 
Guarantee Clause be interpreted to prevent federal interference with state governmental functions.  See 
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).   Likewise, William Van Alstyne thought that the Court’s abandonment of such 
protection in Garcia represented the “second death” of federalism.  See William W. Van Alstyne, The 
Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985).
289 See supra note 1. 
290 See Young, Sky Falling, supra note ___, at ___ (demonstrating that the Rehnquist Court’s state 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, while probably wrongheaded, is largely consistent with prior case law).
291 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 482 (2002) [hereinafter Fallon, Conservative Paths]; Young, State Sovereign 
Immunity, supra note 184, at 1-2.
292 See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) (“[W]e cannot . . . assume that 
the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States.
Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”); Seminole Tribe 
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“‘[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not 
so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’”) (quoting Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
293
 Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743.
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“[a]n integral component of that ‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’”294  Likewise, 
Justice Kennedy’s more extended discussion of the Framers’ original understanding 
focused on “the close and necessary relationship understood to exist between sovereignty 
and immunity from suit.”295
There is an important shift in emphasis from National League of Cities to the 
sovereign immunity cases, however.  Under the former doctrine, the Court stressed the 
need to relieve state governments from federal regulation so that they might  better serve 
their own constituents.  Justice Rehnquist stressed that “[o]ne undoubted attribute of state 
sovereignty is the States' power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those 
whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those 
persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may 
be called upon to work overtime.”296 In one example of the FLSA’s impact, California 
“reported that it had thus been forced to reduce its [highway patrol] academy training 
program from 2,080 hours to only 960 hours, a compromise undoubtedly of substantial 
importance to those whose safety and welfare may depend upon the preparedness of the 
California Highway Patrol.”297 Although the National League of Cities doctrine was 
couched in terms of sovereignty and operated by foreclosing federal regulation of state 
institutions themselves, then, the key to the doctrine was the degradation of the state’s 
ability to govern resulting from loss of control over its own governmental functions.298
In this sense, National League of Cities shared many of the basic concerns of the 
autonomy model.299
The Court’s state sovereign immunity opinions, on the other hand, seem typically 
to invoke the notion of sovereignty for its own sake.  The Court has said that “[t]he 
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is 
294 Id. at 751-52 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991), and The 
Fed eralist No. 39, at 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (James Madison)).
295
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (199).
296
 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976); see also id. at 847 (“Quite apart from the 
substantial costs imposed upon the States and their political subdivisions, the Act displaces state policies 
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their 
citi zens require.”).
297 Id. at 847.
298
 Likewise, Justice Douglas’s dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz – which took a similar position to that adopted 
by a majority in National League of Cities – focused on the extent to which “the 1966 amendments to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act disrupt the fiscal policy of the States and threaten their autonomy in the 
regulation of health and education.”  392 U.S. 183, 203 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas 
was willing to permit some federal regulation of state governments; he drew the line, however, when such 
regulation threatened the States’ ability to make autonomous policy choices.  “It is one thing,” he insisted, 
“to force a State to purchase safety equipment for its railroad and another to force it either to spend several 
million more dollars on hospitals and schools or substantially reduce services in these areas.”  Id.
299 See id. at 851 (“[I]t is functions such as these [e.g., police and fire protection] which governments are 
created to provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If 
Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions 
upon which their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of 
the States’ ‘separate and independent existence.’”) (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
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consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”300  Dignity may have some relationship 
to state governance; indeed, the general level of respect for state institutions seems likely 
to affect the degree of participation in state political processes and the states’ ability to 
attract good people for public service.301  It seems unlikely, however, that the sort of 
dignity enhanced by state sovereign immunity helps on these fronts.  If anything, one 
would expect that haughty refusals by the State to compensate those injured when the 
State violates federal laws would engender resentment toward state institutions.  Of 
course, all of these effects – both positive and negative – would be hard to measure 
rigorously.  But at best the case for promoting viable state governance through a 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence based on state dignitary interests is far from proven.
State sovereign immunity serves other values besides dignity, and some are much 
more closely related to a state’s ability to govern.  Occasionally, the Court has invoked 
the potential of damages liability to disrupt a state’s financial decisionmaking processes 
as a reason for expanding immunity from suit.  In Alden, for instance, Justice Kennedy 
noted that “‘[t]he principle of immunity from litigation assures the states and the nation 
from unanticipated intervention in the processes of government.’”302  “A general federal 
power to authorize private suits for money damages,” by contrast, “would place 
unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their 
citizens.”303  Aside from this passage in Alden, however, this concern for the degradation 
of state governance arising from damages liability hardly ever crops up in the Court’s 
analysis.  Rather, most opinions have tended to focus either on more abstract notions of 
sovereignty or state dignitary interests.304  Indeed, the Ports Authority decision explicitly 
300 Ports Authority, 535 U.S. at 760.
301
 Anyone who has tried to get students at a “national” law school interested in state court clerkships or 
state government lawyering will be familiar with this phenomenon.
302
 527 U.S. at 750 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944)).
303 Id. at 750.  Justice Kennedy explained:
Today, as at the time of the founding, the allocation of scarce resources among competing 
needs and interests lies at the heart of the political process. While the judgment creditor 
of the State may have a legitimate claim for compensation, other important needs and 
worthwhile ends compete for access to the public fisc. Since all cannot be satisfied in 
full, it is inevitable that difficult decisions involving the most sensitive and political of 
judgments must be made. If the principle of representative government is to be preserved 
to the States, the balance between competing interests must be reached after deliberation 
by the political process established by the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree 
mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen.
Id. at 750-51.
304 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 748 (discussing dignitary concerns); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 
U.S. 261, 277 (1997) (“The course of our case law indicates the wisdom and necessity of considering, when 
determining the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment, the real affront to a State of allowing a suit to 
proceed.”) (plurality opinion);  Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 
139, 146 (1993) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment “accords the States the respect owed them as 
members of the federation” and stressing “the importance of ensuring that the States' dignitary interests can 
be fully vindicated”); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (“The very object and purpose of the 11th 
Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals 
at the instance of private parties.”).
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rejected an argument that the States should not be immune where autonomy-related 
concerns about state finances are not present:  “While state sovereign immunity serves 
the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving ‘the States’ ability 
to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens,’ the doctrine’s central purpose is to 
‘accord the States the respect owed them as’ joint sovereigns.”305
The Court has made clear that, despite its benefits for state financial integrity, 
state sovereign immunity is not meant to increase state governments’ freedom of action 
by allowing them to make their own policies at variance with federal law.  In Alden, for 
example, Justice Kennedy insisted that “[t]he constitutional privilege of a State to assert 
its sovereign immunity in its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant 
right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law.”306 Indeed, the Court plainly 
expects that state governments will generally continue to comply with federal law 
notwithstanding their immunity from suit.307  In any event, a broad range of private 
remedies against state entities remain, and Congress retains an impressive array of 
legislative instruments to ensure state compliance with federal law.308  That does not 
mean that the state sovereign immunity decisions are unimportant; as Dan Meltzer has 
observed, the remedial architecture is a critical, if often overlooked, aspect of 
constitutional law.309  My point is simply that restrictions on particular remedies against 
state governments are likely to have a considerably more attenuated impact on the ability 
of states to govern themselves than restrictions on Congress’s ability to regulate states 
per se.
The Court’s focus on sovereignty is not restricted to the old National League of 
Cities doctrine and state sovereign immunity.  Federalism concerns also stand at the 
center of the Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence,310 and recent doctrinal developments 
in that area also have the effect of constricting state accountability for violations of 
305 Ports Authority, 535 U.S. at 765.  Justice Thomas thought that the Solicitor General’s argument in 
defense of the statute revealed “a fundamental misunderstanding of the purposes of sovereign immunity .”  
Id. at 765.  He explained that “[s]overeign immunity does not merely constitute a defense to monetary 
liability or even to all types of liability. Rather, it provides an immunity from suit. The statutory scheme, as 
interpreted by the United States, is thus no more permissible than if Congress had allowed private parties to 
sue States in federal court for violations of the Shipping Act but precluded a court from awarding them any 
relief.” Id. at 766.  For a general discussion of the Court’s reliance on state dignitary interests in sovereign 
immunity cases, see Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (2003).
306
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754-55 (1999).
307 See id. at 755 (“We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the 
binding laws of the United States.”).
308 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1334-39, 1389 (2001) [hereinafter Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity]; Young, Sky 
Falling, supra note ___, at ___.
309 See Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity, supra note 308, at 1333.
310 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (“This is a case about federalism. It concerns 
the respect that federal courts owe the States and the States' procedural rules when reviewing the claims of 
state prisoners in federal habeas corpus.”).
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federal rules.311  The doctrine of procedural default, for example, holds that federal 
constitutional errors committed at a state court trial ordinarily cannot be remedied on 
habeas review if the petitioner failed to comply with state procedural rules.312  As with 
state sovereign immunity, the effect is not to absolve state courts from their obligation to 
comply with federal constitutional rules – states cannot, for instance, choose not to follow 
Miranda’s rules on custodial interrogation – but rather to restrict the availability of 
federal remedies when such violations occur.   And the central concern is to prevent 
federal interference with the internal workings of state institutions.313
The habeas case law, like sovereign immunity and the National League of Cities, 
defies any attempt to draw too bright a line between sovereignty and autonomy concerns.  
The Court has reined in habeas remedies largely out of a general concern for the States’ 
ability to punish violations of their criminal laws – surely a core concern of state 
governance.314  And a rule like the procedural default doctrine is designed to protect the 
States’ ability to manage their criminal justice system by establishing rules of criminal 
procedure; if state procedural defaults are ignored on federal habeas review, the Court 
has argued, then no one will have any incentive to comply with state procedural rules.315
Although one occasionally sees references to state dignitary interests in habeas opinions, 
they tend to take a back seat to the practical costs that federal habeas review imposes on 
state law enforcement.316  Nonetheless, the autonomy concerns present in habeas cases 
are at one further remove from those at issue when the Court decides whether or not to 
impose federal constitutional rules on the states in the first place.317
311 But see Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003) (invalidating state court death sentence on grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (same).  Because of the key role 
that ineffective assistance plays in habeas cases, and because Wiggins and Williams are the first cases in 
many, many years in which the Court has vindicated an ineffective assistance claim, these decisions may 
represent an important loosening of the constraints on habeas relief.
312 See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see generally Daniel 
J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128 (1986).
313 See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748 (observing that “federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate 
both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional 
rights.”) (quoting Sykes, 433 U.S. at 128).
314 See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554-56 (1998).
315 See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-35 (1986).
316 See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 738-39 (“State courts presumably have a dignitary interest in seeing that 
their state law decisions are not ignored by a federal habeas court, but most of the price paid for federal 
review of state prisoner claims is paid by the State. When a federal habeas court considers the federal 
claims of a prisoner in state custody for independent and adequate state law reasons, it is the State that must 
respond. It is the State that pays the price in terms of the uncertainty and delay added to the enforcement of 
its criminal laws.”).
317 Compare, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that state courts are not bound by the 
federal exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding 
that state courts are bound by the exclusionary rule); see also id. at 681 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In my 
view this Court should continue to forbear from fettering the States with an adamant rule which may 
embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar problems in criminal law enforcement.”).
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Given that most federalism doctrines will serve both sovereignty and autonomy to 
some degree, the evidence so far hardly demonstrates a clear commitment to the former 
over the latter.  But the case for such a commitment becomes much clearer, in my view, 
when we turn to the cases in which the Rehnquist Court’s pro-states majority has failed to 
protect state autonomy.  The most important cases here involve preemption of state laws 
by federal statutes, administrative agency action, and judge-made federal common law.  
A number of commentators – including this one – have observed that the Court’s 
putatively pro-states majority often votes against the States in preemption cases.318  The 
strong tendency of the Rehnquist Court is to find state law preempted more often than 
not,319 and the five Justices who made up the pro-states majority in cases like Lopez, 
Printz, and Seminole Tribe are the most likely to favor preemption.320  As Calvin Massey 
has observed, “[i]t is hard to understand why Justices who are so aware of the values of 
federalism in Lopez, Morrison, or Garrett exhibit such blindness to those values when 
presented with a preemption case.”321
I have canvassed the Rehnquist Court’s preemption jurisprudence in wearisome
detail in a companion article,322 so I will provide only a few examples here.  Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly323 is perhaps the most striking.  There, the Court held that federal 
law requiring warning labels on cigarette packages preempted a Massachusetts law 
forbidding sign and poster advertising near schools.  In dissent, Justice Stevens pointed 
out that “[t]he Court’s holding that federal law precludes States and localities from 
protecting children from dangerous products within 1,0000 feet of a school is particularly 
ironic given the Court’s conclusion [in Lopez] that the Federal Government lacks the 
constitutional authority to impose a similarly-motivated ban.”324  Even more ironic was 
the line-up, which featured exactly the same five-four split as in Lopez, except that the 
putatively pro-states “conservatives” voted to strike down the state law. 
318 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 362-78 
[hereinafter Meltzer, Judicial Passivity]; Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at ___; Calvin 
Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 502-12 (2002); Young, Two Cheers, 
supra note ___, at ___.
319 See Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 462 (noting that the Court found preemption in 
nearly two-thirds of the thirty-five preemption cases decided since Justice Thomas joined the Court).
320 See Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note 318, at 369-70 (observing that “of eight non-unanimous 
preemption decisions in the 1999, 2000, and 2001 Terms, Justice Scalia voted to preempt in all eight, the 
Chief Justice and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy in seven each, and Justice Thomas in six.  By contrast . . 
. in those same eight cases, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer each voted to preempt only twice and 
Justice Stevens never voted to preempt”).
321
 Massey, supra note 318, at 508.
322 See Young, Preemption, supra note 19.
323
 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
324 Id. at 598 n.8.  Of course, Congress could not doubt ban advertising within 1000 feet of a school, since 
advertising presumably is a commercial activity.  But Justice Stevens’ basic point – that Lorillard involved 
exactly the same sort of basic police-power regulation that Lopez took to be at the heart of federalism –
stands nonetheless.  One might also reverse the irony and ask why, if Justice Stevens was so solicitous of 
local control in Lorillard, he voted the other way in Lopez.
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Lorillard is suggestive because of its facts, but it pales in importance beside a 
case like AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,325 decided in 1999.  The federalism issue 
in that case concerned whether the new rules implementing competition in the local 
telephone market under the 1996 Telecommunications Act would be written by the 
Federal Communications Commission or the state regulatory agencies.  Local telephone 
regulation had expressly belonged to the States under the 1934 Communications Act, and 
nothing in the new statute clearly purported to shift implementation responsibility to 
Washington.326  Nonetheless, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion found the dissenters’ 
invocation of federalism “most peculiar”; to him, the case was a straight up question of 
federal administrative law with no vertical structural implications.  But Iowa Utilities 
Board obli terated more state regulatory “turf” at one fell swoop than any other decision 
in recent memory.327
As I discuss in more detail in Section D, preemption cases are the quintessential 
“autonomy” cases.  They concern whether the states will continue to have the authority to 
regulate third parties within their own jurisdiction, pursuant to their own view of the 
public interest, or whether that authority will be displaced by federal control.  The 
Rehnquist Court majority’s failure to see central federalism concerns at issue in 
preemption cases thus provides the best evidence that, for them, the central values of 
federalism lie elsewhere – not in state regulatory autonomy, but in the sovereign 
prerogative of state institutions themselves to be exempt from federal intrusion or control.  
To be sure, elements of the Court’s jurisprudence – most importantly, the Court’s limited 
revival of the doctrine of enumerated powers in cases like Lopez and Morrison – seem 
directed to autonomy-type concerns.328  These departures serve as reminders of the 
difference between theoretical models and the inevitably more messy judicial 
performance that the models help us to evaluate.  I do think it is fair to conclude, 
however, that the Rehnquist Court’s strong tendency has been to promote a vision of state 
sovereignty that bears only an attenuated link to the viability of state governance.
The reasons for this choice of emphasis are not obvious, and I do not pretend to 
offer a complete explanation here.  As Richard Fallon has demonstrated, much of the 
Court’s emphasis on sovereign immunity may be path dependent:  “Significant obstacles 
impede aggressive steps to protect federalism along other paths,” he points out.  “By 
contrast, the Court has learned how to deploy sovereign immunity to symbolize and 
325
 525 U.S. 366 (1999).  I have discussed Iowa Utilities Board in greater detail in an earlier work.  See
Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at 39-42 (arguing that Iowa Utilities Board was far more 
important to federalism that the sovereign immunity decisions in the same Term, including Alden and the 
Florida Prepaid cases).
326 See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the States retained 
administrative authority over the local market), rev’d, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
327
 Justice Breyer tellingly compared the impact of Iowa Utilities Board with Printz, in which Justice Scalia 
had waxed eloquent about in the intrusion on state sovereignty arising from a federal requirement that state 
law enforcement officials conduct background checks for gun sales.  “Today's decision,” he said, “does 
deprive the States of practically significant power, a camel compared with Printz's gnat.”  Iowa Utils. Bd., 
525 U.S. at 427 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
328 See infra TAN ___.
13-Jul-04 draft
66
protect federalism.”329  Path dependence may also explain the Court’s efforts to protect 
state sovereignty in habeas cases:  Courts have traditionally taken a strong role in shaping 
habeas relief, and for much of the past decade Congress has been supportive of the 
Court’s effort to narrow the availability of the writ.330  Finally, both the immunity cases 
and the habeas cases dovetail with politically conservative suspicions of civil plaintiffs 
and criminal defendants.331
Nonetheless, these explanations seem unlikely to capture the whole picture.  After 
all, many of the Court’s critics – people who would overrule the precedents that the Court 
has built upon, and who generally do not share the political predilections that some of the 
cases may vindicate – seem to accept the states’ righters’ assumption about the central 
importance of doctrines like National League of Cities or state sovereign immunity in 
determining the balance of power between the States and the Nation.  How else could one 
argue, for example, that the Court’s state sovereign immunity decisions have truly 
“narrowed the nation’s power” and altered our federal balance in favor of the States?332
A wide range of people on both sides of the federalism debate seem to agree that 
sovereignty is just what federalism is about.
2. Judicial Review
So much for the first dimension of federalism doctrine – the choice of sovereignty 
over autonomy.  What about the other two variables, which are concerned with the focus 
and structure of judicial review?  Many commentators have seen the Court as plainly 
committed to a strong judicial role focused on drawing substantive lines between state 
and federal authority.  In one important article, for instance, John Yoo observed that the 
Rehnquist Court’s recent decisions “have reasserted the applicability of judicial review to 
questions concerning state sovereignty and the proper balance between the national and 
state governments.”333  That meant, for Professor Yoo, that the Court would “establish 
329 See Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 482.
330 [cites]
331
 Any political explanation must be tempered, however, by the relatively apolitical or politically mixed 
nature of some of the major immunity cases.  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996) (invalidating certain enforcement provisions of the not-exactly-ideologically-charged Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating the state liability portion of the Patent Act – a statute under which large 
businesses often sue as plaintiffs).  Likewise, the habeas picture is complicated by the fact that the 
Rehnquist Court has issued a number of pro-defendant landmarks lately, see, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 
S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of the mentally retarded); Ring v. 
Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002) (holding that aggravating factors in capital sentencing must be found by a 
jury, not a judge); supra note 311 (cases upholding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel), and has 
often found itself in the role of narrowing and moderating harsher limits on habeas enacted by Congress, 
see, e.g., [cites].
332 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE  SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE 
STATES 156 (2002).  But see Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government?  State 
Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1560-66 
(2003) (book review) [hereinafter Young, Sky Falling] (arguing that Judge Noonan radically overstates the 
importance of these cases).
333
 Yoo, Judicial Safeguards, supra note 163, at 1312. 
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areas of state control that are to remain immune from federal regulation.”334  Although 
Professor Yoo acknowledged that “the Court has and will continue to debate where the 
line is to be drawn between federal enumerated powers and state sovereignty,” he 
nonetheless concluded that “there seems to be little dispute on the Court over its 
institutional obligation to draw that line.”335
Professor Yoo’s assessment is most obviously applicable to the Commerce Clause 
cases, Lopez and Morrison.  Although Lopez contained language suggestive of a process 
focus,336 Morrison makes clear that the doctrine turns on substance:  Congress may only 
regulate commercial activity under the Commerce Clause.  The Court’s other line of 
enumerated powers cases – construing the limits of Congress’s power to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments337 – is similar.  One can make a case for process orientation 
here as well by focusing on the Court’s language concerning the legislative record 
compiled by Congress in enacting the law.338  But I and others have argued elsewhere 
that a more plausible reading of the cases focuses on the nature of the activity prohibited 
by Congress and the proportion of that activity that is actually unconstitutional under the 
constitutional provision that Congress is enforcing.339  That would put these cases firmly 
on the substance side of the relevant divide.
The immunity cases also generally fit this preference for substance over process.  
One occasionally sees a process argument in the opinions:  The Court has suggested, for 
instance, that we should worry about the U.S. government delegating to private persons 
its right to sue the states notwithstanding immunity, because private suits are not subject 
to the same political checks as suits by federal governmental actors.340  But by and large 
these cases are about the substance of federal legislation – the imposition of liability on 
state institutions – rather than defects in the federal lawmaking process that produces the 
334 Id.
335 Id.  Professor Yoo’s assertion that there is “little dispute on the Court over its institutional obligation” is 
true to the extent that the dissenters in cases like Lopez and Morrison have not argued that the legal 
questions are non-justiciable.  But surely there is considerable dispute as to whether the judicial job 
description includes the task of enforcing meaningful limits on federal enumerated powers.  I discuss that 
dispute in Section C, infra.  
336 See supra note 219 (discussing the mention of congressional findings and jurisdictional elements in the 
Lopez opinion).
337 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act on the ground that it was not designed to prevent or remedy an actual constitutional 
violation).
338 See, e.g., NOONAN, supra note ___, at 6; [others]. 
339 See Young, Sky Falling, supra note ___, at 1577-80; Berman, Reese, & Young, supra note 259, at 1072-
74.  As my colleague Doug Laycock has explained, “[t]he proportionality part of [the City of Boerne] 
standard seems to require an empirical judgment:  Congressional enforcement legislation is valid only if 
violations of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, appear in a sufficiently large proportion of all 
cases presenting violations of the statute.” Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 746 (1998).  Findings in the record are important to assist the Court in 
making this empirical judgment, not to determining whether the law in question was enacted by an 
appropriate process. 
340 [Alden]
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challenged statutes.  And the rules produced – that Congress may not abrogate the 
sovereign immunity of the states – are not designed to enhance the States’ representation 
in Congress or shore up their political position more generally.  If anything, the Court’s 
notion of immunity may be counterproductive to that purpose.341
These two areas of the Court’s jurisprudence – the Commerce Clause and 
immunity cases – have also generally featured “hard” doctrinal rules.  Although Congress 
has treated Lopez as a remand for more legislative findings,342 that effort seems unlikely 
to save the statute should it be challenged again.  It seems better to read Lopez and 
especially Morrison as categorical statements that non-commercial activities are simply 
outside the scope of Congress’s commerce power.  So, too, with the immunity cases.  
There, the Court has substituted a hard rule (Congress simply may not abrogate state 
immunities when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers343) for the pre-existing soft one 
(Congress may abrogate only by making a very, very clear statement of its intent344).  
Indeed, to the extent that the soft rule remains operative in Section Five abrogation 
cases,345 the Court has watered it down by no longer requiring painfully explicit 
abrogation language in the text of the statute itself.346  That move strongly suggests that 
the Court has placed its faith in hard rules as the primary guarantors of state sovereignty.
As with the choice between sovereignty and autonomy, the Court’s preference for 
hard, substantive rules may be best illustrated by the cases in which the justices in the 
usual pro-states majority have not sided with the States.  Again, the preemption cases are 
the best example.  The basic presumption against preemption in statutory construction347
is substantive in the sense that it would turn upon the substantive effect of the federal 
statute in question rather than defects in the lawmaking process that gave rise to the 
statute.348  But we might rely on process-oriented justifications for such a rule.  One 
might argue, for instance, that the sort of concentrated interest groups that often seek 
preemption of state regulation have certain organizational advantages at the federal level 
that offset state representation.349  More fundamentally, one might emphasize the extent 
341 See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at ___ (arguing that immunity rules may lead 
Congress to impose more draconian alternatives and to eschew devolution of authority to States); 
[Karlan?].
342 [cite]
343 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
344 [cite]
345 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at ___ (affirming that Congress retains the power to abrogate under 
Sec tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
346 Compare [Garrett w/Dellmuth]
347 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
348
 Other anti-preemption rules might be more obviously process-oriented.  For example, a rule restricting 
the preemptive powers of federal actors other than Congress – such as federal administrative agencies –
would be triggered by the fact that the statute originated from a part of the federal government in which the 
states are not represented.  See Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at ___ (discussing the preemptive 
powers of federal agencies); infra TAN ___.
349 [cite]
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to which widespread preemption threatens the state autonomy necessary to maintain a 
viable system of political checks on central power.350  Consistent with its focus on the 
substantive scope of federal power, the Rehnquist Court has been relatively uninterested 
in these sorts of arguments.
The presumption against preemption is also the quintessential “soft” limit on 
federal power.  When the courts rule that a federal statute does not preempt state law, 
Congress can always amend the act to clarify its intent to preempt more broadly.  The 
unwillingness of many usually pro-states justices to apply the anti-preemption canon 
rigorously may reflect a general lack of faith in soft rules and a preference for the harder 
limits offered in cases like Lopez or Seminole Tribe.  That preference is explicit in the 
writings of several scholars sympathetic to the general aims of the Federalist Revival but 
critical of the presumption against preemption.351
There may be any number of explanations for the pro-states justices’ distaste for 
the presumption against preemption.  It may reflect the fact that federal preemption 
generally displaces more rigorous state regulation, so that political conservatives 
generally hostile to government regulation may be sympathetic to preemption 
arguments.352  Several of the ordinarily pro-states justices, like Justice Scalia, tend to 
believe that statutes have a readily discernible “plain meaning”; for that reason, they may 
be relatively uninterested in “clear statement” rules whose application is predicated on 
statutory ambiguity.353  I explore this question of motivation further in a companion 
article.354  The important point for present purposes, however, is simply that the five 
justices ordinarily constituting the Rehnquist Court’s pro-states majority have tended to 
deemphasize the most important form of “soft” limit on federal power.
But just as the Rehnquist Court has not single-mindedly pursued sovereignty over 
autonomy, so, too, it has taken different directions at different times on the focus and 
structure of judicial review.   Under the Commerce Clause, for instance, Lopez and 
Morrison exist side-by-side with Jones v. United States355 and Solid Waste Association v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,356 both of which employed “soft” clear statement rules to 
avoid decision whether the statutes in question fell within or without the outer reaches of 
the Commerce Clause.  Jones used a soft rule that turned on the substance of the 
regulated activity (arson of a non-commercial building).357 Solid Waste, on the other 
350
 I discuss this argument infra TAN ___.
351 See Dinh, supra note ___, at ___; Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, ___ (2000).
352 [cite Meltzer; Fallon; Chemerinsky]
353 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 
521 (“One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its 
relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement [of statutory 
ambiguity] for Chevron deference exists.”).
354 See Young, Preemption, supra note ___, at ___.
355
 529 U.S. 848 (2000)
356
 Solid Waste Assn. of Northern Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
357 See 529 U.S. at ___ 
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hand, combined its soft rule with a process-based concern about delegation of power to 
administrative agencies.358  In essence, Solid Waste held that administrative agencies 
(which in corporate no mechanism for representing state interests) may not push the 
limits of the Commerce Clause unless Congress (where the states are represented) clearly 
authorizes them to do so.359
The anti-commandeering doctrine of Printz and New York offers a more dramatic 
instance of process federalism.360   While that doctrine is not concerned with the process 
that led to enactment of a law like the Brady Act, it does focus on the ways in which 
commandeering can undermine the political safeguards that ordinarily operate to protect 
states.  Hence, the Court has emphasized the ways in which commandeering distorts the 
ordinary operation of the political process by shifting the costs of regulation and 
obscuring which level of government is responsible for unpopular policies.361  Justice 
Scalia explained in Printz that 
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of 
implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can 
take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents 
to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even when the 
States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal 
program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its 
burdensomeness and for its defects.362
Put another way, the anti-commandeering doctrine helps shore up the political safeguards 
of federalism by forcing the national government to internalize the costs – both fiscal and 
political – of its actions.363
Printz and New York establish the anti-commandeering principle as a hard limit 
on national power:  Congress cannot, for instance, overcome that principle by clearly 
stating its intent to do so.  But much of that firmness disappears when we take into 
account the Court’s refusal to place any meaningful limits on Congress’s power to 
358 See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117, at ___ (explaining how delegation of lawmaking 
authority to administrative agencies raises process federalism concerns); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 
___, at ___ (same).
359 See Solid Waste, ___ U.S. at ___ [quote]
360
 It is somewhat harder to place anti-commandeering on the continuum between sovereignty and 
autonomy. Some have identified the anti-commandeering cases with a “sovereignty” model of federalism, 
see, e.g., Werhan, supra note ___, at 1273-74, and it is true that the very term “commandeering” may 
connote some sovereignty-based concern about state dignity; the Court sometimes seems to suggest that 
ordering state officials about is simply inconsistent with the respect that a coordinate sovereign government 
deserves.  [cite]  But the Court has balanced that strand of the anti-commandeering argument with another 
suggesting that conscripting state institutions to pursue federal policies trades off with those institutions’ 
autonomy to pursue their own goals.  [cites]  At the end of the day, the doctrine seems relatively well-
adapted to pursue both sovereignty and autonomy ends.  That in itself is an important point, as it 
demonstrates that these goals need not always trade off with one another.
361 [cites]
362
 Printz v. United States, 527 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
363 See Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at ___.
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condition federal funding on state compliance with federal directives.364  Absent such 
limits, Congress may generally purchase state implementation of federal policies through 
conditions on the grant of federal funds.365  That hardly renders the anti-commandeering 
doctrine meaningless; as Roderick Hills has demonstrated, there are good reasons to 
prefer a regime under which Congress must purchase state implementation rather than 
simply mandate it.366  In particular, the purchase price undermines Congress’s ability to 
use commandeering to externalize the costs of its regulation.  The conditional spending 
option does, however, largely transform the anti-commandeering rule into a “soft” 
doctrine that Congress can generally overcome through further action.367
These examples again demonstrate that while particular models of judicial review 
may help to analyze trends in the jurisprudence of actual courts, we rarely see such 
models in their pure form.  It seems fair to say that the vision of federalism embraced by 
the five justices of the Rehnquist Court’s usually pro-states majority leans strongly 
toward this “strong sovereignty” model, choosing sovereignty over autonomy, substance 
over process-oriented rules, and hard doctrines rather than soft ones.  To say the 
jurisprudence “leans” in this direction is to admit that not all cases fit the pattern.  But the 
model is useful, I hope, in comparing the majority’s approach both to other positions on 
the Court and to the somewhat different model I will be pressing here.
C. Weak Autonomy
If state sovereignty has prospered under the Rehnquist Court, state autonomy has 
had a considerably tougher time of it.  That might initially seem like a strange judgment;
after all, many still see Lopez v. United States – as well as its follow-up in United States 
v. Morrison – as the paradigm cases of the Federalist Revival.  The Commerce Clause 
cases do address state autonomy relatively directly by holding that some areas are off-
limits to federal legislation.368  If Congress were to attempt to supplant state autonomy to 
make regulatory decisions over physician-assisted suicide or gay marriage, for example, 
Lopez and Morrison would likely offer the most promising basis for challenging such 
legislation.369
364 See South Dakota v. Dole [cite]; see generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After 
Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1947-51 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, Conditional Spending],
365 See, e.g., New York [cite] (noting that Congress retains this option and upholding a portion of the law in 
question as a valid instance of conditional federal spending).
366 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
367
 One might say the same thing of any hard rule, and in fact conditional spending is proposed as a 
response to judicial decisions under the Commerce Clause and Eleventh Amendment as well.  Nonetheless, 
conditional spending (and its cousin, conditional preemption) seem more prevalent in the commandeering 
context than in these other areas.  [cites]
368
 This is true even though the particular statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison were not preemptive –
that is, they did not forbid parallel state legislation on the same subjects.  
369 See, e.g., Stephanie Hendricks, Note, Pain Relief, Death with Dignity, and Commerce: The 
Constitutionality of Congressional Attempts to Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon via the 
Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691 (2001); Grant S. Nelson & 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal 
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The emphasis on Lopez and Morrison is understandable.   Lopez was the most 
dramatic of all the recent cases in its departure from prior trends, invalidating a federal 
statute under the Commerce Clause for the first time in nearly 60 years.  The Commerce 
Clause cases are also the easiest to teach in the first-year course in Constitutional Law, 
which is often the only exposure to constitutional federalism that attorneys receive in law 
school.  The more significant cases concerning state sovereign immunity, for instance, 
are typically held for more advanced courses in federal jurisdiction.370
Nonetheless, Lopez and Morrison are likely to have only limited practical 
significance.  They seem thus far to have had little impact on the lower courts.371  And 
even if lower court judges could be persuaded to follow, it is unclear how far the 
Supreme Court is willing to lead.  Lopez and Morrison were both extreme cases; if the 
Court had upheld either the Gun Free School Zones Act or the Violence Against Women 
Act, it would have been very difficult to say there was any limit at all on the commerce 
power.372  To say that such a limit exists, however, is not to say that it is very 
constraining.  Most important, the Court has conceded that the national economy has 
become integrated to the extent that there is no meaningful distinction between intra- and 
inter-state commerce; rather, there is just “commerce.”373  And the Court has also 
eschewed any effort to compartmentalize the various forms of economic activity, as it 
once sought to distinguish between “commerce” and “manufacturing” or “agriculture.”374
Now all of these things are “commerce”; that term, the Court has made clear, 
Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 170-72 (1999) 
(discussing same-sex marriage).
370
 I once tried to teach a reasonably detailed unit on the Eleventh Amendment to first-years in Con Law I.  
One would hope that my students must have forgiven me by now, but I’m not confident.  
371 See generally Reynolds & Denning, supra note 2.  Professors Reynolds and Denning concluded in 2000 
that lower courts had generally been exceptionally reluctant to follow Lopez and find other federal statutes 
to be outside the commerce power.  See id. at ___.   They updated their research in 2003, almost three years 
after the Court’s Morrison decision confirming the new course charted in Lopez.    Reynolds and Denning 
found that 
Contrary to the fears of numerous critics of Lopez and Morrison, the decisions have not loosed a 
flood of opinions holding congressional statutes unconstitutional. In fact, in nearly two years 
following Morrison, only one statute has been held unconstitutional on its face, and that decision 
did not survive en banc review. Courts have, however, been marginally more comfortable 
sustaining as applied challenges to legislation containing commands that activity be "in interstate 
commerce," "affect interstate commerce," and the like. 
Id. at 1256.   Interestingly, Reynolds and Denning reach the “unsettling” conclusion that “there is more at 
work here than mere judicial self-restraint. . . .  The more strenuously the courts resist the implementation 
of Lopez and its progeny, the more it begins to look as if the courts simply disagree with the results.”  Id.
372 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“To uphold the Government's contentions 
here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the 
States.”).
373 See Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions? 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 37-38 (1995); Young, Dual 
Federalism, supra note ___, at159.
374
 [cite Hammer; others]
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comprehends all “economic activity.”375  These concessions belie Erwin Chemerinsky’s 
assertion that “there has been a revolution with regard to the structure of the American 
government because of the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding 
federalism.”376
Despite such breathless assessments, these decisions seem important mostly for 
what they symbolize, not what they actually do.  They may also (perhaps) remind the 
Congress to consider the limits of its powers when it acts.377  We must look elsewhere, 
however, for meaningful protection for state autonomy.  Fortunately, there is an 
elsewhere, and it crops up in an unusual quarter.  The same justices who have formed a 
monolithic dissenting bloc in cases like Lopez, Printz, and Seminole Tribe378 have also, in 
a different class of opinions dealing with the preemption of state law, developed their 
own theory of federalism enforcement.  This theory forms the heart of the “weak 
autonomy” model of federalism doctrine.
I have already canvassed some of the Court’s recent preemption cases in my 
treatment of the strong sovereignty model.  As I discussed, cases like Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly are striking because they reverse the ordinary voting alignments:  Ordinarily 
pro-states justices forget about federalism in preemption cases, and generally nationalist 
justices suddenly remember.  Nor are Lorillard or Iowa Utilities Board flukes.  As Dan 
Meltzer has shown, the Lopez majority is consistently pro-preemption and the Lopez
dissenters consistently oppose it.379
The significance of the preemption cases goes beyond the voting alignments, 
however.  Equally important are the rationales that the putatively nationalist give for 
reaching the results that they do.  All these cases concern the central problem of how to 
treat federal statutes that are ambiguous on the subject of their preemptive effect on state 
law.  There are a variety of sub-issues:  How does the presence of an express preemption 
375 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (“[I]n those cases where we have sustained 
federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, 
the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.”).
376
 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001).  To be fair, Professor 
Chemerinksy seems to have had in mind the anti-commandeering cases and the state sovereign immunity 
cases as well.  But neither of those doctrinal lines has worked a “revolution with regard to the structure of 
the American government” either.  The anti-commandeering cases involved minor statutes, and most 
commandeering is voluntary.  See Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at ___; [Hills?].  And the state 
sovereign immunity cases, while much more important, leave many avenues for relief against states and are 
relatively continuous with prior precedent.  They are thus “revolutionary” in neither a practical nor a 
doctrinal sense.  See Young, Sky Falling, supra note ___, at ___. 
377 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 191-95 (1982) 
(discussing the “cueing function” of the National League of Cities doctrine); Bednar & Eskridge, supra
note 202, at 1484 (arguing that Lopez may serve the same function).
378
 That would be Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  These are sometimes called the “Fab 
Four” to match the “Federalist Five.”
379 See Meltzer, Judicial Passivity, supra note ___, at ___; see also Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 
___, at ___.
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clause change the analysis for issues outside the scope of that clause?380  How much 
deference should the views of the enforcing agency get on the preemption question?381
Does it matter if Congress is regulating within a field of “traditional state concern”?382
But at bottom these are generally cases about how strongly to apply a longstanding rule 
of statutory construction that Congress should generally make itself clear before a court 
should find preemption of state law.383 On this question, the Lopez dissenters have 
generally demanded considerably more evidence to defeat this “presumption against 
preemption” than have the members of the Lopez majority.384
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.385 provides a 
good window into the weak autonomy model of federalism doctrine.  Geier was one of 
five major preemption cases decided in the 1999 Term.386  All of them went against the 
States, at the same time that the Court was working hard to promote state sovereignty in 
cases like Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents387 and the Alden trilogy.388 Geier itself was 
a products liability suit by an injured motorist who claimed that her car was defectively 
380 Compare, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (suggesting that presence of 
an express preemption clause creates a strong presumption that state measures not covered by that clause 
are not preempted) with id. at 545-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(rejecting this view).
381 Compare, e.g., Medtronic, inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 505-07 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
in the judgment) (suggesting some degree of deference to agency interpretations of Congress’s preemptive
intent) with id. at 511-12 (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (arguing against such deference 
to the agency).
382 Compare, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (suggesting that the presumption against 
preemption “is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of 
significant federal presence”) with Medtronic, 470 U.S. at 485 (majority opinion) (suggesting that the 
presumption applies “[i]n all pre-emption cases”).
383
 On the history of this rule of construction, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 767, ___ (1994) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Preemption].
384 See generally Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note ___, at ___.  For an example, compare Gade v. Nat’l 
Solid Wastes Mgt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 96-104 (1992) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (finding that 
federal OSHA regulations impliedly preempted any state standard on a subject where a federal standard 
existed) with id. at 116-17 (Souter, J., dissenting) (insisting that “[i]f the statute's terms can be read sensibly 
not to have a pre-emptive effect, the presumption controls and no pre-emption may be inferred”).
385
 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
386
 The others were Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (federal regulations preempted state safety regulation of oil 
tankers); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (federal law preempted state restrictions on 
tobacco ads); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (federal law preempted state 
sanctions imposed to protest Burma’s human rights record);  Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee, 531 
U.S. 341 (2001) (federal law preempted state law tort claims involving medical devices); see also Egelhoff 
v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (holding, in a less prominent case, that the federal ERISA preempted a 
state probate statute).
387
 [cite]
388
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (19999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College 
Sav ings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).  These immunity decisions came in the 1998 Term, just one year prior to the 
preemption decisions cited in note 386, supra.
13-Jul-04 draft
75
designed because it lacked an airbag.  Honda defended on the ground that Department of 
Transportation standards promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act did not require airbags for Ms. Geier’s model year, and that this federal policy 
judgment preempted the state tort suit.389  A majority of the Court agreed, finding that 
while the Act itself did not expressly preempt Ms. Geier’s suit, the suit did conflict with 
the policy embodied in the DOT’s regulations promulgated under the Act.390
Justice Stevens began his analysis in dissent by noting that “‘[t]his is a case about 
federalism,’” raising “important questions concerning the way in which the Federal 
Government may exercise its undoubted power to oust state courts of their traditional 
jurisdiction over common-law tort actions.”391  He emphasized the impact of federal 
preemption on the state’s autonomy to make basic policy choices for itself, insisting 
that”[t]he Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte blanche to use 
federal law as a means of imposing their own ideas of tort reform on the States.”392
Justice Stevens also highlighted the process concerns implicated by doctrines of implied 
preemption like the conflict theory employed by the Geier majority.  “Congress neither 
enacted any such rule itself [that state courts may not entertain airbag suits] nor 
authorized the Secretary of Transportation to do so.”393  In such cases, the presumption 
against preemption should control:  
The signal virtues of this presumption are its placement of the power of 
pre-emption squarely in the hands of Congress, which is far more suited 
than the Judiciary to strike the appropriate state/federal balance 
(particularly in areas of traditional state regulation) . . . .  In this way, the 
structural safeguards inherent in the normal operation of the legislative 
process operate to defend state interests from undue infringement.394
389 Geier, 529 U.S. at ___.
390 Id. at ___.
391
 529 U.S. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991)).  
Coleman was a habeas case that strongly emphasized the respect that federal courts owe to state tribunals.  
By quoting that language, Justice Stevens both tweaked his more conservative colleagues in the majority 
(Stevens had dissented in Coleman) and made the more important point that preemption cases raise the 
same sorts of basic federalism concerns that are more commonly acknowledged in other kinds of cases. 
392 Id. at 894.
393 Id. at 887.
394 Id. at 907.  Likewise, Justice Stevens identified even more serious process concerns where, as in Geier, 
“the preemptive effect of an administrative regulation is at issue.”  Id. at 908.  He explained:
Unlike Congress, administrative agencies are clearly not designed to represent the interests of 
States, yet with relative ease they can promulgate comprehensive and detailed regulations that 
have broad pre-emption ramifications for state law.  We have addressed the heightened federalism 
and nondelegation concerns that agency pre-emption raises by using the presumption [against 
preemption to build a procedural bridge across the political accountability gap between States and 
administrative agencies.  Thus, even in cases where implied regulatory pre-emption is at issue, we 
generally “expect an administrative regulation to declare any intention to pre-empt state law with 
some specificity.” . . .  This expectation . . . serves to ensure that States will be able to have a 
dialog with agencies regarding pre-emption decisions ex ante through the normal notice-and-
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.
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Finally, Justice Stevens stressed the dialogic nature of the “soft” presumption against 
preemption; rejecting the preemption argument in the case before the Court, he noted, 
would still leave to the political branches the option of clarifying their preemptive intent 
later on.395
The presumption against preemption that Justice Stevens argued for in Geier is, of 
course, a rule of statutory construction.  For that reason, many seem to treat preemption 
cases as hardly raising any constitutional issues at all.396  But the presumption against 
preemption – along with the other pro-federalism “clear statement” rules – are in fact a 
form of constitutional review.  Clear statement rules matter only when they cause a court 
to pick an interpretation of a statute other than the one it would have picked in the 
absence of the rule.397   That requires us to ask, What justifies a court in departing from
what would otherwise be its best interpretation of what the enacting Congress intended?  
I argue in Part VII that he best answer to that question in the federalism context – perhaps 
the only plausible answer – is that principles of federalism derived from the constitutional 
structure require the departure.  The clear statement rules must be defended on the same 
sorts of grounds as, say, the anti-commandeering doctrine:  Both doctrines are judge-
made rules, not clearly grounded in constitutional text, but functionally promising as 
means to enforce federalism under contemporary conditions.398
When a court applies a judge-made rule of statutory construction for the purpose 
of protecting state autonomy, in other words, it is enforcing the Constitution.  Such a 
decision neither ignores federalism concerns nor, as Justice Souter suggested in his 
Morrison dissent, “remits them to politics.”399  The preemption cases thus make clear that 
when these justices speak of “political safeguards” in the Commerce Clause and state 
sovereign immunity cases, they are willing to formulate and apply doctrine to try to 
ensure that those safeguards have some bite.  
Several qualifications are in order.  First, the various justices’ positions in 
preemption cases are not nearly as consistent as their positions on the Commerce Clause 
or the Eleventh Amendment.  Justice Breyer wrote the pro-preemption majority opinion 
Id. at 980-09 (quoting California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987)). 
395 See id. at 912 (“Requiring the Secretary to put his pre-emptive position through formal notice-and-
comment rulemaking -- whether contemporaneously with the promulgation of the allegedly pre-emptive 
regulation or at any later time that the need for pre-emption becomes apparent -- respects both the 
federalism and nondelegation principles that underlie the presumption against pre-emption in the regulatory 
context and the APA's requirement of new rulemaking when an agency substantially modifies its 
interpretation of a regulation.”).
396 See, e.g., Gardbaum, Preemption, supra note 383, at 768 (observing that “preemption has largely been 
ignored by constitutional law scholars,” despite the fact that “it is almost certainly the most frequently used 
doctrine of constitutional law in practice”). There is, of course, the point that state laws conflicting with 
federal laws are unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause, but the anterior question of how to interpret 
the scope of the federal law is generally thought to raise no constitutional concern.
397 See Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, supra note ___, at ___ (making this point in the particular context of 
the canon favoring construing statutes to avoid constitutional questions).
398 See infra Section VII.___.
399
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. ___, ___ (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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in Geier, for example, and Justice Thomas dissented in Iowa Utilities Board.400  Over the 
run of cases, the four Lopez dissenters are pretty consistently “better” for the States in 
preemption cases, but these cases are not uniformly five-to-four, many are unanimous, 
and most justices are likely to vote for preemption in some cases and others.  This should 
not be surprising, since preemption cases will always turn at least in part on what the 
particular statute in question actually says.
The second caveat is that while the dissenters have promoted a vision of process-
based, soft limits on federal power in the preemption cases, they have often been 
unwilling to follow that model in similar sorts of cases arising in other contexts.  
Although the record is mixed, these justices have often been skeptical of pro-federalism 
clear statement rules outside the context of preemption.401  Justice Stevens, who often 
seems the intellectual leader of the bloc in terms of developing an alternative positive 
vision of state autonomy, nonetheless dissented from the seminal clear statement decision 
in Gregory v. Ashcroft.402 Both Justices Stevens and Souter have been skeptical of clear 
statement rules protecting state governments from statutory liability,403 and none of the 
Lopez dissenters were willing to accept a clear statement requirement for federal 
legislation delegating authority to federal administrative agencies seeking to push the 
limits of the commerce power.404
Even more important, the “weak autonomy” justices have been unwilling to 
extend their notion of process federalism to embrace “hard” rules predicated on political 
malfunctions.  All four joined Justice Stevens’s strong dissent in Printz, which rejected 
“hard” limits in favor of “political safeguards” for state authority.405  This rejection of the 
process-based anti-commandeering doctrine, taken together with their reticence on clear 
statement rules outside the preemption context, suggests that the Lopez dissenters have 
not yet followed through on Garcia’s invitation to develop a full-blown “Democracy and 
Distrust” model of federalism doctrine.
400 See generally Young, Preemption, supra note ___, at ___ (describing the voting patterns in preemption 
cases in more detail).
401 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), is the most important exception to this skepticism.  Jones
was unanimous, and Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion. Jones v. United States, Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence explicitly linked the clear statement rule employed in Jones to the presumption against 
preemption.  See id. at 859-60 (Stevens, J., concurring).  He also invoked concerns about state regulatory 
autonomy, noting that   “The fact that petitioner received a sentence of 35 years in prison when the 
maximum penalty for the comparable state offense was only 10 years . . . illustrates how a [federal] 
criminal law like this may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State.”  Id. at 859.
402
 501 U.S. 452 (1991).  Justice Souter joined the majority in Gregory, while Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
were not yet on the Court.
403 See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 797-98 
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting with Souter); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 87 
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
404 See Solid Waste Assn. of Northern Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting with Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
405 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 956-57 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer).
13-Jul-04 draft
78
Notwithstanding these limitations, it is important to recognize that the Lopez
dissenters do have a theory of federalism.  It is not judicial abdication, and it highlights a 
value – state autonomy – that the Court’s putatively pro-states majority has often ignored.  
The dissenters’ theory may be incomplete, as I argue in the next section, but it deserves to 
be taken seriously.
D. Strong Autonomy
The weak autonomy model of federalism doctrine has much to recommend it, but 
I doubt it describes in itself an adequate judicial role in enforcing the federal balance.  Its 
unwillingness to draw any firm substantive boundaries for federal power seems likely to 
send a dangerous message to Congress – that is, that it may behave as if no such 
boundaries exist.406  And it likely underestimates the extent to which some problems with 
the process by which states are supposedly represented in Congress may require stronger 
medicine than clear statement rules.  In this Section, I sketch the outlines of a model that 
borrows much from weak autonomy but is, in general, somewhat more willing to look to 
substance and to employ hard doctrinal rules.  For want of a better term, I call this model 
“strong autonomy.”
The approach I propose differs from the “weak autonomy” model in at least three 
important respects.  First, it would employ a wider variety of soft, clear statement-type 
rules than the Lopez dissenters have been willing to accept.  While the dissenters have 
been relatively strong supporters of the presumption against preemption, they have been 
far more reluctant to accept other clear statement rules, such as the requirement that 
Congress generally may not delegate authority to push the limits of its Commerce Clause 
authority to an administrative.407  This reluctance is understandable:  The clear statement 
rules are often predicated on the canon of avoiding constitutional doubts, and in many of 
these cases the dissenters believe that there is no constitutional difficulty under the 
Commerce Clause to be “avoided.”408 Better, then, simply to enforce the statute as it 
would be interpreted without any such presumption.  
This view, however, neglects the possibility that federalism constraints like the 
Commerce Clause may simply be under-enforced.  As Larry Sager has demonstrated, 
some constitutional principles are never fully realized in judicial doctrine because of 
institutional constraints on the ability of courts to enforce them; this does not mean, 
however, that those “underenforced” norms are not themselves constitutional law.409  For 
406
 Simply acknowledging some limit on Congress, on the other hand, may be salutary even if it is not a 
strict one.  As my colleague Doug Laycock has pointed out, “[t]he federalism cases . . . have already 
changed the way the federal government works.  At the very least, vast amounts of effort are expended in 
the other two branches trying to figure out the limits of these cases and how to work within them or around 
them.”  Posting of Douglas Laycock to CONLAWPROF@listserv.ucla.edu (Aug. 1, 2000) (quoted with 
permission).
407 See Solid Waste Assn. of Northern Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting with Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
408 See id. at 192-97 (rejecting any Commerce Clause argument against the federal regulation in question).
409
 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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reasons that I discuss further in Part VI, it makes sense to think of many constitutional 
limits on federal power as underenforced, especially after 1937.410  That fact argues for 
decoupling the federalism clear statement rules from the existence of an underlying 
constitutional likelihood that a court would strike down the statute in question if it were 
not narrowly interpreted.  The fact that Congress might well have the authority to 
regulate migratory birds in the Solid Waste case, for example, doesn’t mean that it is 
inappropriate to require a clear statement delegating authority to the Corps of Engineers 
to do so.  Hence, even if one accepts the dissenting position that courts are not 
institutionally well-suited to enforce hard limits on the Commerce Clause, one might still 
think that soft limits on that authority are justified.  The strong autonomy model would 
also value the process-forcing aspects of these clear statement rules, not just in 
preemption cases but across the board.411
Second, the strong autonomy model contemplates that process federalism may be 
enforced through hard rules as well as soft ones.  In this, it builds upon the suggestion in 
Garcia that “[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must 
find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be 
tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process.”412  The anti-
commandeering rule of Printz and New York is a good example:  Because they clarify 
lines of political accountability and force the national government to internalize its 
financial and political costs, Printz and New York fit squarely into the model of process-
correcting doctrines that Garcia seemed to authorize.  Given the importance of such 
rules, moreover, the strong autonomy model might also seek ways to constrain 
Congress’s ability to circumvent them through the spending power.  
The “weak autonomy” justices, however, have made relatively clear that they are 
unwilling to go beyond “soft” presumptions in imposing limits on federal power.413  It 
seems likely that this reluctance stems from an intuition that “clear statement” rules are 
not really constitutional rules at all – they’re just rules of statutory construction.  I have 
already argued that that view is a mistake:  One cannot justify pushing the interpretation 
of a statute in a particular substantive direction unless one thinks either that the enacting 
legislature would have intended that direction or some other source of law authorizes the 
push.  Few think the federalism canons are in fact accurate descriptions of Congress’s 
intent, and the only alternative justification for them is that they are derived from the 
410 See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note ___, at 1603-04 & n.281 (suggesting that several 
important aspects of the structural constitution – including federalism limitations – are underenforced in the 
sense identified by Professor Sager).
411 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (“[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left 
primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. ‘To give 
the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure 
for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests.’”) (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988)).
412
 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
413 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 183-84 (1996) (suggesting that clear statement 
rules should be the primary strategy for limiting federal power and that harder rules – such as a total 
prohibition on legislative abrogation of state sovereign immunity – are inappropriate).
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constitutional structure itself.414  If that is so, then there is considerably less of a 
principled distinction between “hard” and “soft” rules than the Lopez dissenters seem to 
think.
Finally, the approach I propose recognizes a link between process and substance 
in cases implicating state autonomy.  As I discuss in Part ___, arguments about “political 
safeguards” for federalism presuppose that states are viable, functioning governments 
with sufficiently important and salient responsibilities to attract and retain the loyalty of 
their citizens.  For that to be true, however, states must retain some minimum level of 
autonomy.  Process federalism probably cannot work without some ultimate check on the 
national government’s ability to appropriate important governmental responsibilities 
exercised by the states.  Any rule designed to maintain that check, however, seems likely 
to be substantive in its structure.  It seems likely that process checks should play a 
primary role in constraining the national government, but some minimal substantive 
check may also be necessary.415
Much of the remainder of this essay is concerned with fleshing out and defending 
this strong autonomy model of federalism doctrine.  Whether or not that defense is 
persuasive, however, it is important to recognize that different sorts of federalism 
doctrines may have quite different implications.  Our current debates about federalism, 
unfortunately, generally fail to recognize many of these distinctions.  That has lent a 
stilted and ideological cast to discussions about federalism in the academy and in the 
society at large.  We are more likely to come up with persuasive solutions if we realize 
that the problem is more complex and multi-sided than is frequently supposed.  
III. Federalism, History, and Constitutional Change
My central concern in this article is how we should choose among the different 
theories of federalism doctrine discussed in the preceding Part.  One possibility is that the 
text and history of the Constitution make that decision for us, either by mandating 
particular doctrines or at least embodying a particular theory of federalism.   Assuming 
we find text and history binding – and I will discuss different reasons why we might –
these two possibilities suggest different degrees of constraint for judges tasked with 
enforcing federalism today.  The former would leave relatively little room for judicial 
creativity; federalism doctrine would be found, not made.  The latter, on the other hand, 
would leave judges free to fashion means for implementing, say, a strong sovereignty 
theory of federalism, but would foreclose consideration of alternate models.  
I argue in this Part that neither text nor history constrains federalism doctrine in 
either of these two senses.  While textual and historical arguments have played a critical 
role in recent federalism cases – witness, for instance, the historical trench warfare 
between Justices Stevens and Thomas in the Term Limits case416 – they play a less central 
414 See supra TAN ___; see also Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note ___, at ___ (making a 
similar argument about the clear statement requirement for incursions on federal court jurisdiction).
415 See infra Section ___; see also Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at ___.
416
 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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part in my own analysis.  This hardly means that text and history are unimportant, but 
they leave many of the crucial questions unanswered.  This Part seeks to explain what the
role of text and history is, and to explore the limits of what history can and can’t tell us 
about federalism.
The most important role for text and history, I argue in Section A, is to require us 
to have a federalism doctrine.  The Constitution creates a federal structure and its 
provisions presuppose the continued viability of two distinct levels of government.  
Fidelity to that design requires a continuing commitment to the basic elements of that 
structure; even if one were convinced that all the functional arguments for federalism 
discussed in the previous Part were spurious, it would not be open to us to reject 
federalism and create a unitary structure.   Government officials bound by the 
Constitution have a continuing obligation to enact and enforce laws and create doctrines 
that maintain the basic attributes of the federalism in place.  But exploring the basis for 
such an obligation makes clear that it necessarily entails substantial flexibility in adapting 
the original structure to current needs.
Section B contends that this is true notwithstanding the fact that the historical 
thrust of the Founding era was to centralize government.  A number of scholars have 
pointed out that the drafters of our Constitution generally were nationalists, driven by the
failures of the Articles of Confederation to create a much stronger national government 
than anything the country had known before; as a result, these scholars claim, it is 
anachronistic to look to the Founders for support for limits on national authority.417
While conceding the premise, I argue that the conclusion does not follow.  The fact that 
the Founders wished to create an equilibrium more nationalist than the previous 
arrangement hardly proves that under present circumstances, when national power has
expanded beyond their wildest dreams, fidelity to the Constitution does not support 
movement in the opposite direction.
Finally, in Section C, I argue that text and history can tell us relatively little about 
the shape of federalism doctrine under contemporary circumstances.  The primary 
strategy of the original Constitution for preserving the federal balance – the doctrine of 
enumerated powers – has become far less effective over the last century with the advent 
of an integrated national economy.  And the Framers’ political strategy, relying on the 
direct representation of the States in Congress, has been undermined by such 
developments as the direct election of senators and the advent of political parties and 
interest group politics.    These developments do not release us from the obligation to 
preserve a federal balance, but they do mean that contemporary statesmen and judges 
may well have to devise new and innovative techniques to protect that balance under 
modern conditions.
417 See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, Pursuing the Great Experiment: Reserved Powers in a Post-Ratification, 
Compound Republic, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 85 (“[T]he recent federalism opinions undervalue the extent 
to which the Framers and Founders embraced certain constitutional precepts as necessary means for 
reaching appropriate ends, perhaps the most important of which was to curtail the sovereignty of the 
states.”).
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A. Fidelity and Its Limits
Debates about federalism often proceed as if the constitutional principle of 
federalism must stand or fall based on the functional values that it serves.  The implicit 
suggestion seems to be that if federalism can be shown to be a bad idea from the 
standpoint of protecting human rights or promoting good policy, we would be justified in 
reading that principle out of the Constitution.  That suggestion flies in the face of the very 
notion of constitutionalism, which is to entrench certain structures and values so that they 
will be highly resistant to change, even if those structures or values fall out of favor with 
the present generation.418  My own view, of course, is that federalism does serve 
important values, and Part III of this essay argues that those values should help determine 
the structure of federalism doctrine in important ways.  But I want to insist in this Section 
that the constitutional principle of a federal balance would compel our adherence even if 
it could be shown to be pernicious from a policy standpoint.  
Any argument from fidelity, of course, must begin with what the text and history 
of the Constitution actually entail.  Because those materials have been well-canvassed 
elsewhere, I provide only the briefest overview here.  I then discuss the nature and limits 
of arguments from textual and historical fidelity in the context of federalism. 
1. Text and History
The constitutional text says relatively little about federalism.  But then, why 
would it?  As I have discussed,419 this is the national government’s constitution, not a 
constitution for the system as a whole.  The essential creative work of the federal 
constitution was to empower the new national government and establish its internal 
structure.  Just as the federal Bill of Rights was originally unconcerned with limiting state 
governments,420 so too the original Constitution was not directly concerned with 
empowering state governments.421
One critical component of the federal structure is present in the original text:  the 
principle of enumerated powers.  Simply by listing specific powers for Congress rather 
than conferring a general legislative authority, Article I establishes the notion that federal 
418 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 
1030 (1992) (“The purpose of constitutional restrictions on self government is to impede policy 
adjustments in light of changing circumstances.”); 1 TRIBE, supra note 67, § 1 -8, at 23 (comparing 
constitutional restrictions to the ropes that bound Ulysses to the mast of his ship so that he would not be 
able to succumb to the temptation of the Sirens).
419 See supra Section ___.
420 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
421 See Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM. POL. 
SCI. ASS’N 158, 162 (2001) ( “Places in the constitutional text where the states are explicitly accorded 
rights against the national government are few in number and relatively minimal in importance--notably, 
Article I, Section 9's prohibition of federal taxes on exports from any state and of federal preferences for 
the ports of one state over another; Article IV, Section 3's ban on the creation of new states through the 
division or merger of old ones; and various references to the state legislatures, implying that Congress 
cannot validly abolish them.”).
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power is limited.422   Although Article I also included a robust notion of implied 
powers,423 Chief Justice Marshall would acknowledge in Gibbons v. Ogden that “[t]he 
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”424  The Tenth Amendment 
emphatically underlines this notion.425  Even if Justice Stone was right to suggest that this 
Amendment states “but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered,”426
contemporary confusion about that point suggests that this in itself is an important office.
In hindsight, it turns out that categorical enumeration may not be such a great 
strategy for guaranteeing balance in a federal system.427    As I discuss in Section B, the 
failure of this strategy to prevent the national government from invading virtually every 
category of state activity presents a difficult problem for federalism doctrine.  For present 
purposes, however, my point is simply that the original constitution includes, as a purely 
textual matter, a strong commitment to a balanced federal structure.  The document not 
only refers to the states as viable and responsible actors at several points, but also 
structures the basic grant of federal lawmaking power – arguably the Constitution’s most 
important feature – in a way designed to preserve state autonomy.
If the text itself focuses on empowering the federal government, the surrounding 
history features more prominent concern for protecting the states.  As Justice Powell 
observed in Garcia, “[m]uch of the initial opposition to the Constitution was rooted in the 
fear that the National Government would be too powerful and eventually would eliminate 
the States as viable political entities.”428  Some of this concern shaped the drafting of the 
document itself at Philadelphia.  As Jack Rakove has recounted, James Madison and 
422 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 n.8 (2000) (“With its careful enumeration of 
federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal Government are reserved, 
the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal Government an unlimited license 
to regulate.”).
423 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (construing Article I’s “Necessary and 
Proper” Clause).  Some commentators have argued that “proper” also amounts to a textual protection for 
federalism.  See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L. J. 267 (1993).  I discuss this argument 
further in Section C.  See infra TAN ___.
424
 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
425 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999) (“The limited and enumerated powers granted to 
the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National Government . . . underscore the vital role 
reserved to the States by the constitutional design, see, e.g., Art. I, § 8; Art. II, §§ 2-3; Art. III, § 2. Any 
doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth 
Amendment, which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns 
about the extent of the national power. The Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the original 
document.”).
426
 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
427 See infra Section C.  For an argument that  emerging federal systems should not rely overmuch on the 
strategy of enumeration, see Young, European Union, supra note 42, at 1662-77.
428
 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also
SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM & THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 
1788-1828, at 28 (1999) (identifying “[t]he consolidationist/nationalist character of the new government” 
as one of the central themes in Anti-Federalist writing).
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James Wilson arrived at Philadelphia with an aggressive plan “to render the Union 
politically independent of the states and the states legally dependent on national 
oversight.”429  But this position “only inspired other delegates to articulate their notions 
of statehood with equal vigor, ultimately producing in recoil a reaffirmation of the vital 
place that the states would occupy in the federal system.”430  That reaffirmation is 
reflected in the structure of the Senate, implementation of the principle of federal 
supremacy, and the scope and definition of federal legislative power.431
These concessions did not satisfy everyone.  In one of the most influential 
critiques, for example, Elbridge Gerry complained that “[t]he Constitution has few, if any 
federal features, but is rather a system of national government.”432  Brutus, a 
pseudonymous writer in New York, conceded that the proposed Constitution did not “go 
to a perfect and entire consolidation,” yet warned that “it approaches so near to it, that it 
must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”433  As I discuss further in 
Section B, most Anti-Federalists were not states-rights absolutists; many were willing to 
concede the need to strengthen national authority beyond the Articles of Confederation 
model.434  But virtually all Anti-Federalists feared that the Philadelphia draft took this 
imperative too far.435
The Anti-Federalist opposition does not, of course, itself establish a constitutional 
commitment to federalism; standing alone, it would corroborate claims that the 
Constitution was a profoundly nationalizing document.436  What is critical is the response 
to these concerns by the Constitution’s proponents.  They might have conceded the 
charge of consolidation and defended the virtues of national government; that is surely 
what most legal scholars today would haven chosen to do had they been there.437  But 
429 RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 169.
430 Id. at 170; [others]
431 See RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 170-80.  As I discuss further infra TAN ___, Madison’s own views 
evolved as the Convention worked through these issues, so that in the end he incorporated the States’ role 
as a central component of his theory of checks and balances.  See, e.g., LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE 
OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 140 (1995) (observing that 
the positions taken in the Federalist “confessed [Madison’s] reconciliation to decisions he had earlier 
opposed and outlined a position he defended through the rest of his career”).
432 Elbridge Gerry to the Massachusetts General Court (Nov. 3, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 231, 232 (Bernard Bailyn, ed., 1993) [hereinafter DEBATE].  Luther Martin likewise 
complained that the Philadelphia draft was not “in reality a federal but a national government” that would 
bring about a “consolidation of all State governments.”  Luther Martin, Genuine Information, reprinted in
HERBERT J. STORING, ED., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 45 (1981).
433 Brutus I (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 432, at 164, 166.
434 See infra TAN ___.
435 See RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 181 (observing that “[f]or Anti-Federalists, the decisive fact about the 
Constitution was how much more ‘national’ it was than the Confederation”); [more cites]
436
 The persistence of the political tradition that the Anti-Federalists represent, on the other hand, does 
strengthen the case for a historical commitment to balance in our federal system.  See infra TAN ___; 
CORNELL, supra note ___, at ___.
437 [cites]
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instead the Constitution’s most prominent defenders chose to concede – even reaffirm –
the importance of state governments and deny that the proposed national entity would 
unduly threaten the states’ role.  As Mark Killenbeck observes, the Antifederalists’ 
“concerns were widely shared, and these individuals played an important role in shaping 
the text, the ratification dialogues, and, eventually, the drafting and ratification of what 
became the Tenth Amendment.”438  The debates thus strongly suggest that both Federalist 
and Anti-Federalist leaders alike were committed to a meaningful role for state 
governments under the new regime.439  More importantly, the fact that such arguments 
were thought to be necessary in order to achieve ratification indicates broad-based 
support for federalism in the Founding Generation at large.
The Federalist assurances about state sovereignty and autonomy have been well-
catalogued elsewhere,440 and I will provide only a few illustrative examples here.  James 
Wilson’s summation to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention insisted that the proposed 
Constitution, “instead of placing the state governments in jeopardy, is founded on their 
existence.”441  Madison conceded in Federalist 39 that the new government had several 
national features but emphasized that it remained federal in many crucial respects.  In 
particular, he observed that in “the extent of its powers . . . . the proposed Government 
cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated 
objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over 
all other objects.”442  And more specific assurances were given as well.  Hamilton, for 
example, pledged in Federalist 81 that nothing in the Constitution should be understood 
as overriding the traditional principle of state sovereign immunity.443
Nor were these references to the continuing importance of state governments 
mere grudging concessions to the opposition. Federalism, for instance, constitutes one 
half of the “double security” at the core of Madison’s theory of checks and balances in 
Federalist 51.444  Lance Banning has concluded that “[d]uring the ratification contest, as 
438
 Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 107.  See also [others]
439 See Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 107 (acknowledging that “[p]reserving state ‘sovereignty’ was . . . an 
operative and occasionally important founding principle”).
440 [cites]
441 James Wilson’s Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 432, 
at 832, 841.
442
 Federalist No. 39, supra note ___, at 256 [Cooke ed.]; see also infra TAN ___ (discussing Madison’s 
assurance, in Federalist [45 or 46] that states would have the advantage in political competition between 
the two levels of government).
443
 Federalist No. 81, supra note ___, at 548-49 [Cooke ed.].  The more difficult question is whether 
Hamilton meant that further measures, such as federal statutes specifically purporting to strip the states of 
their immunity in particular classes of cases, could not override the traditional immunity from suit.  On that 
question, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, ___ (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (carefully 
tracking Hamilton’s argument).
444
 Madison argued that “the compound republic of America” provided a “double security . . . to the rights 
of the people” because, through the combination of federalism and separation of powers, “[t]he different 
governments will controul each other; at the same time that each will be controuled by itself.”  Federalist 
No. 51, supra note ___, at 351 [Cooke ed.].  See generally infra TAN ___ (discussing Madison’s theory). 
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in 1793, Madison desired a well-constructed, partly federal republic—not, like Hamilton, 
because he thought that nothing more could be obtained, but (more like many 
Antifederalists of 1788) because he thought that nothing else would prove consistent with 
the Revolution.”445   As Professor Banning’s comments indicate, not all Framers –
especially not Hamilton – necessarily shared this view.  But where we must choose 
between them, it seems likely that Madison’s is the more important perspective.446
In the end, some of the Framers may have had their doubts about state power.447
But we deal here in original understandings, not intentions,448 and there seems little 
doubt that the Constitution was understood to reserve an important place for state 
governments.  As Jack Rakove concludes,
The existence of the states was simply a given fact of American 
governance, and it confronted the framers at every stage of their 
deliberations.  In the abstract, some of the framers could imagine 
redrawing the boundaries of the existing states, and a few hoped to convert 
the states into mere provinces with few if any pretensions to sovereignty.  
But in practice the reconstruction of the federal Union repeatedly led the 
framers to accommodate their misgivings about the capacities of state 
government to the stubborn realities of law, politics, and history that 
worked to preserve the residual authority of the states—and with it the 
ambiguities of federalism with which later generations would continue to 
wrestle.449
I begin wrestling with exactly what the Framers’ accommodation commits us to in the 
next subsection.
2. The Argument from Fidelity
If the text and history of the Constitution entail a commitment to federalism, what 
does that mean for the Constitution’s present interpreters?  The answer depends on two 
different kinds of constitutional theories:  a theory of obligation and a theory of 
interpretation.450  The first asks, What is it about the Constitution that binds us?  The 
second inquires, How do we ascertain the meaning of the materials that bind us?  
Although these two questions are related in important ways, they are not the same, and 
445 BANNING, supra note 431, at 297. 
446 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 51, at xvi (noting that “Madison was the crucial actor in every phase of 
the reform movement that led to the adoption of the Constitution”); [cites on Hamilton as idiosyncratic].
447 See also note 470 and accompanying text.
448 [cites;  W&M?]
449 RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 162.
450 See Vermeule & Young, supra note 205, at ___ (discussing theories of constitutional obligation and 
their relation to theories of interpretation).
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keeping them separate will help in assessing arguments about fidelity to the 
Constitution’s federalist commitments.451
One might express this insistence in a number of different ways, depending on the 
theory of constitutional obligation that one brings to the enterprise.  Those who view the 
Constitution as a binding social contract would stress the inherent authority of the initial 
bargain.  Other sorts of originalists might stress the binding nature of the Constitution as 
law, based on the authority vested in the Ratifiers by the sovereign People.452
Conventionalists, on the other hand, would emphasize the need for society to agree on a 
basic set of constitutive principles; such agreement becomes difficult if, once a particular 
document is agreed upon, people remained free to pick and choose which principles in 
that document will actually be binding in individual instances.453  Finally, Burkeans 
would point to the prescriptive wisdom immanent in a political order that has survived for 
over two centuries and view departures from that order with suspicion.454
Each of these different arguments establishes the binding nature of constitutional 
obligation, independent of whether we would approve various principles or structures in 
the Constitution on moral or policy grounds.455  The breadth of that obligation, however, 
will depend at least to some extent on the particular rationale for constitutional obligation 
one accepts.  The broadest obligation would stem from the view that the original 
understanding binds of its own force – that is, we are bound by the Framers’ conception 
of federalism because they said so.  I have argued at length elsewhere that this conception 
451 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127, 1128-33 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Dead Hand] (demonstrating how various theories of 
obligation might lead to different theories of interpretation).
452 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375-76 (1981) (“Our 
legal gründnorm has been that the body politic can at a specific point in time definitively order 
relationships, and that such an ordering is binding on all organs of government until changed by 
amendment.”); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 231 (1988).
453 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, ___ 
(1996) (discussing conventionalism as a basis for constitutional obligation).
454 See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Speech on the Reform of the Representation in the House of Commons (1782), 
in 2 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE 486, 487 (Henry G. Bohn ed., 1841) (“It is a 
presumption in favour of any settled scheme of government against any untried project, that a nation has 
long existed and flourished under it.”); see also Anthony Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 
1029 (1990); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 80, at 648-50.
455
 Other theories of obligation might focus on this sort of moral or policy approval; we obey the 
Constitution because we think it is a good one.  I generally agree with Michael McConnell that these sorts 
of approaches to constitutional obligation tend to defeat the very notion of constitutionalism itself.  See
McConnell, Dead Hand, supra note 451, at 1129 (“If the Constitution is authoritative only to the extent that 
it accords with our independent judgments about political morality and structure, then the Constitution 
itself is only a makeweight: what gives force to our conclusions is simply our beliefs about what is good, 
just, and efficient.”).  Federalism can, of course, still be defended on these grounds, but the arguments 
would have little to do with history; instead, they would focus on the political and policy benefits of a 
federal structure.  See infra Part ___.  The present Part is concerned with what text and history can and 
cannot tell us; accordingly, it makes sense to focus on theories of obligation placing some value on those 
sources.
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of constitutionalism is less persuasive than one that takes account of the entire arc of our 
history,456 and most seem unwilling to accord this sort of dispositive authority to a 
particular phase of our national development.  And even those who do accept the 
contractarian account of obligation tend to moderate its implications for radical change in 
other ways, such as a strong commitment to stare decisis in adjudication.457  Others have 
insisted that fidelity to the Constitution’s original understanding may require, under 
modern circumstances, some alteration in institutions or doctrine.458
The other accounts of obligation produce significantly more limited implications. 
Take conventionalism first.  The basic notion here is that a diverse society needs to agree 
on a basic set of ground rules, which include not only a constitution but also basic rules 
for interpreting that constitution.459  The need to secure widespread agreement tends to 
rule out efforts to substitute some other set of principles for the constitution that history 
has left us.  But conventionalism is basically presentist in its fundamental criterion: the 
need to secure societal acceptance.  As a result, the constitution that binds is the one that 
has come down to us – a product of the entire arc of our history, rather than a few isolated 
founding moments.  If the fundamental goal is societal agreement on a basic set of rules, 
we cannot isolate the Constitution from “the gloss that life has written on it,”460 because 
that gloss informs what our fellow citizens understand the Constitution to mean.461  The 
conventionalist is thus bound by more recent history as well as the Founding, and he will 
find it impossible to reject entirely the more nationalizing trends of the Twentieth 
Century.
The Burkean perspective is similar.  Like the conventionalist, the binding force of 
history extends to the whole sweep of our national story:  not just 1787, but 1800, 1868, 
1876, 1937, 1980, 1994, etc.  Burkeans are skeptical of human reason and foresight in the 
setting-up of political arrangements, and they doubt the capacity of any single generation, 
no matter how extraordinary, to comprehend, anticipate, and capture in a set of political 
institutions all the needs and contingencies of a large and complex society.462  They thus 
456 See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 80, at 673 (insisting that “there can never be a 
single isolated point in time to which we can appeal to find the complete meaning of our mutual 
commitments”).
457 See, e.g., Kay, supra note 452, at 229; Monaghan, supra note 452, at 382 (“The expectations so long 
generated by this [nonoriginalist] body of constitutional law render unacceptable a full return to original 
intent theory in any pure, unalloyed form.”).
458 See Larry Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
459 [Strauss]
460 [Missouri v. Holland?]
461 See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1070 (1981) (“The 
question is not simply what the framers thought, but what has become of their ideas in the time between 
their age and ours.”).
462 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 8 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF 
EDMUND BURKE 138 (Paul Langford ed., Clarendon Press 1989) (hereinafter Burke, Reflections] (“We are 
afraid toto put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this 
stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank 
and capital of nations and of ages.”); see also J.G.A. POCOCK, Burke and the Ancient Constitution—a 
Problem in the History of Ideas, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
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stress the organic and incremental growth of political institutions over time. 463  This 
perspective at once inspires a reverence for the past – the present generation, after all, is 
no more omniscient than its predecessors – and a limit on that reverence based on 
appreciating the need for constant reform.464   The insistence that reform be incremental, 
however, means that Burkeans will be almost prohibitively reluctant to launch a broad 
attack on established institutions.465  Like the conventionalist, then, a Burkean proponent 
of federalism must be prepared to live with the New Deal and other institutional 
alterations in the original structure that have themselves stood the test of time.
From a variety of different theoretical perspectives, then, federalism’s prominent 
place in the original constitutional design as well as its continuing significance in the 
years since impose an obligation of fidelity to the notion of a federal balance between 
States and Nation.  As Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge have observed, 
“[c]onstitutional law must make some sense of federalism.”466  The conventionalist and 
Burkean perspectives allow for gradual evolution of this balance over time, however.  
Moreover, as I have already discussed, even a strong originalists may have to allow for 
“translation” of the original understanding into contemporary circumstances.467  For that 
reason, history can provide only limited guidance on the question of what federalism 
doctrines to adopt.  Before discussing that problem, however, I must deal with a potential 
counter-argument – that is, that because the Founding Generation intended the 
Constitution to create a more nationalistic one than existed under the Articles of 
Confederation, fidelity in fact requires adherence to a strong nationalist vision.  I address 
that argument in the next section.
B. The Nationalist Vector
One cannot dispute that the Constitution is a centralizing document.  The Framers 
did not meet in Philadelphia in 1787 because they feared the overweening power of the 
Confederation Congress.  Rather, they were concerned about weakness at the center:  
HISTORY 202, 203 (1971) (“[B]urke’s account of political society . . . endows the community with an inner 
life of growth and adaptation, and it denies to individual reason the power to see this process as a whole or 
to establish by its own efforts te principles on which the process is based.”). 
463 See Burke, Reflections, supra note 462, at 217 (“By a slow but well-sustained progress, the effect of 
each step is watched; the good or ill success of the first, gives light to us in the second . . . .  The evils latent 
in the most promising contrivances are provided for as they arise. . . .  We compensate, we reconcile, we 
balance.”).
464
 Edmund Burke, after all, spent virtually his entire political career as a Whig reformer. See, e.g., Burke, 
Reflections, supra note 462, at 206 (“A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, 
would be my standard of a statesman.”); see generally CONOR C. O’BRIEN, THE GREAT MELODY: A 
THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY OF EDMUND BURKE (1992) (stressing the reformist 
aspect of Burke’s career).
465 See Burke, Reflections, supra note 462, at 112 (“[I]t is with infinite caution that any man ought to 
venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common 
pur poses of society.”).
466
 Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 202, at 1448.
467 See supra Section ___.
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Congress’s inability “to frame and implement satisfactory foreign policies,”468 for 
example, or to put the Union on a firmer financial footing.469  Many of the Framers were 
also profoundly mistrustful of the competence and good faith of the state governments 
with respect to their internal policies, and they sought a national constraint on state 
politics.470  The direction of movement at Philadelphia clearly was from a comparatively 
less centralized to a more centralized plan of government.
The question is the significance of this centralizing purpose for contemporary 
constitutional interpretation.  Some have urged that fidelity to the Founders’ purpose 
requires that we continue their nationalist project.  Mark Killenbeck, for example, has 
insisted that “current reserved powers opinions . . . shortchange the extent to which the 
decisions made in the nation’s formative years were motivated by and directed toward a 
pervasive desire to curtail the sovereignty of ‘subordinately useful’ states.”471  The 
suggestion seems to be that since the Framers meant to move the country from a less to a 
more centralized state, it is illegitimate to invoke their understanding of the federal 
balance for the opposite purpose – that is, to justify an effort to reinvigorate state power 
and autonomy.
The counter-argument – which I mean to argue for here – is that however much 
more centralized the 1787 Constitution was than the Articles of Confederation, we have 
now moved far beyond what even the most nationalist Framers could have envisioned.  
The position is not so much that the Framers would favor a more limited federal 
government if we could ask them today – we can’t.  Rather, it is that the original 
understanding of the Constitution embodied a notion of balance between state and 
national authority that was more centralized than the Articles but less centralized than, 
say, the New Deal or the Great Society.  The same vision that inspired centralizing 
pressure in 1787 thus ought to tug in the opposite direction today.  That vision need not 
mandate a reactionary effort to tear down the administrative state and return to the early 
19th century; it does suggest, however, that the primary direction of incremental reform 
ought to be toward shoring up the limits on federal authority.
An analogy to elementary geometry may help illustrate the contending positions.  
In geometry, a “ray” is a line that extends from a set starting point in a particular 
direction to infinity.472  A “vector,” on the other hand, has a set magnitude; it extends in a 
particular direction for a specified distance, but goes no further.473  With these terms in 
mind, we might restate our question as whether the Framers’ centralizing intentions 
should be treated more like a vector or a ray.  Did they, in other words, intend to keep 
centralizing indefinitely?  Or did they simply desire a more centralized government than 
468 RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 26.
469 See MCDONALD, supra note 43, at 12-14.
470 See RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 29-30.
471
 Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 97.
472
 [cite]
473
 [cite]
13-Jul-04 draft
91
existed in 1787 while nonetheless contemplating that some degree of centralization might 
be excessive?
Some constitutions may explicitly mandate a ray rather than a vector.  The Treaty 
of Rome that established the European Economic Community – predecessor to today’s 
European Union – committed the signatories to seek an “ever closer union of the Peoples 
of Europe.”474  European courts have tended to treat the EU’s foundational treaties as a 
constitution of sorts, and they have invoked the “ever closer union” language to support 
an explicitly teleological approach pressing for increasing centralization.475  More 
generally, it is safe to say that many Europeans see a teleological purpose to EU 
institutions as a whole – to function as engines of integration – rather than a purpose to 
maintain a balance.   
One can find similar examples of a centralizing teleology in our own law, albeit 
arguably on a somewhat more modest scale.  For much of our history, the federal 
judiciary – and particularly the Supreme Court – has functioned as an engine of 
integration.  Certainly that was the thrust of federalism doctrine in the Nineteenth 
Century, which both legitimated an expansive view of federal legislative power476 and 
reined in state attempts to regulate the national economy.477  It was also the thrust of the 
Warren Court, which my colleague Scot Powe has described as centrally concerned with 
imposing national norms on recalcitrant states, primarily in the South.478  The Lochner-
era Commerce Clause cases – which restricted Congress’s legislative power – might 
seem like an obvious exception to this trend.479   But as Stephen Gardbaum has 
demonstrated, the Supreme Court simply used the Commerce Clause (as a check on 
federal economic regulation) in tandem with theories of economic substantive due 
process (as a check primarily on state economic regulation) to achieve a uniform, 
nationally-imposed policy of laissez faire.480  And one can argue that even the Rehnquist 
Court’s gestures in the direction of “states’ rights” have been overshadowed, as a 
practical matter, by its willingness to squelch state policy in any number of areas.481
The Supreme Court’s centralizing tendency should surprise no one, given that the 
Justices are national officials and face relatively strong incentives to favor the national 
474
 Preamble to the EEC Treaty, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
475 See generally Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 701 (1999) 
(describing the “preference for Europe” in the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence); António Goucha 
Soares, Pre-emption, Conflicts of Powers and Subsidiarity, 23 EUR. L. REV. 132, 138 (1998) (describing 
how the ECJ has used this teleological approach to maximize the preemptive effect of Community 
legislation on Member State laws); Young, European Union, supra note 42, at 1712-18.
476 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
477 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
478 See generally LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS ___ (2000).
479 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal child labor law as outside 
the commerce power).
480 See Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 122, at ___.
481 See Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1384-86;  infra TAN ___.
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government.482   But the constitutional text and historical record on this side of the 
Atlantic hardly provide the same support for a centralizing teleology that one finds in 
Europe.  Indeed, the question whether the Framers contemplated infinite centralization 
virtually answers itself.483  To deny that possibility is to concede that, at some point, we 
will reach a point of optimal centralization and at that point the task of constitutionalists 
will be to prevent further consolidation.  Nor is there any particular reason to think that 
centralization occurs at a uniform rate across the wide variety of areas of governmental 
concern, or that the optimal centralization point is the same in each of these different 
areas.  
If all this is true, then surely it is the task of federalism doctrine to ask, in each 
area, not only whether we are centralized enough but also whether we have centralized 
too much.  There are no true rays, only vectors.  Federalism doctrine must guard against 
both centripetal and centrifugal forces.  As Richard Fallon has observed, “[i]t is not 
enough for courts to identify constitutional values and weight those values against each 
other. . . .  [C]ourts must also ask what are the main threats to constitutional values at any 
particular time, which rules would work more or less effectively to protect those values, 
and what would be the empirical effects of alternative rule structures.”484  The “main 
threats” to the balance of federalism are likely to come from different directions in 2004 
than in 1789.
The best reading of the history seems to bolster this conclusion – that is, that we 
should think of federalism as a state of balance rather than a centralizing teleology.  Even 
in 1787, neither the proponents nor the opponents of the Constitution seem to have had 
much sympathy for extreme polar positions of centralization or decentralization.  With 
respect to the Anti-Federalists, Saul Cornell has observed that
Relatively few Anti-Federalists were willing to return to the Confederation 
as a model for federalism, and few of the Anti-Federalist elite were willing 
to challenge the Federalist claim that the Articles of Confederation were 
inadequate and that some central authority ought to be created with 
sufficient power to force compliance from the states.  Most Anti-
Federalists conceded that some limited degree of coercive authority had to 
be ceded to the federal government.485
As a result, Professor Cornell concludes, the Antifederalists’ “quarrel with the Federalists 
was, not over consolidation, but the degree to which the new government would be 
nationalized.”486
482 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, ___ (1999).
483
 The teleological provision in the Treaty of Rome seems like a provision that could only crop up very 
early in a polity’s institutional existence.  [check if there’s a similar provision in the draft constitution]
Not surprisingly, the ECJ has tended to moderate its centralizing impulses as the EU system has matured.  
[cites – Halberstam?]
484
 Fallon, Foreword, supra note ___, at 65 n.51.
485 CORNELL, supra note 428, at 63.
486 Id. at 64.
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Likewise, few Federalist proponents of the new constitution were unwaveringly 
committed to consolidation.  Jack Rakove has observed that while the Anti-Federalists 
focused on the Philadelphia draft’s centralizing tendencies, “for the framers, by contrast, 
the greater irony was that it was much more ‘federal’ than the alternatives they had 
rejected.”487  The Supremacy Clause, for example, is far more respectful of state 
autonomy than Madison’s initial proposal for a congressional negative of all state laws.488
Likewise, the Necessary and Proper Clause’s recognition of implied powers, even 
defined broadly as in McCulloch, stops well short of the Virginia Plan’s initial grant of a 
discretionary federal legislative power.489
The area of agreement between Federalists and Anti-federalists thus turns out to 
have been larger than is sometimes supposed.  Both groups wanted some movement in a 
more nationalist direction from the Articles of Confederation; neither wanted to push that 
movement to its logical extreme.  James Madison’s own political trajectory exemplifies 
this wish to push centralization only so far.  Lance Banning has documented that “[a]s 
late as August 1789, Madison believed that state encroachments on the powers of the 
federal government would be most likely to endanger constitutional reform.  By 1792, his 
fears were on the other side.”490  The case seems strong for treating centralization as a 
vector – with a limited magnitude – rather than a ray extending infinitely in the 
nationalist direction.  That, of course, leaves plenty of room to argue over the appropriate 
magnitude of the vector.  I argue in the next section that that argument is less important 
than it might seem, and that more generally the history can tell us relatively little about 
the particular shape of federalism doctrine.
C. Limits of History, Limits of Change
So if history doesn’t tell us to centralize relentlessly, can it tell us how to maintain 
balance?  Unfortunately, I think the answer will generally be “no” – at least if we are 
looking for specifics.  I have already argued that history does bind us to have federalism 
doctrine, that is, fidelity to both history and text forecloses a conclusion that federalism is 
simply unattractive under modern circumstances and therefore not something courts 
should worry about.491  In this Section, however, I argue that history is comparatively less 
useful in helping us choose among particular federalism doctrines.  As my colleague 
Frank Cross has observed, “the Constitution clearly creates a federalist structure of 
government” but “it does not necessarily command anything approaching current 
federalism doctrine.”492 Rather, those doctrines will most often have to be chosen based 
on a variety of more functional and pragmatic grounds.
The obvious alternative, of course, is to cast off the “dead hand” of the past and 
seek the answers to questions of federalism in purely presentist terms.  Those terms might 
487 RAKOVE, supra note 435, at 181.
488 [cites]
489 [cites]
490 BANNING, supra note ___, at 295-96.
491 See supra Section III.A.
492
 Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).  
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include a broad array of concerns, such as economic efficiency, protection of minority 
rights and interests, or maximizing the accountability of public officials.  I do not want to 
deny that all of these presentist values – and no doubt many others – are important, and 
they should play a role in resolving federalism issues.  But I also want to insist on an 
important role for the “dead hand” in the definition of the federal balance, rather than 
simply – as I argued earlier – in requiring us to have one.  While my argument in Section 
A sought to justify some respect for federalism from a variety of different perspectives on 
the relevance of history, the latter half of this Section adopts an explicitly Burkean view.  
Changes in the structure of our constitution should be incremental, and the direction of 
marginal change should be influenced – at least in part – by an imperative to stay 
reasonably close to historical norms.     
1. Can History Dictate Doctrine?
One thing we might search the history for is a description of the appropriate 
equilibrium between state and federal power.  I claimed in the previous section that the 
Founders most likely understood federalism to entail such a state, rather than viewing it 
as an open-ended centralizing imperative.  But that does not mean that they clearly 
envisioned what such a state should look like.  Aspects of such a vision emerge from 
their debates, but so does a general sense that much would remain to be worked out.493
The immediate task that the Framers confronted was to choose the direction and 
mechanisms of present reform, not necessarily to crystallize the ideal end-state.  As Mark 
Killenbeck has observed, the Framers were “pragmatists who viewed their assignment 
[as] creating not the ‘ultimate’ Union, but simply ‘a more  perfect’ one.”494
Likewise, I doubt that we need to agree on an end-state in order to choose 
contemporary federalism doctrine.  The judicial process proceeds incrementally; as I have 
argued elsewhere, that is one of its most important strengths.495  As long as courts 
formulate doctrine in incremental rather than sweeping terms, they can focus on 
ascertaining the direction of incremental change without necessarily formulating a firm 
idea of how far that change ought to go in the future.  In Lopez, for example, the Court 
confronted the question whether it should end its half-century moratorium on striking 
down federal statutes as outside the Commerce Power.  One could answer that question 
affirmatively, deciding that the Court should be more willing to strike down federal laws 
on this ground than it had been, while leaving a more complete version of Commerce 
Clause doctrine to be developed in future cases.496  For reasons that I will discuss 
further,497 the incremental method seems like the best approach.  Even if history could
paint us a complete picture of the federal end-state envisioned by the Founders, I would 
suggest that courts should pay it relatively little attention.
493 See Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 85; [others]
494
 Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 86.
495 See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1208-09 
(2002) [hereinafter Young, Judicial Activism]. 
496 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, ___ (1995) (noting that if the Court had upheld the statute in 
question, there would have been no basis for ever invalidating commerce legislation).
497 See infra TAN ___.
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We might alternatively ask two somewhat narrower questions of history.  First, 
can history tell us how to choose between the two different ends of federalism – state 
sovereignty or state autonomy – that I identified in Part II?  Second, does history sanction 
particular means for enforcing federalism?  I think the answer to the first question is no; 
both the constitutional text and history seem relatively indeterminate on the choice of 
ends.  Evidence of concern for both sovereignty and autonomy appears in the record.  On 
the sovereignty side, the constitutional text includes specific guarantees against 
dismemberment of states,498 and Deborah Jones Merritt has argued that the Guarantee 
Clause can be interpreted as a safeguard against national interference with the integrity of 
state governmental processes.499  Likewise, the Framers’ discussions of state sovereign 
immunity indicate significant concern for protecting state sovereignty.500  On the other 
hand, the whole notion of reserving governmental powers over key policy areas to the 
States in the Tenth Amendment speaks to state autonomy.501 And – to pick just one of 
several possible examples – the solicitude of Article III’s drafters for preserving a 
meaningful role of state courts indicates a strong concern that state institutions should 
retain important things to do.502  Nor should we necessarily take the balance of this 
evidence as conclusive, even if it all pointed in the same direction.  In particular, we 
would not expect to see as much evidence of concern for state “autonomy,” defined 
primarily in terms of state regulatory prerogatives, in an era that generally eschewed 
activist government.503  Obviously, state autonomy may be a much more important factor 
today.
The answer to the second question is “yes, but.”  The Framers did seem to 
envision two particular strategies for enforcing federalism.  One was to rely heavily on 
political and institutional checks.  The second was through enumeration of federal 
responsibilities and reservation of the remainder to the states – a strategy which does 
seem to have contemplated some degree of judicial enforcement.  The problem is that 
these strategies have each been substantially undermined by subsequent developments.  
498 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any 
other States; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”).
499 See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third 
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1988) (“The guarantee clause . . . restricts the federal government's 
power to interfere with the organizational structure and governmental processes chosen by a state's 
residents.”).
500 See, e.g., Federalist No. 81, supra note ___, at 548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) [Cooke ed.] (“It is inherent 
in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. . . .  Unless, 
therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states. . 
. .”); Federalist No. 32, supra note ___, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (identifying a relatively narrow set of 
cases in which such a surrender could be deemed to have taken place).
501
 As does the omission of these reserved powers from Article I in the first place.
502 See Evan Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to 
Implement Federal Law? 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1056 n.220 (1995) (observing that “the opposition to 
ubiquitous inferior federal court jurisdiction reflected in the Madisonian Compromise was driven largely by 
the fear that . . .  state court lawmaking power [in common law cases] would be essentially trumped”).
503 [cites]
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The notion of political enforcement has been undermined by changes in the incentives 
facing federal politicians,504 the severance of direct ties between federal representatives 
and state political institutions,505 and the watering-down of institutional mechanisms at 
the national level that once encumbered federal lawmaking.506  Likewise, I have already 
discussed the changes of fact and failures of doctrine that undermined the enumerated 
powers strategy.507
The question thus becomes whether history binds us to these failed strategies or 
permits innovations designed to shore up their weaknesses.  There is good reason to find 
the latter course consistent with historical understandings.  Mark Killenbeck, for 
example, finds that the Framers “understood that the text as ratified provided an 
important, but by design not necessarily a definitive matrix for analyzing sovereignty 
issues.”508  Rather, they expected that many issues of federalism would be worked out in 
the course of time.509  Likewise, Jack Rakove states more generally that “[w]hatever else 
we might say about [the Framers’] intentions and understandings, this at least seems 
clear:  They would not have denied themselves the benefit of testing their original ideas 
and hopes against the intervening experience that we have accrued since 1789.”510
The Founders’ vision of a flexible federalism may be understood through a 
variety of different interpretive lenses.  We might shift to new, ahistorical strategies for 
protecting federalism as an act of “translating” the original design into new contexts.  
Such translation, as Larry Lessig has pointed out, often entails a “duty of creativity” for 
the contemporary interpreter.511  A Burkean, on the other hand, might simply say that our 
duty of fidelity runs to the whole of our history, not simply the founding moment, and 
that part of the duty of fidelity is the adoption of incremental reforms designed to 
preserve the basic character of our institutions.512  Finally, a conventionalist might argue 
that the essential characteristic of federalism doctrine is its ability to command 
widespread assent, and pragmatic virtues of consistency and coherence are more 
important by this measure than the connection of doctrine to the Founders’ own 
expectations about how federalism would be enforced.513  The case for departure from or 
modification of the Founders’ own enforcement strategies can thus be made from any of 
these perspectives.
504 See infra TAN ___.
505 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (replacing selection of senators by state legislatures with direct election 
by the people).  As I discuss further infra TAN ___, it is implausible to view the 17th Amendment as a 
deliberate constitutional amendment designed to weaken constitutional protections for state autonomy. 
506 See supra TAN ___.
507 See supra TAN ___.
508
 Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 85.
509 See id.
510 RAKOVE, supra note ___, at xv.
511
 Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 82, at 1205-06.
512 See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 80, at ___.
513 [cites]
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The Supreme Court itself has recognized that history provides only limited 
assistance in answering particular doctrinal questions on a number of occasions.  In the 
Ports Authority case,514 for instance, the Court confronted the question whether state 
governments should enjoy sovereign immunity in proceedings before federal 
administrative agencies.  Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas acknowledged that, 
“[i]n truth, the relevant history does not provide direct guidance for our inquiry.  The 
Framers . . . could not have anticipated the vast growth of the administrative state.” 515
As a result, “the dearth of specific evidence indicating whether the Framers believed that 
the States’ sovereign immunity would apply in such proceedings is unsurprising.”516
The Ports Authority Court overcame this lack of specific historical evidence 
primarily through doctrine rooted in more functional considerations.517  Justice Thomas 
first examined proceedings before the Federal Maritime Commission, to which the South 
Carolina Ports Authority had been subjected, to determine whether they were 
institutionally similar to federal judicial proceedings in which the Eleventh Amendment 
would bar jurisdiction.518  He then asked whether the underlying value of federalism that 
state sovereign immunity is supposed to protect – state dignitary interests – is threatened 
by federal administrative adjudications.519  One can quarrel about whether the particular 
value of dignity is really crucial to federalism,520 but the basic approach of building 
doctrine with an eye on federalism’s underlying values seems sound.
History thus does not generally propose particular doctrines; in fact, most of the 
doctrines that we have employed for much of the past two centuries are, well, history.  
The history does suggest a basic strategy, however – that is, that federalism and other 
structural values ought to be as self-enforcing as possible.  I doubt that we are bound to 
this strategy if it can be shown to be ineffective, but surely respect for the Founders’ 
vision counsels that we should look to this strategy first in seeking to reinvigorate 
federalism doctrine.  I turn to the prospects for reviving that strategy in Part V.  In the 
remainder of this Section, however, I focus on the relation between history and structural 
change.
514
 Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
515 Id. at 755.
516 Id.
517
 Justice Thomas did say that “[w]e . . . attribute great significance to the fact that States were not subject 
to private suits in administrative adjudications at the time of the founding or for many years thereafter.”  Id.
But this argument seems important primarily as simply indicating the absence of historical counter-
examples to the Court’s ultimate result; it can bear little affirmative weight.  After all, “[b]ecause 
formalized administrative adjudications were all but unheard of in the late 18th and early 19th century,” id., 
we shouldn’t be surprised that States didn’t appear in them.  In any event, the remainder of the majority 
opinion makes clear that the more functional considerations are doing the analytical heavy lifting here.
518 See id. at 756-59.
519 See id. at 760-61.
520 [cites]
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2. History and Incremental Change
It turns out, as I argue in Part VI, that a desire to make changes incremental is a good 
reason to choose courts as the agents of that change.  (It also, of course, shapes the sorts
of doctrines that courts should adopt.)
IV. Sovereignty, Autonomy, and the Values of Federalism
The shape of an institutional strategy for protecting federalism ought to be 
influenced – although not completely determined – by why we care about federalism in 
the first place.  Many reasons are often given, and I try to collect the major themes in this 
Section.  They tend to fall into two loose groups.  The first is concerned with regulatory 
outcomes:  Federalism permits a diversity of regulatory regimes from state to state, which 
may allow satisfaction of more people’s preferences, regulatory experimentation, and 
competition among states to provide the most attractive regime.  The second group has to 
do with the political process itself:  State governments provide a check on national 
overreaching, foster political competition and participation, and may even help build 
social capital.
Autonomy, not sovereignty, provides the common theme of all these arguments.  
Just having state governments is not enough; those governments need to have meaningful 
things to do.  Federalism cannot provide regulatory diversity unless states have autonomy 
to set divergent policies; state governments cannot provide fora for political participation 
and competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those fora.  The 
sovereignty model advanced by the Rehnquist Court’s working majority on federalism 
issues, by contrast, has emphasized on the “separate and independent existence” of the 
States, as if mere existence were the primary value to be preserved.521  The Court’s focus 
on the States’ sovereign immunity from private lawsuits, for example, has expended 
much of the Court’s time and political capital on an issue that has little to do with what 
functions remain for state governments to perform.522
This Section surveys the values generally associated with federalism and uses 
them as criteria for assessing the relative importance of sovereignty and autonomy.  
Before undertaking that discussion, however, two caveats are in order.  First, I do not 
mean this section as a normative defense of federalism.  The pros and cons of federalism 
521
 The phrase itself goes back to then-Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1976), which framed the crucial issue as whether setting wages and hours for state 
employees “are ‘functions essential to separate and independent existence’ so that Congress may not 
abrogate the States’ otherwise plenary authority to make them.” (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).  Much has changed since 1976 in the Court’s jurisprudence, but the current 
majority remains focused on this principle.
522 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not, 
pur suant to its Article I powers, abrogate the States’ immunity from suit); see also Fallon, Conservative 
Paths, supra note 291, at 459 (commenting on “the relative boldness of the sovereign immunity decisions” 
as compared with the Court’s caution in other areas of federalism doctrine); Young, State Sovereign 
Immunity, supra note 184, at 1-2 (arguing that the Court’s “most persistent and aggressive efforts” to 
advance the cause of federalism have occurred in the area of sovereign immunity).
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have been ably debated by others,523 and I am unsure whether I have anything much to 
add to that discussion.  What I want to do instead is to survey the grounds on which 
federalism has been defended, and trace the implications of those arguments for 
federalism doctrine.  Obviously I do find these reasons for valuing federalism persuasive, 
but that is not what this Article is about.  The point is simply to identify with some 
precision why we care about federalism in the first place so that we can then ask what 
follows in terms of enforcement strategies.
The second caveat is that, as I argued in the last Part, federalism need not be 
defended in terms of its promotion of particular values at all.524  The Constitution 
presupposes some meaningful balance between state and federal power; constitutional 
fidelity therefore requires some level of constitutional protection for state governmental 
prerogatives.  As Justice O’Connor has written, “[o]ur task would be the same even if one 
could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising 
our preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework 
set forth in the Constitution.”525  Nonetheless, we still confront questions of interpretive 
choice concerning the particular form that protections for federalism should take.  And it 
makes sense for the answers to those questions to be shaped, to the extent that binding 
legal materials permit, by the respects in which federalism may be beneficial.
A. Regulatory Diversity, Competition, and Experimentation
One of the most basic aspects of state autonomy is the right to do things 
differently.  California chooses to set rigorous environmental standards, while Louisiana 
prefers looser regulation in order to attract industry.526  Vermont relies for revenue on a 
state income tax, while New Hampshire emphasizes property taxes.527  New Jersey 
protects lesbians and gay men from discrimination based on their sexual orientation, 
while Michigan does not.528  New York’s state judges are appointed by the governor, 
523 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); Michael McConnell, 
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) (book review); 
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a 
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).  For a particularly well-balanced appraisal of both sides 
in this debate, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
524 See supra Section ___.
525
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).  The obligation is comparable to our commitment 
to protect broad categories of harmful expression under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844 (1997) (indecency); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (hate speech).  The analogy is 
not a perfect one; most critics of particular forms of speech do not claim that “free speech” is on-balance a 
bad thing, whereas that claim is sometimes made with respect to state autonomy. [cites]  But few actually 
do make the on-balance claim about federalism, and it is not clear that it would matter in terms of 
constitutional obligation if they did.
526
 [cite]
527
 [cite]; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 89 n. 113 (discussing the disparities in taxing policy among 
the New England states).
528 See Lambda Legal, Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on 
Sexual Orientation, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=217
(visited Feb. 7, 2003).
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while Texas elects them.529  As my examples demonstrate, state-by- state diversity 
extends not only to particular substantive policies, but also to the structure of the 
government and the means by which policy choices are carried out.
Lynn Baker and I have argued elsewhere that federalism is analogous to the 
“negative freedom” of individuals in that federalism frees state governments from 
constraints on their policy options without dictating what choices they should actually 
make.530 This makes it difficult to argue for or against federalism based on the 
attractiveness or unattractiveness of particular policies that the states might adopt.  The 
most basic argument for state autonomy thus starts with the observation that individuals 
often have different preferences, so that the best way to please more of the people, more 
of the time is to offer a choice of regulatory regimes.531  Assuming that the initial 
geographical distribution of preferences is not uniform, then a higher proportion of 
citizen preferences are likely to be satisfied by state-level regulation than by adoption of a 
uniform national rule.532  On issues that are sufficiently important to induce individuals to 
“vote with their feet,” the proportion of satisfied preferences is likely to be even 
higher.533  As Seth Kreimer has observed, “the lesbian who finds herself in Utah, like the 
gun lover who lives in Washington, D.C., and the gambler in Pennsylvania, need only 
cross a state border to be free of constraining rules.”534
A related set of arguments does suggest that regulatory diversity will in turn lead 
to “better” policy outcomes.  The first is that, as Justice Brandeis famously noted, “a 
single courageous state may serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”535  The most well-known recent 
example of such experimentation is the recent federal welfare reform, many elements of 
which were tried out by individual states such as Wisconsin.536  Even more recently, 
529
 [cite]
530 See Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 135 (“[J]ust as negative freedoms do not prescribe what the 
individual shall do within this protected sphere of liberty, so too federalism does not dictate that the state 
gov ernment make any particular substantive choice within the range of options permitted it.”).  On the 
concept of “negative freedom,” see generally ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969).
531 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 364, at 1947-51 ; McConnell, supra note 523, at ___ . 
532 See McConnell, supra note 523, at ___.  Of course, groups holding a particular preference may not be 
sufficiently numerous even in their state of greatest concentration to enact a regime that reflects their 
preference.  This may be an argument for further decentralization on some issues (if, say, the group is more 
politically powerful in particular localities) or simply an occasion for observing that no system can satisfy 
everyone’s preferences.
533 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150 
(1992) (observing that “[f]ederalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet”); Kreimer, 
supra note 134, at 72 (“Mormons moved from Illinois to Utah, while African Americans migrated from the 
Jim Crow South.  Rail travel and, later, automobiles and airplanes enabled residents of conservative states 
to escape constraints on divorce and remarriage.”).  See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, 
AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 106-12 (1970).
534
 Kreimer, supra note 134, at 72.
535
 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Friedman, 
Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 397-400.
536
 [Friedman n. 346]
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Maine has provided health insurance for all of its residents, thereby providing a valuable 
test for similar proposals at the federal level.537  Important aspects of federal 
environmental regulation are based on prior experimentation at the state level, and state 
programs have moved in to fill gaps in the federal scheme.538
Much of this innovation, as Barry Friedman has observed, “just happens as 
governments try to solve problems.”539  But a second argument provides a further 
impetus, that is, that state governments will compete with one another to offer a more 
attractive policy mix to mobile employers, investors, and taxpayers.540  Drawing an 
analogy to the free market, proponents of regulatory diversity thus argue that competition 
among jurisdictions will result in “better” policies.541
One problem with these sorts of arguments, of course, is that we have not yet 
defined “better,” and definitions may be hard to agree upon.  One man’s regulatory 
competition may be another’s “race to the bottom” – that is, a situation in which 
regulatory competition among autonomous jurisdictions makes it impossible to 
implement desirable policies.  In Hammer v. Dagenhart,542 for example, the Court 
recognized that competitive dynamics made it difficult for individual states to implement 
restrictions on child labor, since industry could avoid one state’s restrictions by relocating 
to another state, with a concomitant loss in jobs and tax revenue to the regulating state.  
For proponents of child labor, this would simply be an example of regulatory competition 
at its best, while reformers saw these dynamics as an argument for national regulation.  
Others have made similar arguments for action at the national level in a variety of 
contexts.543
When a national consensus emerges in a particular policy area, arguments from 
regulatory diversity lose much of their force.  We have such a consensus, for example, on 
537 See On Health Care, Maine Leads, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at ___.
538 See [cite on California’s pre-existing mobile source emissions limits]; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism 
and Regulation: Some Generalizations, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 3, 13-14 (Daniel Esty & Damien Gerardin, eds., 2001) (describing state 
innovation in hazardous waste regulation and cleanup).  For other policy innovations by state governments, 
see, e.g., Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 399 (citing “bookmobiles, pre-election day 
‘early’ voting, town meetings, televised court proceedings, greenways, community agenda programs, 
leadership programs”); Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 523, at 9 [examples]; SHAPIRO, supra note 
523, at 87-88 (citing “the development of workers’ compensation programs, experiments in public 
education, welfare reform, health care, taxation systems, penology, environmental protection, and a number 
of other subjects”).
539
 Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 398.
540 See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 78 (“The argument rooted in the value of competition among the 
states, especially when combined with the right of exit of capital or labor, remains at the heart of the 
economic case for federalism.”).
541
 [cites]
542
 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918).
543
 [cites]; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 76 (1991) (“Interstate competition hampers inefficient regulation, but it can also hamper 
efficient regulation as well.”).
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the unacceptability of most forms of racial discrimination, and those areas have been 
appropriately federalized – placed off-limits to state-by- state regulatory diversity – as a 
result.544  But in many, many other areas – environmental policy, safety regulation, other 
forms of discrimination, to name just a few examples – no such consensus exists.  We 
either do not know the best way to reach an agreed-upon policy end, or we disagree about 
the proper ends themselves.
All this makes it quite difficult to say that regulatory diversity will result in more 
(or less) “good” policy outcomes on balance.  Two possible lines of argument are 
available.  The first would be to define a “good” set of outcomes as simply that which 
maximizes the preferences of the most voters; in this sense, it seems plausible to say that 
regulatory diversity is “better” than uniformity whenever there is no consensus on 
substance.545  Even this argument, of course, assumes the absence of spillover effects or 
public goods problems.  The second argument would attempt to define the “better” policy 
outcome on the merits across a broad range of issues, then ask whether regulatory 
experimentation and competition are likely to help or hinder the implementation of that 
outcome.  Merely to frame the question this way, however, is to make clear that it is 
unanswerable.  Not only is the range of relevant issues broad and the effects of 
competition hard to assess, but also normative agreement on many, if not most, of the 
relevant policy questions will be contested.
These problems pervade the extensive literature disputing whether federalism is a
“good” or “bad” thing.  I would prefer to make two less ambitious points.  The first is that 
our constitutional tradition is committed to some degree of state autonomy, and that 
autonomy has traditionally been justified, in part, on grounds of regulatory diversity.546
When we look for doctrine that can realize and make sense of our constitutional 
commitment to federalism, it thus makes sense to focus on the value of regulatory 
diversity.  We should have doctrines that preserve the ability of state governments to 
regulate in diverse ways, and downplay doctrines that offer little or no protection for that 
function.
The second point is that many critics of state autonomy seem to think that the 
normative question can be answered in a definitive way.  They seem convinced, despite 
544
 As the child labor example suggests, such consensus will more often than not be negative in character –
that is, we are more likely to agree that particular practices are unacceptable than that a particular 
regulatory program is optimal.  Racial equality is another example of this kind; we can agree that 
segregation was unacceptable, but it is harder to reach consensus on the right package of remedies for it.  
On race, of course, the remedial questions were rightly federalized as well once it became apparent that 
deferring to state and local policymakers on remedies would thwart implementation of the more general 
principle of racial equality.  See, e.g., [cites].
545
 One might say that in the classic “race to the bottom” situation, inter-jurisdictional competition actually 
thwarts the realization of voters’ preferences.  The voters of New Hampshire, for example, might prefer to 
ban child labor, but might nonetheless be deterred from enacting such a law by fear that their vital 
manufacturing industries will move to Vermont.  It seems more accurate in that situation, however, to say 
that New Hampshirites’ real preference is for jobs and tax revenue over a child labor ban.   
546 See, e.g., C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. REG. 93 (1983) (justifying the Reagan 
Administration’s “New Federalism” initiative in part on the ground that returning regulatory authority to 
the States “fosters diversity and experimentation”).
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the problems canvassed above, that races to the bottom predominate over beneficial 
competition, and in particular that state-by- state regulatory diversity will tend to thwart 
the implementation of “progressive” policy reforms.  Many of these arguments come 
from political liberals who seem not to have woken up to the fact that they no longer 
control the national government.547  In any event, I have endeavored in other work to 
demonstrate that federalism generally lacks a reliable political valence.548  It may be 
impossible to demonstrate that inter-jurisdictional competition and experimentation will 
produce “good” policy outcomes in a majority of cases, but one can identify a wide range 
of instances in which regulatory diversity fosters rather than impedes “progressive” 
policy goals.  This is not to say that such goals are inevitably the ones that ought to be 
pursued; rather, the point is that debates over state autonomy ought not to break down on 
simple ideological lines.
B. Political Participation, Competition, and Checks on the Center
A second set of values associated with federalism focuses on the political process 
itself rather than the substantive policies likely to be adopted by institutions at the state or 
national level.  We might usefully divide these values into two clusters – one associated 
with the benefits that citizens derive from participating in politics on the level of 
individuals and local communities, and another associated with the benefits of dividing 
power to the system as a whole.  
David Shapiro (along with many others) has pointed out that “to the extent the 
electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to 
individuals and their concerns, government brought closer to the people, and democratic 
ideals are more fully realized.”549  Public participation seems easier at the state and local 
level; this may be so because the issues seem more immediate, because citizens are more 
likely to know state or local politicians personally, or because the barriers to entry into 
politics are lower at the state and local level.550  We might value this participation for a 
547 See Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 151-53.  Progressives may, of course, retake power in 
Washington, D.C.  But the important point is that a broader view of our history demonstrates that the 
political leanings of individual institutions – the national political branches, the federal or state courts, even 
the national political parties – tends to swing back and forth over time.  It would be a mistake to make basic 
structural judgments based on an ephemeral current configuration of political forces.
548 See id. at 149-62; Young, Preemption, supra note ___.
549 SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 91-92. See also Merritt, supra note 523, at 7 (“The greater accessibility and 
smaller scale of local government allows individuals to participate actively in governmental 
decisionmaking.  This participation, in turn, provides myriad benefits: it trains citizens in the techniques of 
democracy, fosters accountability among elected representatives, and enhances voter confidence in the 
democratic process.”); Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 389 (“States, and their substate 
local governments, are closer to the people and provide an opportunity for greater citizen involvement in 
the functional process of self-government.”).
550
 Many of these benefits are far more pronounced at the local level than at the state level, and for that 
reason some have suggested that notions of constitutional federalism – which protect only state
governments as a constitutional matter – are therefore irrelevant to values of citizen participation.  See, e.g., 
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 523, at 915.  As I explain further infra at TAN ___, this Article’s concern with 
values of regulatory autonomy is central to local and state governments alike.  Moreover, as David Shapiro 
points out, “the states are in a far better position to respond to local pressures for home rule than is a more 
remote and centralized government.”  SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 93- 94.
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number of different reasons.  For some, it is a good in itself.551  For others, it is a means 
of building community solidarity and social capital.552  On this theory, the opportunities 
for participation in politics that federalism affords encourage individuals to interact not 
only with the government but with each other, building networks of trust and reciprocity 
which in turn redound to the benefit of citizens in a wide variety of ways.553
The operation of state and local governmental processes may also benefit our 
political system as a whole.  To the extent that state and local processes are more 
participatory and responsive to citizens, shifting responsibilities to them may alleviate the 
“democratic deficit” suffered by a distant central government that is often perceived as 
bureaucratic and dominated by special interests.554  Many forms of political 
accountability, moreover, are best exercised at close range.  Barry Friedman thus 
observes that “[o]fficials, elected and appointed, should be available for public comment, 
anger, approval, suggestions, and ideas about the course of public affairs. . . .  Officials 
ought to look their constituents in the eye on the street and see them in the grocery 
store.”555
More fundamentally, our federalism has always been justified as a bulwark 
against tyranny.  Madison extolled federalism as part of the “double security” that the 
new Constitution would provide for the people; just as the three branches of the central 
government were to check one another, the state governments would check the center.556
As Lynn Baker and I have discussed elsewhere,557 Madison’s discussion in the Federalist 
emphasized worst-case scenarios in which the States would have to oppose the Center 
militarily,558 and this emphasis has sometimes distracted critics of federalism from more 
prosaic – but also more relevant – mechanisms by which federalism protects liberty.559
Even in the Founding period, however, state autonomy buttressed individual liberty in 
other, less dramatic ways.
States may oppose national policies not only militarily but politically, and in so 
doing they may serve as critical rallying points for more widespread popular opposition.  
551
 [cites]
552 See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY 
L. J. 27, 29 (2001) (“[F]ederalism has value because it promotes social capital: ‘features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated action.”) (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN 
MODERN ITALY 167 (1994)).  On the importance of social capital generally, see ROBERT D. PUTNAM, 
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
553 See Mazzone, supra note 552, at 42-58.
554 See Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 392-93; SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 91-92.
555
 Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 395.
556
 The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
557
 Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 137 & n.280.
558
 [cites]
559 See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 523, at 928-29 (treating federalism’s protection of liberty purely 
as a military issue). 
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Madison and Jefferson, out of national power during the Federalist administration of John 
Adams, worked through the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures to oppose the Alien and 
Sedition Acts.560  The States thus, as Professor Friedman puts it, “serve as an independent 
means of calling forth the voice of the people.”561  More recently, “[s]ome state and local 
governments have proven themselves formidable lobbyists and indefatigable litigants” on 
issues such as affirmative action, benefits for the disabled, and environmental policy.562
The intertwinement of federal and state bureaucracies through various forms of 
“cooperative federalism” likewise gives state and local officials the ability to resist 
federal initiatives in more subtle ways.  Recently, for instance, dozens of localities and 
several states have criticized – and sometimes even refused to cooperate with – aspects of 
the War on Terrorism that they felt intruded too far into personal liberties.563
More fundamentally, states serve as the seedbeds of political competition in our 
“compound republic.”564  Many political and social movements – such as abolitionism 
and Progressivism – originate and gain strength at the state level before making a bid for 
national power.  The existence of the states as alternate arenas for political competition 
bolsters our two-party system, moreover, by ensuring that a party defeated at the national 
level can nonetheless exercise power in statehouses around the country.  In the 2002 
elections, for example, the Democrats lost their hold on the Senate but picked up power 
at the state level by winning three additional governorships.565  Because the loyal 
opposition can not only oppose but actually govern at the state level, the opposition party 
can develop a track record of success that enhances its prospects in subsequent national 
elections.  Hence, the Democrats’ control of so many statehouses “prepared the ground 
for a revival of their own party.”566  Opposition parties in non-federal systems, by 
contrast, face greater obstacles in staying competitive.  A recent comparison of the 
British Tories with American Republicans, for example, noted that the Tories “face 
560
 [cite Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions]; see also Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 
403 & n.363.  For another example, see MCDONALD, supra note 43, at 66-70 (describing the New England 
states’ opposition to the War of 1812).
561
 Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 403.
562
 Merritt, supra note 523, at 5.
563 See Portland Decision Highlights Differing Attitudes, CNN.com, Nov. 22, 2001 (available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/11/21/inv.portland.questioning/index.html); see also Town Criminalizes 
Compliance with Patriot Act, CNN.com, May 18, 2003 (available at 
http://wwww.cnn.com/2003/us/west/05/18/patriot.act/a[/index.html) (describing Arcata, California’s 
symbolic ordinance directing town officials not to comply with federal investigations under the Patriot 
Act).  For a general discussion of these acts of state and local opposition, and their relationship to broader 
debates  about federalism, see Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of 
Terror, ___ BROOKLYN L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004); Young, Dark Side, supra note ___.
564 See Merritt, supra note 523, at 7 (“Most importantly, states check national power by serving as a well-
spring of political force.”).
565 See One Cheer for the Democrats, ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 2002, at 34 (noting that the Democrats “picked 
up four big industrial states—Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin” as well as hanging on to 
California, and that “the proportion of Americans living under Republican governors has shrunk from 70% 
in 1994 to only 46% today”).
566 Id.
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problems in imitating Mr. Bush—not least because they lack a testing ground for their 
ideas.”567  It should not be surprising, then, that four of the last five U.S. presidents were 
former governors who developed a reputation for competence at the state level while the 
other party held the White House.568  As Deborah Merritt has pointed out, federalism 
buttresses our liberty by “maintain[ing] the multiparty system and prevent[ing] the 
growth of a monolithic political power on the federal level.”569
Again, of course, there are counter-arguments.  A tradition in political science 
reaching back to Federalist No. 10 holds that it is state and local governments – not the 
national one – that are more likely to be dominated by special interests.570  While 
participation may be easier at the state and local levels, voter turnout measures suggest 
that it is also less valued by many people.571  And some states have become such large 
political communities in their own right that the state government hardly seems likely to 
realize the benefits of political participation on a human scale.572  Finally, the whole 
experience of racial subordination in this country demonstrates that state governments 
will sometimes be the oppressors, and the national government the bringer of liberty.573
I would hesitate to argue for state autonomy without an agreed-upon, national 
floor for fundamental human rights.  But that, in fact, is the system we have.  Virtually no 
proponent of state autonomy today wishes to roll back the Reconstruction Amendments, 
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights as binding on the States, or even the broad power 
of the Congress to enact basic civil rights legislation.574  But state autonomy may enhance 
567 A Tale of Two Legacies, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2002, at ___.
568
 George W. Bush governed the Great State of Texas from 1995 to 2000, during the Clinton 
Administration; Bill Clinton was governor of Arkansas from 1983 to 1992, during the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations; Ronald Reagan became governor of California in 1967 during the Johnson 
Administration, although most of his term (1967-1975) was during the Nixon and Ford Administrations; 
and Jimmy Carter was governor of Georgia from 1971 to 1975, during the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations.
569
 Merritt, supra note 523, at 7.
570
 [cites]
571 See, e.g., D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process—The Alternative 
to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 631 & n. 310 (1985) [check].  But see
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 552, at 35 (pointing out that voting is an atypical form of political 
participation and that other forms are more important to building social capital).
572 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 528 (1995); SHAPIRO, 
supra note 523, at 93 (noting that “the goal of realizing democratic values . . . may not be significantly 
enhanced by reducing the relevant polity from one of some 280,000,000 (the United States) to one of, say, 
30,000,000 (the state of California)”).  For some relevant statistics, see supra note 116.  The point that 
many states may no longer be small enough to capture the benefits of popular participation tends also to 
blunt the force of Madison’s argument for national government in Federalist 10. 
573 See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note ___, at 52-55; but see id. at 95 (noting that “another side to the story 
cannot be ignored—a side that acknowledges the role of the states in protecting individual and group rights 
and interests”).
574
 The Court’s recent decisions restricting the scope of Congress’s authority to enforce the Reconstruction 
Amendments have generally focused on the particular remedies available against state governments 
themselves, rather than power of Congress to enact such laws.  See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of 
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personal liberties even in the sphere of individual rights by allowing space for more 
expansive interpretations of those rights.  In areas of privacy, criminal procedure, and 
civil rights protections, for example, individual states have chosen to provide a greater 
measure of protection for individual liberty than that available under federal law.575
More fundamentally, nothing in the logic supporting the necessity of federal protection 
for individual rights suggests that such protections are a sufficient condition for liberty.  
Modern constitutional law has focused its attention on those individual rights provisions, 
but the federalism and separation of powers constraints on government tyranny have 
always been operating in the background.  Our history affords no reason for confidence 
that a significant erosion of state autonomy would not have a negative impact on 
individual freedom.576
C. Sovereignty, Autonomy, and Decentralization
All these values associated with federalism share a common characteristic:  They 
are predicated on active state governments with important responsibilities.  “Active” in 
this context need not mean intrusive or interventionist; whether states adopt rigorous 
regulatory policies or laissez faire ones, the important point is that the policy questions 
they confront must be meaningful ones, and their regulatory jurisdiction must cover a 
broad range of issues important to their citizens.   Regulatory diversity means little, after 
all, if it extends only to a handful of unimportant issues.  And citizens will have little 
incentive to participate in state and local politics if the issues decided at those levels are 
not important to them.
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); but see
[Hibbs] (upholding Congress’s power, under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity for private suits under the Family Medical Leave Act).  This line of cases, moreover, 
has gone out of its way to reaffirm earlier precedents upholding the Voting Rights Act – probably the most 
important civil rights statute enacted under Section Five.  [cites]  The exceptions to this trend are City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which held 
that Congress lacked power entirely to enact civil rights protections against burdens on religious exercise 
and gender-motivated violence.  But Boerne was driven as much by separation of powers concerns as by 
federalism, [cite].  The Violence Against Women Act struck down in Morrison, on the other hand, was an 
unusual civil rights statute in that its substantive prohibitions – i.e., assaults and rapes – were duplicative of 
existing state law protections and strayed outside the traditional spheres of employment and public 
accommodations, in which Congress has been able to employ the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Katzenbach 
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) .  
Nothing in the Court’s recent jurisprudence suggests that other recent civil rights statutes – such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or even the other 
provisions of the VAWA itself – are in any danger of being found to lie outside the commerce power.
575 See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995) (rejecting “good faith exception” to state 
constitutional version of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); New Jersey Coalition v. J.M.B., 650 
A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994) (holding that state constitutional protection for free speech requires private shopping 
centers to allow non-commercial leafleting); see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and 
the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 
(1986); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 
HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 93 (2000).
576 See, e.g., Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 404 (“Perhaps we have been so successful 
in creating the institutions that protect us that our liberty will never again be threatened.  Perhaps, on the 
other hand, the dispersion of political voice represented by federalism is part of this protection.”).
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This might seem like an obvious point.  Why, after all, should anyone care about 
state governments if those governments have nothing to do?  The point is worth 
belaboring, however, because of the Rehnquist Court’s focus on issues of sovereignty 
rather than autonomy.  Although many aspects of the jurisprudence are positive, the 
Court has done relatively little to protect the regulatory jurisdiction of the States or their 
ability to provide essential services to their citizens.577  Instead, the Court has focused on 
limiting the accountability of state governments when they violate federal law.  The most 
important line of such cases – those expanding the sovereign immunity of the states from 
suits for money damages under federal law578 – has even emphasized the “dignity” of the 
states over the impact of federal damages remedies on the states’ ability to perform their 
governmental functions.579  To be sure, limiting the ability of courts to impose extensive 
financial liabilities on state governments may protect important aspects of state 
autonomy, such as the ability of state institutions to control the allocation of scarce 
financial resources pursuant to their view of the public good.  And even dignity may have 
some importance, especially in an age in which state sovereignty is so often denigrated in 
the most extreme terms.580  But these considerations, in my view, pale beside the 
importance of preserving meaningful state regulatory responsibilities.581
The Court’s federalism jurisprudence has thus been preoccupied with Texas v. 
White’s notion of “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”582  But 
“indestructibility” gained prominence at a time when dismemberment – either of the 
individual States or the Union as a whole – was a more than credible threat.  It has little 
relevance to the problems confronting our federal system today, because 
“indestructibility” in itself offers no guarantee that the States will retain the sorts of 
powers and responsibility necessary to be viable, functioning governments.  A State may 
577
 The defunct doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was often justified in 
terms of the need to protect state governments’ ability to serve their citizens.  [cites]  That doctrine held 
that Congress could not subject the institutions of state governments themselves to generally-applicable 
federal laws, at least where those laws regulated the “traditional governmental functions” of those 
governments.  But the threats against which the doctrine was erected were hardly credible.  Under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act – the statute at issue in both Usery and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528 (1985)– Congress merely asked state governments to abide by the same wage and hour rules 
that bound General Motors and virtually all other private employers.  As Bruce La Pierre has noted, in such 
cases the fact that Congress is subjecting a broad set of private entities to the same regulation as the States 
helps to ensure that such regulation will not be overly burdensome.  See D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 
WASH. U. L.Q. 979, ___ (1982).  
578 See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
579 See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, ___ (2002); 
[Peter Smith draft].
580 See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 523, at 908-09 (“[F]ederalism is a neurosis, a dysfunctional belief 
to which we cling despite its irrelevance to present circumstances.”); [others].
581 See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at 51-58 (arguing that the Court’s state sovereign 
immunity decisions do little to protect the more important value of state regulatory autonomy).
582
 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869).
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remain “indestructible,” in terms of the integrity of its own institutions, while retaining 
no meaningful role in the broader system.
A federalism jurisprudence focused on problems of regulatory autonomy would 
directly address many of the values that motivate our attachment to federalism in the first 
place.  An autonomy-centered model may also be well-adapted to address two other 
functional dilemmas facing doctrines that rely more heavily on notions of state 
“sovereignty.”  The first of these, identified by a number of scholars, is that federalism 
doctrine generally protects state governments while ignoring local governments, which 
have no independent status under the federal Constitution.583  This is true despite the fact 
that, as Richard Fallon has observed, “in functional analysis of the values that federalism 
serves, the significance of local governments is enormous.”584 Threats to state regulatory 
autonomy like federal preemption, however, often fall on both state and local 
governments alike.585  Autonomy-centered doctrines that limit the preemptive sweep of 
federal law are thus likely to benefit all governmental entities further down the food 
chain.  
Likewise, autonomy doctrine is well-suited to address an argument by Edward 
Rubin and Malcolm Feeley to the effect that the benefits of federalism discussed in this 
Section generally flow from decentralization of decisionmaking, whether such 
decentralization arises from constitutional mandate or merely from the policy decisions 
of officials at the center to devolve power.   Values of regulatory diversity and citizen 
participation, in other words, are not necessarily reasons to enforce protections for state 
autonomy as a matter of constitutional law.586  The short answer, which I explain further 
below,587 is that autonomy doctrine has the capacity to address these values on both
levels – that is, the constitutional guarantee of state prerogatives and the policy choice to 
devolve power.  To appreciate how this is so, however, requires an investigation of the 
institutional imperatives involved in the enforcement of federalism.  That investigation is 
the subject of the next Section.
V. Federalism in the Political Branches:  The Viability and Extent of Self-
Enforcement
Doctrine should be shaped not only by the values that it seeks to promote but also 
by the relative institutional capacity of courts to promote them.  This question, as I 
acknowledged in Part I, is a matter of comparative institutional choice.  At least in theory, 
583 See, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L. J. 377 (2001); 
Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1994).
584
 Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 441.
585 See, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (addressing preemption 
challenge to local ordinance regulating pesticides); Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“[F]or the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local 
ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of statewide laws.”).
586 See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 523, at 914.
587 See infra TAN ___.
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the institutional choice question (Are the courts or the political process better suited to 
protecting the federal balance?) is distinct from and prior to a second question of 
interpretive choice (What sort of doctrinal tools should courts adopt for protecting 
federalism?).  I have already argued, however, that the institutional question will 
generally be so multifarious in the federalism context as to preclude categorical 
conclusions, and that in any event courts are not free simply to abstain from deciding 
federalism questions institutional grounds.588   A third reason emerges from the 
discussion in this Part:  The political branches’ capacity to protect federalism is simply 
too limited and uncertain to justify a categorical exclusion of the matter from judicial 
concern.
If we are unwilling or unable to exclude courts entirely, then comparative 
institutional analysis is best brought to bear on doctrine – that is, we will resolve the 
interpretive questions in federalism doctrine to give courts a broader or narrower role, 
depending on whether how we think courts compare with other institutions that might 
resolve federalism questions.  That is certainly commonplace enough:  Courts adopted 
federalism doctrines that were highly deferential towards Congress after 1937, for 
example, because their experience of the prior two or three decades suggested (to them, at 
least) that the political branches were better suited for resolving such questions.589
Comparative institutional analysis will also be relevant to other issues as well; I conclude 
this Part, for example, with some very brief speculations about how the political branches 
might structure their own internal operations to reflect these sorts of considerations.  But 
this is primarily an essay about courts and doctrine, so the bearing of institutional 
considerations on the latter must necessarily take center stage.
Although I frame the issue as one of interpretive choice, a frequent observation by 
institutional analysts remains critical:  Too many scholars and judges have addressed the 
question who should decide federalism issues in what Neil Komesar describes as “single 
institutional analysis.”590 Some have stressed the strengths or weaknesses of courts in 
addressing federalism issues; others have emphasized the capacity, or lack thereof, of the 
political branches.591  As Professor Komesar explains, however, “[v]alid institutional 
comparison calls upon courts to function when they can do a better job than the 
alternatives.”  This means that “[c]ourts may be called upon to consider issues for which 
they are ill equipped in some absolute sense because they are better equipped to do so in 
a relative sense.592
My analysis here tries to address both sides of the comparison.  The present Part 
focuses on the political branches, while the following Part emphasizes courts. The 
analysis is far from definitive in either case.  As I have suggested, it is simply not 
possible to draw many firm conclusions at a high level of generality on these sorts of 
588 See supra TAN ___.
589 [Cushman?]
590 See KOMESAR, supra note ___, at 27.
591 [examples]
592 KOMESAR, supra note ___, at 149.
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questions.  Moreover, as Adrian Vermeule has demonstrated, issues of interpretive choice 
(and institutional choice as well) often turn on empirical questions, and in many cases the 
answers may be unknown or even unknowable.593  I have tried throughout my discussion 
to point out areas where it might be possible to advance the ball through empirical 
research.  But many important facts will remain unknown, and courts will often have to 
frame doctrine under conditions of uncertainty.  
For example, my discussion in Section A of the argument that federal political 
actors represent state governmental interests accepts that this dynamic operates some of
the time, but also suggests that in other situations federal representatives may actually 
compete with state-level politicians.  Which effect dominates is, at bottom, an empirical 
question, but one would be hard pressed to resolve it through further research.  It would 
be even more difficult to calculate the “optimal” level of judicial intervention to 
counteract the competitive activities of federal politicians, even if we could agree on 
exactly how much federalism we want.  Similar sorts of difficult and possibly intractable 
empirical uncertainties pervade this area of the law.
My analysis here attempts to respond to these uncertainties through several 
related strategies.  First, I address these institutional questions at a relatively high level of 
generality, assessing general tendencies while recognizing that individual doctrinal 
contexts may require different resolutions, depending in part on how the underlying 
empirical issues play out in that particular context.  Second, I pay relatively close 
attention to the claims made by prior advocates of judicial deference to the political 
branches, on the view that the factual intuitions reflected in those views represent the 
considered assessments of informed and intelligent observers over time.  Third, I argue
that the development of federalism doctrine should be incremental, so that we need only 
decide the direction and approach of incremental change while leaving its magnitude to 
be worked out over a series of decisions.  Finally, I suggest that empirical uncertainty is 
itself an argument for choosing a “soft” over a “hard” model of judicial review; under the 
former, the court’s resolution of federalism question is provisional and subject to 
modification by the political branches, who may have better information in any given 
case.  I will still have to make certain assumptions and leaps, but hopefully I can at least 
press some distance toward a more nuanced analysis of the “political safeguards of 
federalism” than has sometimes appeared in the prior literature.
I consider three different sets of claims about the institutional capacity of the 
political branches to protect federalism.  Section A begins by addressing the most 
commonclaim, that political actors at the federal level represent and respond to the 
interests of state political institutions.  This is the classic Twentieth Century version of 
the “political safeguards” claim advanced by Herbert Wechsler and Jesse Choper, among 
others.  Section B considers an older variant, identified most closely with James Madison, 
which holds that the sovereign People control the federal balance of power and that 
federal and state governments compete for their loyalty.  In Section C, I canvass the quite 
different claim that the federal political process protects the States not through 
representation but through sheer inertia; States retain their freedom of action to the extent 
593 [cite]
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that it is difficult to make federal law.   Finally, Section D considers what each of these 
arguments can tell us about how to build current federalism doctrine.
A. Representation
Herbert Wechsler’s classic article began by describing a national “mood,” under 
which national action is “regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be justified 
by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case.”594  The bulk of his 
argument, however, emphasized the first aspect of Madison’s discussion in Federalist 45, 
that is, the extent to which federal political institutions are derived from and dependent 
on the institutions of state government.  The Senate, Wechsler observed, “cannot fail to 
function as the guardian of state interests as such,” and “[f]ederalist considerations . . . 
play an important part even in the selection of the President.”595  Because of these 
relationships, he concluded that “the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its 
interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interests of the states, whose 
representatives control the legislative process and, by hypothesis, have broadly 
acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act of Congress.”596
The Supreme Court largely adopted Professor Wechsler’s analysis in Garcia, 
observing that
The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the 
Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.  The 
States were vested with indirect influence over the House of 
Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral 
qualifications and their role in Presidential Elections. . . .  They were given 
more direct influence in the Senate, where each State received equal 
representation and each Senator was to be selected by the legislature of his 
State.597
Because of these safeguards, the Court concluded that “[s]tate sovereign interests . . . are 
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal 
system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”598
There is no evidence that Professor Wechsler meant the “political safeguards” to 
be a complete theory of federalism enforcement.  To the contrary, he carefully denied 
“that the Court can decline to measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is 
called upon to face the question in the course of ordinary litigation.”599  By pointing out 
that “the supremacy clause governs there as well,”600 Wechsler seemed to insist that the 
limits on federal power in the Constitution itself, such as the doctrine of enumerated 
594
 Wechsler, supra note ___, at 544.  
595
 Wechsler, supra note ___, at 548, 557.  
596 Id. at 559.
597
 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985).
598 Id. at 552.
599
 Wechsler, supra note ___, at 559.
600 Id.
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powers, remain supreme law that courts must enforce.  Judicial review should be 
deferential, but it must still police the outer boundary of federal power.
That would be consistent with the apparent position of Chief Justice Marshall, 
who made his own “political safeguards” argument in Gibbons v. Ogden601:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though 
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in 
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its 
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found 
in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of 
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their 
constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as 
that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have 
relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the 
people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.602
Critics of judicial review in federalism cases have sometimes read this passage as an 
argument for abdicating judicial enforcement altogether.  Justice Souter’s dissent in 
Morrison, for example, moves seamlessly from Marshall’s declaration that politics is the 
“one restraint on [the] valid exercise” of Congress’s “plenary . . . power within the sphere 
of activity affecting commerce”603 to the conclusion that “supposed conflicts of sovereign 
political interests implicated by the Commerce Clause” are “remit[ted] . . . to politics.”604
But the italicized concepts are not equivalent.  Justice Souter carefully and correctly (as is 
his wont) characterizes Marshall as holding that politics take over only when Congress is 
actually regulating commerce.  Morrison, however, was a case about whether that 
condition was met in the first place.  That question surely “implicates” the Commerce 
Clause, but nothing in Gibbons supports remitting boundary questions about the scope of 
that clause to politics.605
601
 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
602 Id. at 197.
603
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 648 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons) (emphasis 
added).
604 Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
605
 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Morrison rightly pointed out the distinction between that 
case and Gibbons:
[Justice Souter’s] assertion that, from Gibbons on, public opinion has been the only restraint on 
the congressional exercise of the commerce power is true only insofar as it contends that political 
accountability is and has been the only limit on Congress' exercise of the commerce power within 
that power's outer bounds. As the language surrounding that relied upon by JUSTICE SOUTER 
makes clear, Gibbons did not remove from this Court the authority to define that boundary.  
Id. at 616 n.7 (majority opinion) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95).  Justice Souter admitted as 
much, acknowledging that “[n]either Madison nor Wilson nor Marshall, nor the Jones & Laughlin, Darby, 
Wickard, or Garcia Courts, suggested that politics defines the commerce power.”  Id. at 651 n.19.  He 
argued that the outer boundary is described by the extremely lenient “substantial effects” test, and that the 
majority’s exclusion of non-commercial regulation that nonetheless “affects” commerce thus operated 
13-Jul-04 draft
114
Justice Souter cited the Court’s endorsement of Wechsler in Garcia as support for 
abstaining in Morrison,606 but Garcia actually illustrates the distinction between the latter 
case and what Chief Justice Marshall most likely had in mind.  Garcia, unlike Morrison, 
was not case about the boundaries of the commerce power.  Instead, Garcia concerned 
the validity of the National League of Cities doctrine – a new, judge-made principle of 
state sovereignty protecting “traditional state functions” from otherwise-valid Commerce 
Clause regulation.607  Presumably, Wechsler (or Marshall) would have said that while the 
Court cannot abdicate its responsibility to enforce limits on federal power that are clearly 
“in” the Constitution, the political safeguards of federalism largely obviate the need to 
fashion new limits through doctrinal innovation.
It is an important enough point that neither Marshall nor Wechsler nor Garcia
spoke to the right and duty of the Court to police the outer boundary of Congress’s 
power.  But I actually want to defend an exercise of judicial power in the class of cases 
that Wechsler, Garcia, and Gibbons all render problematic. For reasons that I discuss in 
Part VI, the scope of the commerce power is likely to remain so broad as to offer largely 
a symbolic constraint on Congress.608  If federal power is meaningfully to be limited, it 
will have to come through doctrines that restrain national action even within the scope of 
the enumerated powers.  The anti-commandeering doctrine, for example, operates to 
check otherwise-valid exercises of the commerce power.609  “Weaker” doctrines like pro-
federalism clear statement rules also generally operate to restrict the scope of federal 
legislation even without a colorable argument that Congress has exceeded the boundaries 
of its constitutional authority.610
To justify such doctrines, we might look to Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Garcia.  
That opinion invoked Professor Wechsler’s idea of political safeguards, but read (or 
misread) him as eschewing virtually all substantive limits on Congress’s power in favor 
of a nearly exclusive focus on the process of representation.611  Blackmun argued that 
within the sphere of political control.  See id.  That simply makes clear, however, that the disagreement 
between Justice Souter and the majority was over the proper doctrinal test for defining the boundary of the 
commerce power, and Justice Souter conceded that that question cannot be decided by politics.
606 See id. at 649 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528 (1985)).
607 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
608 See infra TAN ___.  As I explain, that does not mean that the symbolic constraint is unimportant.
609 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  
Souter’s dissenting position in Morrison thus would have been more persuasive in Printz or New York, 
although Justice Souter in fact joined the majority in the latter case.
610 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (requiring a clear statement of Congress’s intent to 
regulate state governments in circumstances that once would have implicated the National League of Cities
doctrine); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (presumption against preemption of state 
law).
611
 The “virtually” is required by Justice Blackmun’s statement, late in the opinion, that “[t]hese cases do 
not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on 
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)).  The citation to Coyle –
which held that the Federal Government may not dictate the location of a state capitol – suggests that even 
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“the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce 
Clause to protect the ‘States as States’ is one of process rather than one of result.”612
Because of this procedural focus, “[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of 
Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic 
limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national 
political process rather than to dictate a ‘sacred province of state autonomy.’”613
The Garcia majority is often read as completely disavowing a judicial role in the 
protection of state autonomy.  But whether or not Justice Blackmun intended to do so, the 
opinion left the door open to a “Democracy and Distrust”614 for federalism doctrine – that 
is, doctrines that would derive their justification from failures in the political process but 
which might fairly aggressively limit federal incursions on state autonomy.615   John Hart 
Ely’s work on process failures surely demonstrates how far-reaching such review can be 
in the context of individual rights, and Andrezj Rapaczynski traced the outlines of such a 
theory in the federalism area shortly after Garcia came down.616  Some of the promise of 
such a jurisprudence has been realized in the anti-commandeering doctrine, which may 
be justified on process grounds,617 as well as in the various “clear statement” rules that 
the Garcia majority might be willing to acknowledge some very narrow affirmative limit imposed by state 
sovereignty concerns on Congress’s enumerated powers.  But this limit would seem to be so narrow as to 
hardly be worth mentioning. 
612 Id. at 554 (emphasis added). See also id. at 552:
In short, the Framers chose to rely on a federally system in which special restraints on federal 
power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather 
than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority.  State sovereign interests, then, are 
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system 
than by judicially created limitations on federal power.
There is, to be sure, ambiguity in statements like this.  The allusion to “judicially created limitations” 
suggestions a position similar to that I have just attributed to Wechsler:  Courts may enforce textual limits 
on Congress’s power, but there is no need to make up new limits.  However, the textual limitation of 
federal power to “commerce among the several states,” for example, is a “discrete limitation[] on the 
objects of federal authority” even though it is not “judicially created.”  In any event, Justices on the present 
Court who would follow Garcia’s approach have invoked it in enumerated powers cases as well as in cases 
involving “judicially created” limits on federal authority.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
649-50 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
613 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
614 See, of course, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); 
see also Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1364-66 (applying Professor Ely’s theory to federalism 
doctrine).
615 See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, The Preconditions for Home Rule, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 409 
(1990) (suggesting that Justice Blackmun might have had in mind a “sort of ‘equal protection for states’ 
principle” that could be invoked if “other States took advantage of their political power to impose 
limitations on certain disfavored geographic areas that those States were unwilling to live with 
themselves”).
616 See Rapaczynski, supra note ___, at 364-65.
617 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927-28 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,, 
182-83 (1992); see also Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1360-61 (discussing the anti-
13-Jul-04 draft
116
guard against interpretations of federal statutes that encroach on state sovereignty.618
These sorts of doctrines make clear that Garcia need not be read as the “Second Death of 
Federalism.”619
Others, however, have pressed the “political safeguards” theory so far as to justify 
a complete abdication of judicial responsibility for enforcing the federal balance.  Most 
famously, Jesse Choper urged that the Court should simply declare federalism cases non-
justiciable, in order to save its political capital for the more important task of enforcing 
individual rights.620  Lynn Baker and I have criticized this version of the “political 
safeguards” argument elsewhere.621  The important point for present purposes is that 
Professor Wechsler’s (and Madison’s) idea opens up a range of possibilities for judicial 
review (or non-review) of federalism issues.  I want to suggest that how we choose 
among them ought to be guided by our assessment of the soundness of Wechsler’s 
political theory, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the alternative approaches to 
judicial review that may be available.
It must be said that the Garcia/Wechsler theory of protection through 
representation has all kinds of problems.  The critical literature is extensive,622 and I will 
commandeering doctrine as a means of requiring Congress to internalize the financial and political costs of 
its programs); La Pierre, Political Safeguards, supra note 577, at 989.
618 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) 
(refusing to defer to administrative agency interpretation of statute that would push the bounds of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (requiring a clear 
statement of Congress’s intent to subject core state functions to federal regulation); Atascadero State Hosp. 
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243  (1985) (requiring a very clear statement where Congress wishes to abrogate 
the states’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments); see also 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (holding, prior to Garcia, that Congress 
must clearly state conditions on grants to states of federal funds); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. 
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 593 (1992) (discussing the clear statement cases).
619
 Van Alstyne, supra note 288, at 1709 (criticizing Garcia as an abdication of the Court’s responsibility).  
I do not mean to suggest that Professor Van Alstyne was wrong in his assessment of what Garcia meant to 
the justices in the majority at the time it was decided.  Justice Blackmun may very well have intended to 
minimize judicial review of federalism issues across the board, and some of his subsequent votes suggest 
no great enthusiasm for finding process-based limits on federal power.  See, e.g., New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 189 (1992) (joining Justice White’s dissent rejecting the anti-commandeering rule).  
The point is simply that Garcia – perhaps inadvertently – pointed the way toward a more rigorous doctrine 
of federalism.  When life gives you lemons . . . .
620 See CHOPER, supra note ___, at ___ [quote?].
621 See Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 103-06 (arguing that the political question doctrine exhausts the 
category of “non-justiciable” constitutional claims, and that federalism issues cannot be fit within that 
category).
622 See, e.g., Kramer, Politics, supra note ___, at ___ (demolishing the traditional version of the theory 
before trying to rehabilitate it through reliance on the role of political parties); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 
226 (lacking much patience with either the old or the new versions); Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism 
Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1069 (2001); Baker & Young, supra
note 10, at 106-33; William Marshall, The Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
139 (1998); Lewis Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty:  The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
847 (1979).
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hit only the high points here.623  The first has to do with Professor Wechsler’s theory of 
representation.  Because federal representatives are dependent upon constituents at the 
state level, Wechsler assumed Members of Congress will function effectively as 
ambassadors for their states in Washington, guarding their states’ interests against federal 
encroachment.624  As Larry Kramer has demonstrated, however, this view conflates 
representation of interests at the state level with representation of the actual institutions 
of state government.625  The two are not the same; indeed, federal and state politicians are 
likely to find themselves competing to provide for the needs of their common 
constituents.  This competition provides strong incentives for federal representatives to 
expand their own responsibilities at the expense of their state-level colleagues.  As 
Jonathan Macey has explained, “the political-support-maximization model would seem to 
predict that the federal government will always exercise its power to preempt local law –
either to regulate or to forbear from regulating – in order to obtain for itself the political 
support associated with providing laws to interested political coalitions.”626
Some opponents of judicial review in federalism cases have acknowledged these 
sorts of problems, but have sought to rehabilitate the Garcia/Wechsler approach by 
identifying alternative political mechanisms that protect state autonomy.  Larry Kramer, 
for example, has argued that political parties and administrative agencies tie the fortunes 
of state and federal-level politicians together, so that federal representatives and 
bureaucrats are inclined to look out for the institutional interests of state government 
instead of to compete with state politicians.627  This dynamic no doubt works out the way 
Professor Kramer predicts at least some of the time.  Yet there are also reasons to doubt 
623
 I have already discussed the objection that the judicial abdication called for by strong versions of the 
“political safeguards” argument is inconsistent with the obligation of Courts, outside the narrow scope of 
the political question doctrine, to decide constitutional issues that come before them.  See supra TAN ___.  
624
 [cite Wechsler].  Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Garcia likewise seems to have assumed an 
ambassadorial or intergovernmental model when it stated that the makeup of Congress provides for “state 
participation in federal governmental action.”  469 U.S. at 556.
625 See Kramer, Politics, supra note 622, at ___ [quote].
626
 Macey, Federalism, supra note ___, at 266.  Professor Macey notes, however, that “contrary to this 
prediction, we observe that the federal government willingly defers to local governments over a wide range 
of issues by allowing them to continue to supply laws.”  Id.  He identifies three sets of circumstances in 
which, under the economic theory of regulation, we would expect such federal deference, and I address 
these circumstances in the next Subsection.  See infra TAN ___.  The important point for present purposes 
is that, as Macey’s analysis makes clear, state politicians are often dependent upon federal ones, rather than 
the reverse.  See, e.g., id. at 291 (“Deferring regulatory matters to the state legislatures must take its place 
alongside the other strategies by which federal politicians can offer wealth transfers to interest groups in 
exchange for political support.”).  For the notion that state and federal politicians compete with one 
another, see also Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1347, 1357 (1997) (“Where central representatives are popularly elected, they may have a stake in 
reelection that induces them to favor central intervention whenever they can thereby be perceived as 
addressing an issue of interest to constituents, regardless of whether centralized attention to the issue is 
required or authorized.”); Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 114-15 (arguing that the federal Gun Free 
School Zones Act illustrates this dynamic); Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 374-75 
(noting the incentives that federal politicians have to move “‘apple pie’ issues” to the federal level). 
627 See Kramer, Politics, supra note ___, at ___ [quote]; Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 
___, at ___.
13-Jul-04 draft
118
how far the argument goes.  Mutual dependence is a double-edged sword; in some 
instances, it may encourage state politicians to sacrifice their own institutional interests 
and the interests of their state for the good of the national party.628
Unlike Madison’s and Wechsler’s version of the interdependence argument, 
moreover, Professor Kramer’s account is predicated on mechanisms – the structure of 
political parties, the interlocking nature of state and federal administrative responsibilities
– that are not themselves grounded in the Constitution.629  They change with every 
alteration in party nomination and campaign financing rules, executive orders 
centralizing or decentralizing control within the Executive branch, and the structure of 
cooperative federalism statutes and federal funding programs.  In each of these settings, 
protections for state autonomy are often a byproduct of a structure designed primarily to 
meet other needs.  Under these circumstances, we have little reason to be sanguine that 
preservation of those protections will be an imperative when the structures are redesigned  
for other reasons.630
Professor Kramer’s mechanisms are, in any event, no answer to a second problem 
that arises when we distinguish between the classic problem of vertical aggrandizement –
that is, attempts by the national government to increase its own power vis a vis the states 
for its own purposes – and horizontal aggrandizement.631  Most discussion of “political 
safeguards” focuses on the vertical scenario.  In the horizontal version, one group of state 
governments or interests concentrated at the state level use the national government as an 
instrument for imposing its preferences on other states.  A good nineteenth century 
example is the Fugitive Slave Law, by which the Southern states were able to use the 
federal government as an instrument for enforcing their preference for a draconian regime 
of recovery of escaped slaves on states in the North that preferred to give putative 
628 See, e.g., Laylan Copelin & Michele Kay, D.C. Keeps Eye on Special Session, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, June 19, 2003 (available at 
http://www.statesman.com/legislature/content/coxnet/texas/legislature/0603/0619perry.html) (describing 
pressure on Texas state officials from House Majority Leader Tom Delay and presidential advisor Karl 
Rove to convene a contentious special legislative session to re-draw federal House districts, in order to help 
Republican party fortunes in Congress); Dave Harmon, Representatives Seek Senate’s Help for Threatened 
Bills, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 14, 2003 (available at 
http://www.statesman.com/hp/content/coxnet/texas/legislature/0503/0515deadbills.html) (describing how 
the attempt to push redistricting legislation through the state legislature, at the behest of federal officials, 
endangered important state legislation). 
629 See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 226, at 1480-89 (arguing that Professor Kramer’s theory “relies on an 
extraconstitutional structure of politics that is so admittedly mutable and uncertain that it only proves our 
point: more permanent mechanisms, such as judicial review, are necessary to safeguard federalism”); Baker 
& Young, supra note 10, at 115-17 (voicing a similar criticism).
630 See, e.g., Howard, supra note 173, at 793 (observing that “[t]he ‘nationalization’ of campaign finance 
has led to the weakening of the federal lawmakers’ loyalties to constituents”).
631
 On the distinction between horizontal aggrandizement, see generally Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 
109-10; see also Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note ___ at 1940 (arguing that conditional federal 
spending is problematic because it allows “some states to harness the federal lawmaking power to oppress 
other states”).
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escapees more due process.632  Because the horizontal scenario depends on Congress’s 
responsiveness to the states, it is driven by the very dynamic that Professor Wechsler and 
the Garcia opinion posited.  Even if the political safeguards theorists are correct, in other 
words, horizontal aggrandizement would remain as a threat to the autonomy of individual 
states.633
Third, political safeguards theorists often seem to downplay the many political 
and economic forces that press for resolution of problems at the national level.   One 
factor is that “it simply [is] much easier to fight a regulatory war in one central location, 
rather than in fifty state fora.”634  Interest groups seeking enactment of a particular policy 
may also prefer federal law because it is “considered a higher quality product than state 
law,”635 or because it is harder for those who are made worse off by the regulation to 
avoid it by exiting to another jurisdiction.636  The result of these factors, according to 
Professor Macey, is that “we observe interest groups exhibiting a strong preference for 
federal as opposed to state law in most areas.”637  Those tendencies will not, of course, be 
dispositive in all cases.  But from the perspective of state regulatory autonomy, it’s fair to 
say they don’t help.
Finally, it’s worth pointing out that the Supreme Court has very explicitly rejected 
Garcia’s theory of representation, although the Court seems not to have realized it.  In 
the Term Limits case, the Court rejected the notion that the States may interpose 
themselves between the People and their federal represenatives.638    Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, stated that “the Framers, in perhaps their most important 
contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly responsible to the people, 
possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen directly, not by States, but by the 
632 See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (holding that the federal Fugitive Slave 
Law preempted Pennsylvania’s more lenient regime); Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 121-24 (discussing 
the Fugitive Slave Law as an instance of horizontal aggrandizement).  In this instance, of course, the 
Southern States were sufficiently influential to obtain a Fugitive Slave Clause in the Constitution itself.  
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.3.  See also Earl M. Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the 
Constitution, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 466, 471 (1992) (“[T]he fugitive slave clause clearly restricts the 
freedom of state governments to define the status of some individuals—runaway slaves—within the 
territorial limits of their power.  A federal standard thus displaces preexisting state authority in 
contravention of the general principle of state autonomy.”).
633 See Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 118.
634
 Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 374; see also Macey, Federalism, supra note ___, at 
271 (observing that “transaction costs” help explain why “interest groups generally will prefer to obtain 
rents by invoking federal rather than state law”).
635 See Macey, Federalism, supra note ___, at 272.  Professor Macey explains that this perception may 
arise because “federal bureaucrats and judges are perceived as more sophisticated than their state rivals,” 
because federal regulators have more resources available, or because federal politicians are considered to 
have more “reputational capital invested in the stability of the deals they make.”  Id.
636 See Macey, Federalism, supra note ___, at 272-73.
637 Id. at 273.
638
 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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people.”639  Justice Kennedy explained this point in more detail, and it is worth quoting 
him at some length:
It was the genius of [the Framers’] idea that our citizens would have two 
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from 
incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system 
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, 
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. 
. . .
The political identity of the entire people of the Union is reinforced by the 
proposition, which I take to be beyond dispute, that, though limited as to 
its objects, the National Government is, and must be, controlled by the 
people without collateral interference by the States. McCulloch affirmed 
this proposition as well, when the Court rejected the suggestion that States 
could interfere with federal powers. “This was not intended by the 
American people. They did not design to make their government 
dependent on the States.” . . . The States have no power, reserved or 
otherwise, over the exercise of federal authority within its proper 
sphere.640
Federal representatives, then, are not ambassadors from their states to Washington, D.C. 
They are not “dependent,” as Professor Wechsler and the Garcia majority thought, on the 
institutions of state government.  Attempts by those state institutions to “control” the 
federal government – through specific instructions to representatives, perhaps, or ballot 
access restrictions on representatives who vote against the state’s interests in Congress –
amount to “collateral interference” and may well be, under the Term Limits result, 
unconstitutional. Instead, federal representatives have their own relationship with the 
people and consequently their own incentives, in competition with state politicians, to 
provide for their constituents.   
Despite all of these problems, I do not mean to suggest that the Garcia/Wechsler 
representational safeguards never operate to protect state autonomy.  There are, no doubt, 
639 Id. at 821.  Ironically, the Term Limits majority was primarily made up of nationalist justices who either 
joined Garcia when it was initially decided (Stevens) or who have endorsed its “political safeguards” 
theory in the years since (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer).  See [cites endorsing political safeguards].  Equally 
ironically, the Term Limits dissenters – who relied on a conception of representation basically similar to 
Garcia – included two of Garcia’s dissenters (Rehnquist and O’Connor), as well as two other justices 
(Scalia and Thomas) who have rejected the “political safeguards” notion whenever it has been raised.  
[cites]  Only Justice Kennedy emerged from Term Limits with anything approaching consistency on this 
point.  See generally Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“That the States may not 
invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my view, as the corollary proposition that 
the Federal Government must be held within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters 
reserved to the States.”) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
640 Id. at 838, 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 
(1819)) (emphasis added).
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situations in which they do.641  Indeed, the fact that significant state autonomy remains in 
practice, despite over 50 years of judicial unwillingness to enforce significant restrictions 
on federal power, suggests that something in the federal political process must act to 
restrain Congress.  And it is not hard to find the occasional piece of anecdotal evidence, 
such as Congress’s enactment of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,642 that points to 
some concern for state institutional autonomy on the part of federal politicians.
The federal political process may protect state autonomy, however, not so much 
because it represents state interests but simply because it is cumbersome.  Brad Clark, for 
example, has emphasized the difficult procedural gauntlet facing federal legislation under 
Article I.  “Each set of procedures,” he argues, “requires the participation and assent of 
multiple actors to adopt federal law.  This creates the equivalent of a supermajority 
requirement and thus reinforces the burden of inertia against federal action, leaving states 
greater freedom to govern.”643  We thus might think of the familiar but difficult process 
by which legislative proposals must secure a place on the legislative agenda, navigate 
both houses of the Congress, and either secure Presidential approval or a supermajority 
sufficient to override a veto as the “procedural safeguards of federalism.”644
This overview of the political and procedural safeguards of federalism suggests 
several conclusions for judicial review.  First, we should set aside Dean Choper’s version 
of the “political safeguards” argument, which dispensed with judicial review entirely out 
of confidence that politics would protect federalism on its own.645  This is true for several 
reasons.  First, none of these political and procedural safeguards inspire complete 
confidence.  The representation model, as I have discussed, is significantly flawed, and 
the procedural safeguards mostly limit the rate at which the federal government can make 
inroads on state authority.  Neither is likely, without more, to provide a sustainable 
bulwark against the continued erosion of state autonomy.
Second, process-based theories of constitutional law in other contexts emphasize 
the need for courts to police the rules of the game and to make sure that all relevant 
interests are, in fact, represented.646  A federalism-centered “Democracy and Distrust” 
641 See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1567 (1994) (conceding that “[u]nder some circumstances, the federal process model 
accurately describes the political relationship between state and national governments. State governments 
have powerful lobbying groups to assert their interests, and national representatives frequently heed those 
voices. The history of national legislation demonstrates that the states frequently influence the legislative 
process and that they have achieved exemption from many important national laws”).
642
 Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 957 (1997) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (invoking the UMRA as evidence that the political safeguards are effective in protecting state 
governmental interests).
643
 Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117, at 1339.  See also Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra 
note 246, at 1609.
644
 Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117, at 1339.
645 See CHOPER, supra note ___, at ___.
646 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 614, at 103 (arguing that the institutional independence of courts “put[s] them 
in a position objectively to assess claims . . . that either by clogging the channels of change or by acting as 
13-Jul-04 draft
122
would thus emphasize a judicial role in enforcing the procedural requirements for federal 
action and in ensuring that dysfunctions in the process do not effectively exclude the 
institutional interests of state governments.647  A process-based approach to federalism 
simply shifts the focus of judicial review; unless we think the process is perfect, however, 
it is hard to see why that shift in emphasis would warrant the judicial abdication that 
many propose.  As I discuss further below, courts can and should enhance the operation 
of political and procedural safeguards in a number of ways.
Third, a complete judicial abdication cannot be squared with traditional notions of 
the judicial power.  Chief Justice Marshall’s justification for judicial review in Marbury 
v. Madison648 relied heavily on the obligation of courts to apply the relevant rules –
including constitutional rules – to whatever cases come before them.649  That obligation 
cannot simply be declined because the court would prefer to focus on individual rights 
cases.  As Marshall observed in Cohens v. Virginia, the Court has “no more right to 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.  
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”650  Unless we think federalism 
cases fit the narrow contours of the modern political question doctrine – and few argue 
that they do – then the Court must decide them.651
The better approach, I think, is to combine the Garcia and Wechsler models.    As 
I have discussed,652 Professor Wechsler seemed to envision judicial enforcement of the 
Constitution’s textual limits on federal power without explicitly endorsing the 
accessories to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not representing the interests of those 
whom the system presupposes they are”).
647 See id. (arguing that the two types of dysfunction that should trigger judicial intervention on behalf of 
individual rights are claims that the process has been distorted or that certain interests are “systematically 
disadvantaging” some other interest).
648
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
649 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note ___, at 114 (interpreting Marbury to hold that “the judiciary’s power to 
construe and enforce the Constitution . . . is to be deduced from the obligation of the courts to decide cases 
conformably to law”); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 
(1965) (arguing that courts decide constitutional questions “for the reason that they must decide a litigated 
issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in doing so must give effect to the supreme law of the 
land”).
650
 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
651
 Personally, I don’t much believe in the political question doctrine, at least if it is construed to mean that 
the Court is simply not permitted to enforce the Constitution in certain instances where it actually has been 
violated.  See Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976) (arguing 
that most instances in which courts deny relief pursuant to the political question doctrine can be ascribed 
either to the simple absence of a constitutional violation or the discretion to deny equitable relief).  One 
might also point to the abstention doctrines, under which courts decide not to decide constitutional 
questions in certain circumstances.  But these doctrines are also justified primarily in terms of courts’ 
traditional discretion to deny equitable relief where such relief would not serve the public interest.  See, 
e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (holding that abstention is impermissible 
outside claims for equitable relief).   And they tend to rest on the primacy of some other judicial forum –
usually a state court – to decide the question.
652 See supra TAN ___.
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development of new doctrines to protect and enhance the operation of political checks.  
This approach might be adequate, notwithstanding the weaknesses of political checks 
operating alone, if one had a great deal of confidence in substantive limits based on text.  
For reasons having to do with the Court’s pre-1937 experience, however, substantive 
limits also seem likely to remain a highly incomplete solution.653
The Garcia opinion, on the other hand, can be read to invite the development of 
doctrines “tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process,” 
but left no role for judicial enforcement of substantive restrictions on Congress – even 
those grounded in the constitutional text.654  While the Court properly has not heeded 
Garcia’s call to ignore substantive limits entirely, it has begun to develop Garcia’s 
affirmative potential in several ways.  I discuss the sort of directions that this sort of 
process-based federalism might take in the next subsection.
B. Competition
Self-enforcement figures prominently in the political theory of the Founders. 
James Madison argued in Federalist 51 that “[i]n framing a government which to be 
administered by men over men . . . you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”655  The proposed constitution 
was to achieve this through the combination of federalism and separation of powers:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the 
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the 
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate 
departments.  Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.  
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that 
each will be controlled by itself.656
While the Founders probably contemplated some judicial role in maintaining these 
allocations in place,657 courts are certainly not the primary mechanism.  Rather, “the 
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each 
may be a check on the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a 
sentinel over the public rights.”658
Applied to federalism, this self-enforcement notion holds that states can take care 
of themselves through the political process – an idea that has dominated debates about 
judicial enforcement of federalism in this country over the past several decades.  This 
653 See infra TAN ___.
654
 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
655 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
656 Id. at 323.
657 See Young, Two Cheers, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1353-54; Prakash & Yoo, supra 
note 226, at 1489-1521.
658 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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idea, adopted as the law of the land in the Garcia case659 although arguably undermined 
by more recent decisions,660 is usually traced to Herbert Wechsler’s seminal article in 
1954.661  But its antecedents – as Wechsler recognized – go back much further than that 
to James Madison’s essays in the Federalist and John Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. 
Ogden.662  As John Yoo has recognized, “the Federalists themselves first developed the 
theory that Professors Wechsler and Choper would resurrect to such great effect.”663  It is 
worth paying attention to the original version, because in many ways it is more 
sophisticated and even – perhaps ironically – more relevant to our current institutional 
arrangements than the Wechsler/Choper revision.
Madison laid out his “political safeguards” theory in Federalist 45 and 46.  He had 
defended the initial allocation of power in prior essays, arguing that good reasons 
supported each individual delegation of power to the center in the proposed 
constitution.664  Numbers 45 and 46 addressed the stability of this initial allocation; 
hence, Number 45 considered “whether the whole mass of [powers transferred to the 
federal government] will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several 
states.”665  The question was not so much whether the Federal Government had been 
granted too much power, but rather whether the proposed structure would allow that 
government to draw more power to itself in the years ahead.
The answer, according to Madison, was that we should be more worried about the 
States aggrandizing themselves than the Federal Government.  Although he had set out to 
consider the notion that “the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove 
fatal to the State governments,” he concluded that “the more I revolve the subject, the 
more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the 
preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.”666  In addition to noting that 
confederacies throughout history had tended to fall apart rather than devolve into 
659
 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
660 See Yoo, Judicial Safeguards, supra note 163, at 1311 (arguing that while “[a] survey of leading 
constitutional law courses and casebooks might suggest that [Garcia] is good law,” it “is not, nor should it 
be”).  I discuss the extent to which Garcia’s paradigm has been shifted by more recent developments in the 
next subsection.  See infra TAN ___.
661
 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition 
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); see also CHOPER, supra note 
720, at ___ (expanding on Wechsler’s theory).  For a typical attribution of credit, see, e.g., Yoo, supra note 
333, at 1312 (“Garcia explicitly adopted an academic theory concerning the nature of the Constitution and 
the political process in order to justify its finding of nonjusticiability. Known commonly as the ‘Political 
Safeguards of Federalism,’ this theory first was put forward by Professor Herbert Wechsler and then 
elaborated and expanded by Professor Jesse Choper.”).  
662
 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
663
 Yoo, supra note 333, at 1361.
664
 [cites]
665 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 288 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
666 Id. at 289.
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centralized tyranny,667 Madison identified two broad sorts of checks on central authority.  
The first relied on the institutional dependence of the federal government on state 
institutions.   “The State governments,” he pointed out, “may be regarded as constituent 
and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the 
operation or organization of the former.”668  That relationship would cause national 
officials to internalize the interests and preferences of the States; national officials, in 
other words, will function more as representatives of than as competitors to state-level 
politicians.669  This is the idea that Professor Wechsler emphasized and, probably as a 
direct result, the mechanism on which current debates have focused.670
Madison, however, had another string to his bow.  He observed that
Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will 
render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not.  On the first 
supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming 
schemes obnoxious to their constituents.  On the other supposition, it will 
not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation 
will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported 
by the people.671
The People’s loyalty, Madison insisted, is the key determinant of political power in a 
system based on popular sovereignty.  This is what he thought the Antifederalists had 
forgotten in their focus on the powers allotted to the central government.  “They must be 
told that the ultimate authority . . . resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend 
merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments whether 
either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of 
the other.”672  Because the People remain sovereign at the end of the day, “the event in 
every case [of federal-state conflict] should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and 
sanction of their common constituents.”673
667 See id. at 289-90 (discussing the Achaean League, the Lycian Confederacy, and the feudal systems of 
Europe).
668 Id. at 291.
669
 Madison explained that “[t]he prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal 
government will generally be favorable to the States.”   THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 296 (Clinton Rossiter, 
ed. 1961).  He therefore expected that 
For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach 
themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to 
attach themselves too much to local objects. . . .  Measures will too often be decided according to 
their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, 
and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States.
Id.  Madison invoked the record of the Confederation Congress to bear out this prediction.  See id. at 296-
97.
670
 [cites]
671 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 300 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
672 Id. at 294.
673 Id.  Hamilton took a similar view in Federalist 28:
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Madison argued that, in this sort of contest, it was “beyond doubt that the first and 
most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective 
States.”674  This was true for two major reasons.  First, “[t]he number of individuals 
employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the 
number employed under the particular States.  There will consequently be less of 
personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter.”675  The argument is 
basically one of political patronage:   Because there are more jobs at the state level, 
“[i]nto the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise.  
From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow.”676
The second reason arose out of the allocation of governmental responsibilities 
between the States and the Union.  “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the federal government,” Madison noted, “are few and defined.  Those which are to 
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”677  But it was not just the 
number of powers allocated to each government that mattered, but the relation of these 
responsibilities to the citizens’ own lives.  In particular, “[t]he powers reserved to the 
several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, 
improvement, and prosperity of the State.”678  As a result, “all the more domestic and 
personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for” by “the 
superintending care” of the States.679  Hamilton likewise saw this “variety of more minute 
interests” as “necessarily fall[ing] under the superintendence of the local administrations” 
and forming “so many rivulets of influence running through every part of the society.”680
Madison expected the Federal Government to be far less involved with these 
“bread and butter” sorts of issues.  “The operations of the federal government will be 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready 
to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition 
towards the general government.  The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will 
infallibly make it preponderate.  If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the 
other as the instrument of redress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 181 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
674 Id.  Hamilton agreed.  See Federalist No. 17 (Cook ed.) at 107 (“Upon the same principle that a man is 
more attached to his family than to his neighbourhood, to his neighbourhood than to the community at larte, 
the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger byass towards their local governments than towards 
the government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better 
administration of the latter.”).
675 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
676 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
677 Id. at 292.
678 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
679 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294-95 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
680 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 107 (J.E. Cooke, ed. 1961).  In particular, Hamilton cited “the ordinary 
administration of criminal and civil justice” as the “most universal and most attractive source of popular 
obedience and attachment” because it is “the immediate and visible guardian of life and property.”  Id.
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most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the States governments 
in times of peace and security.”681  Because he hoped that “the former periods will 
probably bear a small proportion to the latter,” Madison predicted that “the State 
governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government.”682  To put 
the argument more in terms of present allocations of responsibilities, Madison expected 
the average citizen to care more, most of the time, for the state (and local) governments 
that run his children’s local elementary school, arrest the burglar who breaks into his 
house, or enforce his contract with his employer than for the distant national government 
that maintains the Nation’s nuclear deterrent.683
This argument accords with modern political science’s “economic theory of 
regulation.”  That theory holds that politicians obtain political support – in the form of 
votes and campaign contributions, for example – in exchange for providing regulation 
that benefits those groups.684  The theory has a number of controversial implications, 
such as its prediction that the rent-seeking activities of private interest groups will 
dominate legislative outcomes.685  To support Madison, however, we need look only to 
the basic “political-support- maximization” model that undergirds the theory.686   That 
basic model confirms Madison’s insight that the ability of politicians to generate “the 
predilection and support of the people”687 – in Madison’s phrase – depends on their
ability to “regulate[] and provide[] for” the “domestic and personal interests of the 
people.”688
We would thus expect the ability of both state and federal governments to 
generate political support to be largely a function of their jurisdiction and responsibilities.  
Nominally, of course, it is possible for citizens to support both state and federal 
681 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
682 Id.
683 See also THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 108 (J.E. Cooke, ed. 1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (predicting that 
“[t]he operations of the national government” would “[r]elat[e] to more general interests” and therefore be 
“less apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire a habitual 
sense of obligation and an active sentiment of attachment”).
684 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 269 (1990) 
[hereinafter Macey, Federalism] (“[P]oliticians maximize the aggregate political support that they receive 
from interest groups by supplying the legal rules that result in the highest net receipt of support.”); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 (1988) (“Public choice theorists typically treat legislation as an 
economic transaction in which interest groups form the demand side, and legislators form the supply 
side.”).
685 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 (1986) (observing that “special 
interest groups tend to dominate the legislative process”); FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 543, at 22-33 
(describing and critiquing the theory).
686
 Macey, Federalism, supra note 684, at 265-66 (describing this model).
687 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
688 Id. at 294-95.
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politicians; most of us vote for several of each in every election.  But citizens are likely to 
pay the most attention and devote their campaign contributions and participatory energies 
to the level of government likely to have the greatest impact on their most central 
concerns.  And in the situations that Madison had in mind – that is, conflicts between
state and federal institutions in which popular sentiment holds the key to the balance of 
power – the People can be expected to back the institutions that have earned their most 
intensive loyalties in the past.
Although the basic dynamics that Madison identified remain plausible today,689
many of his factual assumptions are under pressure.  Consider, for example, his 
expectation that “the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be 
indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very 
little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.”690  This may still be largely so, 
although one does increasingly see national political parties playing an important role in 
state-level electoral races, both through funding and other forms of support.691  Moreover, 
state governments have become dependent upon Washington, D.C., in other important 
689
 Plausible, but certainly not uncontested. The economic theory of regulation has its critics.  Daniel Farber 
and Philip Frickey, for example, have argued that ideology is a more important factor in determining the 
positions taken by legislators than the economic interests of their constituents.  See FARBER & FRICKEY, 
supra note 543, at 24-33; see also Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the 
Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L.REV. 199, 205 (1988) 
(likewise disputing the premise that government officials act based on narrow self-interest).  I doubt this is 
much of a problem for Madison’s model as I wish to use it, however.  First, to the extent that ideology is an 
important factor in explaining the votes of legislators, it seems likely that it would also be an important 
factor in appealing to constituents at re-election time.  If that is true, then the legislator needs to make sure 
that (a) her own ideology basically reflects that of a majority of her constituents, and (b) that the legislator’s 
“jurisdic tion” includes items which give her an opportunity to act on that ideology; otherwise, voters that 
care about ideology will be more interested in politicians that do have jurisdiction over the ideological 
issues that matter to them.  The scope of legislative jurisdiction seems likely to be important to a 
politician’s ability to generate political support regardless of whether ideology or economic interest is 
driving decisions.  See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS 
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 58-65 (1994) (arguing that the motivation of government 
officials – e.g., whether they act out of self-interest, ideology, or public spirit – is actually irrelevant to the 
interest-group model of politics).
If I am wrong about the first point, that would suggest that legislators simply aren’t as tied to the 
interests and preferences of their constituents as Madison and contemporary public choice-types suggest.  
That would undermine any “political safeguards” approach to federalism that relied on the representation of 
the states on the federal level.  It would accordingly suggest that, if we do value federalism, we need to find 
more direct ways to protect state autonomy.  Preemption doctrine can readily do that simply by making it 
less likely that existing federal legislation will be interpreted to supplant broad swaths of state authority and 
more difficult for broadly preemptive legislation to be enacted in the future.  See infra TAN ___.
Finally, critics like Professors Farber and Frickey do not say that there is nothing to the economic 
theory of regulation – only that it is an incomplete account.  “Our best picture of the political process,” they 
conclude, “is a mixed model in which constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all help 
determine legislative conduct.”  FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 543, at 33.  The fact that the model is 
mixed doesn’t mean that Madison’s analysis isn’t an important part of the dynamic; further, it seems the 
part of the dynamic most directly relevant to issues of “process federalism.”
690 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
691
 [cites on Florida gubernatorial election]; see also [nat’l GOP involvement in TX redistricting]
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ways.  Many states now depend for large portions of their budgets on federal grants, and 
that dependence is only likely to increase as many states face sizeable shortfalls in the 
years ahead.692  As many commentators have observed, Congress is able to translate this 
financial dependence into policy control through the mechanism of conditional 
spending.693
Madison’s assumptions about the relative sizes of the state and federal 
governmental establishments have also not held up.  In absolute terms, both layers of 
governments have of course grown enormously.  Relatively speaking, the differentials 
between the two in terms of employment and gross spending have declined, although the 
states still come out ahead.694  And in the world that many leading constitutional lawyers 
inhabit, the States’ prior advantage may have flipped entirely.  Most graduates of elite 
law schools, for example, seem to prefer federal clerkships and posts in the federal 
Justice Department to equivalent roles in state government.695
So, too, with Madison’s assumption that federal institutions would move to the 
fore only during relatively infrequent crises in foreign affairs.  It is no accident, if we 
accept Madison’s view, that the explosion of federal power came over the course of what 
my colleague Philip Bobbitt has called “the Long War.”696  Nor should it be surprising 
that the advent of the War on Terrorism – which might make the “Long War” look short 
before it is through – has already brought new calls to abandon concerns for state 
autonomy in the name of the national need.697  We may still hope for a world in which 
”periods [of war and danger] will . . . bear a small proportion to [times of peace and 
security],”698 but it is not on the horizon.  Traditionally federal concerns about foreign 
relations and security from external attack are likely to remain highly salient for the 
foreseeable future.699
692
 [cites on state budget crises]
693 See, e.g., Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 364, at ___. 
694
 [cites]
695
 [cites]
696 See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 24 (2002) 
(“We should regard the conflicts now commonly called the First World War, the Second World War, and 
the Korean and Viet Nam Wars, as well as the Bolshevik Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, and the Cold 
War as a single war because all were fought over a single set of constitutional issues that were strategically 
unresolved until the end of the Cold War and the Peace of Paris in 1990.”).
697 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, 
Week in Review Section, at 4 (calling for the Court to abandon its recent federalism jurisprudence in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks). 
698 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
699 See, e.g., Fred Hiatt, Challenging Bush’s World View, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at A21 (observing 
that “Congress has accepted the idea that terrorism allied with weapons of mass destruction represents a 
threat comparable to that posed by communism during the Cold War,” and concluding that “those who 
hope the terrorist threat has been overstated are likely to be . . . disappointed”). But see infra TAN ___ 
(arguing that in a world of globalization and asymmetrical threats, these concerns cannot remain uniquely 
federal).
13-Jul-04 draft
130
Significant expansions of federal power have been justified, in the past century, 
on the basis of other “wars,” such as the “War on Poverty” or the “War on Drugs.”700
These metaphors seek to tie into Madison’s intuition that national activity is most 
justified in response to fundamental threats to the society.  They also reflect, however, the 
substantial pressure that now bears on the Founders’ fundamental assumptions 
concerning the state and federal roles.  Hamilton, for example, thought that “[t]he 
administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of 
agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, . . . can never be desirable cares of a 
general jurisdiction.”  He therefore found it “improbable that there should exist a 
disposition in the Fœderal councils to usurp the powers with which they are
connected.”701  Subsequent experience, however, has disappointed Hamilton’s 
expectation; the federal government, often for very good reasons, has frequently seen fit 
to concern itself with these “local” matters.  In a world where the federal government 
provides social security, health insurance, and civil rights protections for millions – to 
name just a few examples – the states no longer have a monopoly of “the more domestic 
and personal interests of the people.”702  States can thus no longer rely on the 
unchallenged political support they might once have enjoyed as the exclusive guardians 
of these interests.    
Much of this shift has no doubt occurred on account of the States’ failure – or at 
least perceived failure – adequately to perform these responsibilities.703  That was a 
prospect that Madison was prepared to face.  He remarked that “[i]f . . . the people should 
in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can 
only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will 
overcome all their antecedent propensities.”704  In that event, “the people ought not surely 
to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be 
most due.”705  These statements cannot be read, however, as condoning a wholesale shift 
of state responsibilities to the center, beyond what the enumerations of the Constitution 
provided.  Madison insisted that even in the case just contemplated, “the State 
governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that 
700
 [cites linking these initiatives to expansions of federal power]
701
 Federalist No. 17 (Cook ed.) at 106.
702 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294-95 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
703 See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from 
Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, ___ [near n.95] (1997) (“Various failed efforts 
to get states to set and enforce air and water pollution standards convinced federal policy makers in the 
early 1970s that the only viable solution was federal regulation.”). Moreover, as Barry Friedman points 
out, “one of the forces underlying the shift in power from the states to the national government has been 
widespread discontent with the choices made by the states at some critical moments in American history.”  
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 367 (involking nullification, the Civil War, and Jim 
Crow laws).  Many of the factors tending to press toward centralized regulation, however, have little to do 
with state regulatory failure.  I discuss these factors in the next section.  See infra TAN ___.
704 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
705 Id.
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the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.”706  Much 
like John Marshall would later assume that political safeguards would operate within the 
scope of the Commerce Clause defined by courts,707 Madison’s discussion also seems to 
presume an ultimate constitutional limit on political shifts.708
In any event, Madison’s analysis of the linkage between regulatory 
responsibilities and popular support provides a focus for contemporary federalism 
doctrine.  If we (1) care about preserving state autonomy but (2) prefer for that autonomy 
to be as self-enforcing as possible, Madison suggests that we should look to the States’ 
regulatory responsibilities.  If those responsibilities remain intact and important to the 
sovereign People, then the institutions of state government have little to worry about.  But 
if we find those responsibilities under pressure, then that pressure may also undermine 
the ability of the system to police itself.  Because Madison thought a wholesale shift of 
policy momentum to the center unlikely, he was not forced to contemplate the 
consequences of such a shift to the system as a whole.  States exist for reasons other than 
policy competence; they also, for example, help preserve liberty throughout the system.  
Those sorts of values would be sacrificed if state policy responsibilities were allowed to 
wither away. 
C. Inertia
D. “Political Safeguards” and Doctrine
VI. Federalism in the Courts:  Judicial Experience and the Shape of Doctrine
The development of federalism doctrine should be guided not only by the values 
that federalism seeks to promote but also by the institutional capacities of courts and 
other governmental institutions to promote them through law.  This concern has been 
706 Id.  Madison’s allusion to “advantageous” administration might be read to suggest that the limits on 
federal jurisdiction would be set chiefly by practical policy considerations, but he had emphasized in the 
preceding essay that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined.”  THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).  That language suggests a 
legal limit on federal authority.
Chief Justice Marshall’s version of the “political safeguards” argument seems to have contemplated a 
similar limit.  His statement in Gibbons v. Ogden that “[t]he wisdom and the discretion of congress, their 
identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are . . . the sole 
restraints,” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, ___ (1824), comes after his finding that the regulation at issue fell within 
the text of the Commerce Clause.  See id. at ___.   Marshall synthesized the two points by stating that “the 
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specific objects, is plenary as to those objects.”  Id. at ___.  In 
other words, political safeguards operate within the bounds set by enumerated powers.  
707 See supra TAN ___.
708 See also BANNING, supra note ___, at 296 (concluding that “the Constitution, as [Madison] understood 
it, made the central government supreme within its sphere and strictly limited that sphere to matters that 
could not be managed by the states”).
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with us from the beginning.  As Jack Rakove has observed, “Madison doubted whether 
adjudication alone could produce legally demonstrable and politically persuasive 
solutions, given ‘the impossibility of dividing powers of legislation, in such a manner, as 
to be free from different constructions by different interests, or even from ambiguity in 
the judgment of the impartial.’”709  We look to a number of sources to inform our 
judgments about judicial capacities, including history, political science, and the history of
political science.  But in this particular corner of constitutional law the institutional 
experience of the Court itself tends to play a dominant role.  
The history of federalism doctrine in the Supreme Court is a story of relatively 
vigorous early enforcement,710 a fall from grace followed by a period of judicial 
repentance and abdication,711 and more lately a period of cautious revival.712  As the 
opinions of the “Federalist Revival” demonstrate, much of the current debate is 
preoccupied with the institutional lessons to be drawn from this legacy.713  Justice Souter, 
for example, has argued vigorously that new decisions like Lopez and Morrison “can only 
be seen as a step toward recapturing the prior mistakes”714 of the Lochner era.  That era, 
and the collapse of the “dual federalism” model of doctrine that helped mark the era’s 
end, looms as a brooding omnipresence over any current effort to make federalism 
doctrine.  
A. Confrontations with Congress
The relevant decisional history is familiar.  In a series of cases like United States 
v. E.C. Knight Co.715 and Hammer v. Dagenhart,716 the Court narrowly construed or 
struck down federal legislation on the ground that it exceeded Congress’s authority under 
709 RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 176-77 (quoting James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, 
in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 211 (William T. Hutchinson, William M.E. Rachal, Robert Rutland, 
et al., eds. 1962-91)). [get original letter]
710
 By “early” I mean the entire period prior to 1937.  Larry Kramer’s contention that the Court did not
enforce federalism until the late 19th century, see Kramer, Politics, supra note 222, at 234-52, seems to my 
mind to improperly discount the vigorous enforcement of federalism-based limits on state power 
throughout that century, see Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 95 n.100, but I do not need to pursue that 
disagreement here.
711 [cites]
712 [cites]
713
 [cites]
714
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 643 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
715
 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (construing the Sherman Act not to reach a merger that would result in a single 
company acquiring 98 percent of the nation’s sugar refining capacity, on the ground that the Commerce 
Power did not reach “manufacturing,” and that a monopoly in manufacturing would have only an “indirect” 
effect on interstate commerce).
716
 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal statute banning interstate shipment of goods produced by 
child labor, on the ground that the law’s ban on interstate shipment was a pretextual attempt to regulate 
manufacturing activity within particular states).
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the Commerce Clause.  Later decisions building on these precedents placed the Court in 
direct confrontation with efforts by President Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal 
Congress to dramatically expand federal regulatory power as a response to the 
Depression.717  These decisions – and the institutional attacks on the Court that they 
helped provoke718 – form a “brooding omnipresence”719 over current efforts to construct a 
viable federalism doctrine.  
Perhaps the broadest and most obvious lesson of this period is that there are limits 
on the Court’s ability to confront the federal political branches over basic issues of 
governance.  This observation is consistent with, but not necessarily the same as, the 
longstanding theory that the Court has limited “institutional capital” which it must 
allocate with care among the many different areas in which it might potentially exercise 
the power of judicial review.720  I have suggested elsewhere that this idea has some 
intuitive appeal and that the justices may perceive it to be true – and shape their behavior 
accordingly – even if such limitations are not necessary incidents of the institution.721
But one might adopt the reverse theory – that responsible exercise of the power of 
judicial review generates increased public tolerance for judicial intervention722 – and still 
view the Lochner-era experience as suggesting an outer limit on that tolerance.  At least 
the bottom line conclusion ought to be non-controversial – that is, that the Court should 
717 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (strkinig down the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1936 as outside the commerce power); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down, on both Commerce Clause and nondelegation grounds, an industry code 
for the poultry industry promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933).
718 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS ___ (___) (describing the 
institutional confrontation precipitated by the Court’s decisions).
719
 The phrase is from Justice Holmes’ dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), in 
which Holmes observed that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the 
articulate voice of some sovereign . . . that can be identified.” Id. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Jensen
was itself a case about federalism and preemption, and its holding illustrates the fact that the Court’s record 
during the pre-1937 period was more complicated than is sometimes thought.  The Court held that the 
general maritime law, produced by federal judges deciding common law cases within their admiralty 
jurisdiction, is federal law in the sense that it trumps state law under the Supremacy Clause.  See id. at 217-
18 (majority opinion); see generally Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 
291-94 (1999) (discussing Jensen).  The decision was thus consistent with the Court’s general activism 
during this period, striking down a state statute, but strongly nationalist in its thrust.  I discuss federal 
maritime law and Jensen further infra at TAN ___.
720 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 139 (1980) (arguing that “[t]he people’s 
reverence and tolerance is not infinite and the Court’s public prestige and institutional capital is 
exhaustible,” so that the judiciary’s ability to strike down laws within incurring severe institutional costs “is 
determined by the number and frequency of its attempts to do so, the felt importance of the policies it 
disapproves, and the perceived substantive correctness of its decisions”).
721 See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at 58-60.
722 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies, and Restraint, 64 CHI. KENT L. REV. 531, 546 (1988) 
(suggesting that, in some cases, the Court may enhance its legitimacy through opposing the political 
branches).
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avoid confronting the federal political branches where it is possible to do so without 
sacrificing basic constitutional values.  
One can, of course, take this “lesson” too far.  Federal judges – as officers of the 
national government – tend to have a host of natural incentives to underenforce limits on 
federal power.723  Moreover, since the federal courts are much less likely to face effective 
institutional retaliation from state governments than from the federal political branches, it 
is natural that federal judges should function primarily as agents of uniformity, 
preempting divergent state practices through articulation of constitutional rules and 
federal common law.724  If the federal system is to be preserved, then it would seem 
counterproductive to add too strong a normative imperative on top of all the institutional 
incentives that counsel restraint in checking national power.  Most federal systems, after 
all, seem to feature a central constitutional court charged with acting as a neutral arbiter 
between the center and the periphery,725 and there may be times when we need the
Supreme Court to perform this function.  It may not be realistic, however, to rely too 
heavily on the Supreme Court in this role.  The unlikelihood over the long term of serious 
judicial obstacles to the determined exercise of national power thus suggests yet another 
reason to prefer federalism doctrines that promote balance while minimizing such 
confrontations.726
Minimizing confrontations with the political branches means forgoing a direct 
judicial assault on the national administrative state.  Experience suggests that, in Ronald 
Dworkin’s terms, a viable federalism doctrine must “fit” most, while perhaps criticizing 
some, of our existing institutional arrangements.727  Any interpretation of the 
723 See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”:  In Defense of United 
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 807-08 (1994).  Professor Calabresi explains that 
[T]he Justices and judges of the U.S. federal courts are national officers in every possible sense of 
that term. Every good thing they have to hope for and every bad thing that they have to fear will 
happen to them as a result of some national political or social institution. Such Justices and judges 
are far more nationalistic in their outlooks than Members of Congress or even federal bureaucrats, 
who may have to deal personally with state and local officials on a regular basis. Thus, even 
national jurists who arrive on the federal bench from a state court soon may end up with a very 
nationalistic perspective on the world.
Id. at 808.
724 Cf. LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS ___ (2000) (arguing that the 
primary thrust of the Warren Court was to impose national norms in the areas of race and criminal 
procedure on the Southern states).  For a more recent example, see [Garamendi] (purporting to protect 
federal foreign policy from state departures).
725 See Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 321 (Paul Craig & 
Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999).
726
 On the likelihood that the federal political branches will prevail over judicial opposition in the long 
term, see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (concluding that “it would be unrealistic to suppose that the Court would, 
for more than a few years at most, stand against any major alternatives sought by a [national] lawmaking 
majority”).
727 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ___ (___) (discussing the extent to which a theory 
of law may criticize some of the existing legal materials as mistakes).  Another way to think of this is in 
terms of path dependence.  As Richard Fallon has noted, the Court has pushed state sovereign immunity 
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constitutional structure that would invalidate much of the United States Code – such as 
Justice Thomas’s narrow, originalist reading of “commerce” in Lopez728 – is simply out 
of court under this constraint.  Federalism doctrine should thus focus, for the most part at 
least, on how to resolve presently open questions in ways that foster state autonomy.  
This is not to say that the existing apparatus of the federal establishment ought to be 
immune to judicial criticism.  But such criticism is likely to come at a high institutional 
cost, and doctrines that are generally compatible with present arrangements and focus on 
checking further shifts toward the center are more likely to survive.
B. The Quest for Doctrinal Coherence
Part of the reason that subsequent courts rejected the pre-1937 Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence was surely the conviction that it was doctrinally incoherent.729  If unelected 
judges are going to overturn the work-product of an elected national legislature, those 
judges had better have a theory that explains, in a consistent and understandable way, 
why that action is grounded in constitutional principle.730  By 1937, in addition to all the 
other pressures bearing on the Court, the Court’s doctrine was awash in a sea of fine 
distinctions – indirect vs. direct effects, “commerce” vs. manufacturing or agriculture, 
pretextual vs. sincere commercial regulation – that persuaded no one that the Court was 
not just simply enforcing its own policy preferences.  Similar concerns motivated the 
collapse of a later, more limited judicial attempt to enforce limits on national power 
under the National League of Cities doctrine.731
more aggressively than other forms of federalism doctrine precisely because that line of advance was not 
blocked by established precedents or pervasive assertions of federal authority by the political branches.  See
Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 482.   Similar constraints will help direct any new directions 
that the Court might wish to take in protecting the federal balance.
728
 [cite]  
729 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that, after 
1937, “under commerce, as under due process, adoption of rational basis review expressed the recognition 
that the Court had no sustainable basis for subjecting economic regulation as such to judicial policy 
judgments”); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 216-17 (1998) (arguing, based on internal court memoranda, that the 
difficulty of distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate federal regulation of economic activity 
with effects on commerce under pre-1937 case law, pushed the Wickard Court strongly in the direction of 
abdicating judicial limits altogether); Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 370 (noting that 
“doctrinal collapse itself served as a nationalizing force”); see generally Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 
87-106 (discussing the “judicial competence problem” as a basis for abandoning judicial review of 
federalism issues after 1937).
730 See, e.g., Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 194, at 15-16.
731 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that Congress may not regulate 
state governmental institutions in their performance of traditional governmental functions).  For the 
doctrine’s collapse, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (“Any rule of 
state immunity that looks to the ‘traditional,’ ‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental functions 
inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and 
which ones it dislikes.”); Martha A. Field, Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84, 94-95 (1985) (observing that when 
judges apply concepts of “state sovereignty . . . in the absence of clear guidelines,” they “must resort to 
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Invoking this history, Justice Souter has warned of a “portent of incoherence” 
hanging over the Court’s current attempt to revive limits on national authority.732  Justice 
Souter would get out of the business altogether, leaving limits on national power to the 
political process.733  It must be said that Justice Souter and his fellow dissenters in 
Morrison have little problem with judge-made doctrine when it limits state power734 or 
promotes individual rights.735  But just because the Court’s nationalists are inconsistent 
does not mean they are wrong to worry about the coherence of federalism doctrine.  I 
discuss the many merits of this “process federalism” approach later in this Section, 
although I believe a total abandonment of substantive review would be a mistake.736  But 
we might also usefully focus on the particular failings of the Court’s prior federalism 
jurisprudence as a clue to what sorts of doctrines are unlikely to work.  That, in turn, may 
suggest more fruitful avenues that the Court might pursue going forward.
Much of the pre-1937 case law can be filed under the heading of “dual 
federalism.”  I have traced the contours of dual federalism in more detail elsewhere;737 in 
brief, the doctrine contemplated “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of 
power—that of the national government and of the States.”738  The Court pursued a 
variety of conceptual distinctions to define these fields:  commercial vs. police 
their own opinions concerning the worth of social and economic legislation” and “the Court becomes 
vulnerable to a charge that it is acting as a superlegislature”).
732
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 656 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (emphasizing “the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone—a 
set of comprehensible interpretive rules that courts might use to impose some meaningful limit, but not too 
great a limit, upon the scope of the legislative authority that the Commerce Clause delegates to Congress”).
733 See id. at 649-50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
734 See, e.g., [Garamendi]
735 See, e.g., [Lawrence]  A decision like Lawrence, of course, does both:  It protects the individuals rights 
while eliminating the state’s autonomy to go its own way on questions of moral policy.  I do not mean to 
suggest the Lawrence is wrongly decided – only that it has a strong centralizing effect.
736 See Young, Two Cheers, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1390-95.
737 See Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 142-50.
738
 Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 8, 24-25 (Valerie A. Earle, ed., 1968); see also Kincaid, supra note 75, at 29; MARTIN H. 
REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 26 (1995) (contrasting “dual” and “cooperative” 
federalism).  “Dual federalism” should not be confused with “dual sovereignty,” the Federalists’ political 
theory that both state and federal governments derive their sovereignty from delegations by the People.  See 
generally U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery.  The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 151-52 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The People possessing this 
plenary bundle of specific powers were free to parcel them out to different governments and different 
branches of the same government as they saw fit.”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 524-32 (1969) (discussing the Framers’ political theory).  “Dual sovereignty” is 
consistent with any number of strategies for allocating powers and functions, only some of which depend 
on defining the mutually exclusive spheres of activity that characterize “dual federalism.”  See Young, 
Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 143-46.
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regulation,739 essentially local vs. essentially national concerns,740 commerce vs. 
manufacturing,741 indirect vs. direct effects.742
By 1950, Edward Corwin was able to observe that the “entire system of 
constitutional interpretation” associated with dual federalism lay “in ruins.”743  The 
doctrine’s demise suggests the futility of trying to divide up the world into separate and 
exclusive spheres of governmental competence.744  The respective state and federal 
spheres always turn out to overlap.  Consider, for example, the sphere of family law – a 
traditional enclave of state authority if there ever was one and an area that even the Lopez
dissenters seemed willing to concede as off limits to federal authority.745  That sphere 
overlaps with traditional federal concern over interstate travel in the context of interstate 
child support enforcement,746 with traditional federal foreign affairs concerns in the 
context of international human rights conventions bearing on family relations,747 and 
even with the federal government’s administration of federal taxes, pensions, and the like 
in the context of the Defense of Marriage Act.748  Cases involving these issues cannot be 
739 See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 132 (1837) (upholding a New York statute 
requiring arriving ship captains to provide information on passengers on the ground that it was “not a 
regulation of commerce, but of police”).
740 See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (“Whatever subjects of [the 
commerce] powe are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, 
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.”).
741 See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (upholding state prohibition on manufacture of liquor on 
the ground that it did not regulate “commerce”); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1918) 
(holding that the Commerce Clause did not confer power to regulate manufacturing on Congress). 
742 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (stating that the Commerce Clause did not 
cover regulation of activities which have only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce).
743
 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).  
744
 It remains a popular strategy, however.  Recent efforts to place the European Union on a firmer 
constitutional footing have included prominent calls for a more precise delimitation of the respective 
subject-matter competences enjoyed by the Community institutions and the Member States.  See Council of 
the European Union, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, Dec. 15, 2001, available at 
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf; see generally Young, European Union, supra note 42, at 1676-
77.  
745 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 624 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]o hold 
this statute constitutional is not . . . to hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government . . . 
to regulate ‘marriage, divorce, and child custody’”).
746 See Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), 18 U.S.C. § 228; United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 68 
(1st Cir. 2001) (upholding the CSRA against a Commerce Clause challenge).  Notwithstanding a few 
invalidations at the district court level, see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 
1995), rev’d, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997), every circuit court to have considered the issue has upheld the 
CSRA as a valid exercise of the commerce power.  See Lewko, 269 F.3d at 68 (collecting cases).  For 
another example of the intersection of family law concerns with interstate travel, see United States v. Al-
Zubaidy, 284 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, a provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act criminalizing interstate stalking, as applied to a man who crossed state lines for the purpose of 
stalking and assaulting his ex-wife).
747
 [cites]
748
 [cites]
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classified as “family law” cases, on the one hand, or “interstate travel,” “foreign affairs,” 
or “governmental administration” cases, on the other.  They obviously implicate both sets 
of concerns.  
The failure of dual federalism strongly suggests that a revival of judicially-
enforced federalism should not be built around separate “spheres” of state and federal 
regulatory jurisdiction.  Garcia had this much right, at least:  “Traditional state functions” 
– or federal ones – and similar tests are simply too indeterminate to hold up under the 
pressure of time and practical experience.  But to say this is not, as Garcia suggested,749
necessarily to abdicate enforcement to the political branches.  As Larry Kramer has 
observed, “just because it's no longer possible to maintain a fixed domain of exclusive 
state jurisdiction it's not necessarily impossible to maintain a fluid one.”750  I would go 
one step further and urge that federalism doctrine generally need not try to carve out 
exclusive domains at all.  The central preoccupation of the present essay is thus to sketch 
out meaningful protections for state autonomy that can survive in a world in which state 
and federal regulatory jurisdiction is largely concurrent.   
The pre-New Deal Courts were not oblivious to the difficulty of defining and 
enforcing mutually exclusive spheres of state and federal activity.  In decisions like the 
Shreveport Rate Case,751 the Court acknowledged that Congress legitimately may 
regulate within traditional state spheres, such as wholly intra-state commerce, where such 
regulation is necessary to protect the federal ability to regulate inter-state commerce.752
Other decisions recognized the reverse possibility – that federal regulation of interstate 
shipment might be used as a lever effectively to regulate in-state behavior, such as child 
labor.753  Building on Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland,754 the 
749 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (“State sovereign interests . . 
. are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than 
by judicially created limitations on federal power.”).  This statement is most often read as a near-total 
renunciation of judicial enforcement, and perhaps that is how Justice Blackmun meant it.  I argue infra
TAN ___, however, that it need not be read in that way. 
750
 Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499 (1994).  Professor Kramer’s 
more recent work is less sanguine about judicial enforcement:
Theoretically, it may be possible for the Court to replace rigid lines that establish a fixed domain 
of exclusive state jurisdiction with more fluid tests that turn on some notion of functionality.  But 
governing a modern society is much too complicated for the Court’s preferences about where or 
how to draw the line to inspire much confidence.
Kramer, Politics, supra note 222, at 289.  Obviously, my own view is that Professor Kramer was right the 
first time.
751
 Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
752 See also Railroad Comm’n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922) 
(“[I]nterstate and intrastate commerce are ordinarily subject to regulation by different sovereignties, yet 
when they are so mingled together that . . . the nation . . . cannot exercise complete, effective control over 
interstate commerce without incident regulation of intrastate commerce, such incidental regulation is not an 
invasion of state authority.”).
753 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
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Court sought to bar such devices by means of a purpose test that would invalidate 
“pretextual” uses of the commerce power.755  Both the necessity and purpose tests had the 
virtue of grappling with the reality of overlapping spheres, but the Court was able to 
achieve consistency under neither rubric.756
Similar problems plague contemporary efforts to revive some form of necessity 
test.  A number of commentators have noted the disconnect between the Rehnquist 
Court’s federalism doctrines – which involve a set of essentially formal tests757 – and the 
values that federalism is supposed to serve.758  Some have suggested that the Court 
should employ an analysis more directly rooted in those values; Donald Regan, for 
example, has urged that “in thinking about whether the federal government has the power 
to do something or other, we should ask what special reason there is for the federal 
government to have that power. What reason is there to think the states are incapable or 
untrustworthy?”759 Such a test might look much like the European concept of 
“subsidiarity,” which was written into the European Union’s governing structure in the 
Maastricht Treaty.  Under that principle, “the Community shall take action . . . only if and 
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and therefore by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community.”760
754
 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819) (“[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass 
laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty 
of this tribunal . . . to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.”)
755 See Hammer, 247 U.S. at ___ [quote]
756
 [find cites on Shreveport]; see also CUSHMAN, supra note ___, at 217 (quoting a memo from Justice 
Jackson to his law clerk in conjunction with Wickard, to the effect that “legal standards for weighing 
economic effects and for applying them to the commerce power” under Shreveport were “neither consistent 
nor well defined”).  On the inconsistent application of the purpose test, see, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 
U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act, which prohibited the transportation of women in interstate 
commerce for immoral purposes); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding the Federal Lottery 
Act, which banned interstate shipment of lottery tickets).  In both cases, Congress’s purpose was evidently 
to make life difficult for in-state businesses that it considered immoral.
757
 The Court’s opinion in Morrison strongly suggests that the Commerce Clause inquiry boils down to 
whether the regulated activity is “commercial” or not.  See [Morrison]; see also [Lessig].  Likewise, the 
bright line rules against commandeering and abrogating state sovereign immunity are formal in character.  
[cites]; see also Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally 
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 562 (1995) (arguing that the Commerce Clause law 
prior to Lopez was also “a new formalism”).  
758 See, e.g., Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 410, 412 (criticizing the Lopez Court for 
“fail[ing] to support its doctrinal analysis regarding the substantiality of the effect of [the Gun Free School 
Zones Act] on commerce with any understanding of the values of federalism,” and urging that “[t]here has 
got to be a way to bring arguments about the scope of national authority to bear on constitutional 
doctrine”).
759
 Regan, supra note 757, at 557; see also [Althouse].
760
 EC Treaty art. 5 (ex art. 3b); see also George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Reimer von Borries & 
Malte Hauschild, Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 369 (1999); Young, 
European Union, supra note 42, a t 1677-82.
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These sorts of tests make a great deal of sense as a standard for when the federal 
government ought to act.  But they have obvious liabilities as a template for judicial 
doctrine.  Whether there are sound reasons for federal action – whether they be the 
existence of a collective action problem at the state level, a need for uniform standards, or 
the like – will almost always be at bottom a policy judgment, and often a highly political 
one.  Not surprisingly, the European literature on subsidiarity generally seems to have 
concluded that that principle should guide the Community political and administrative 
institutions but should generally not be enforced directly by courts.761  While it certainly 
makes sense to take account of the values underlying federalism in constructing doctrine, 
it seems likely that judges will have to find more formal proxies for those values rather 
than attempting simply to weigh them in each individual case.762
Purpose tests have been less broadly mooted in contemporary discourse about 
federalism,763 and they may bear further exploration.  Conventional wisdom typically 
disparages legislative purpose or motive tests, based on familiar arguments about the 
difficulty of ascertaining the motivation of collective bodies and the possibility that the 
same enactment might be constitutional in some scenarios and yet unconstitutional in 
others, depending on the mental states of the enacting legislature.764  This may not be an 
altogether satisfactory answer.  As both Mitch Berman and Elena Kagan have shown, the 
use of purpose tests is considerably more common than many people seem to think.765
A more fundamental problem in this particular area, however, has to do with the 
circumstances of the commerce power under Article I.  That Article defines both 
particular ends that Congress may pursue, with the Necessary and Proper Clause granting 
broad discretion as to means,766 and particular means that Congress is generally allowed 
to employ for any end that it likes.767  The problem is that the Commerce Clause has 
traditionally been employed as both an end and a means, and it is often hard to tell the 
difference.768  If Congress regulates the price of wheat, is the end to protect commerce in 
an important commodity, or to preserve the viability of a rural lifestyle for cultural 
761
 [cites]  Many have argued that courts can play a role in encouraging deliberation about subsidiarity 
concerns, [cites], and I return to this sort of option under the heading of “process federalism.”  See infra
TAN ___.
762 See Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note ___, at ___ (suggesting that courts should develop 
federalism doctrines characterized by “sophisticated formalism”).
763
 [Berman & Baker]
764 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272 (1982) (“Courts do not have the research tools that they would need to discover 
the motives behind legislation.”). [other cites]
765 See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimension, 
90 GEO. L. J. 1, 23-27& n.100 (2001); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of 
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
766 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland [cite].
767
 [cites on Madisonian and Hamiltonian views of the Spending Power; Engdahl]
768 Cf. Regan, supra note 757, at 578 (observing that it is very difficult to distinguish between “moral” and 
“economic” purposes for federal laws).
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reasons?  If Congress requires that proprietors of public accommodations open their 
restaurants and hotels to African-Americans and other minorities, is it to protect the 
ability of these people to engage in commercial transactions or to promote broader ideals 
of racial equality?  Perhaps a workable test could be constructed to weed out those 
regulatory enactments with no commercial purpose at all, but I doubt whether such a test 
would catch enough extensions of federal power to be worth the candle.  Anything more 
rigorous would not only run strongly against the grain of current doctrine,769 but would 
seem likely to encounter the same sorts of indeterminacy troubles that plagued earlier 
incarnations of the doctrine.
To sum up, the experience of judicial activism under the Commerce Clause – as 
well as under the more amorphous doctrine of freedom of contract770 – cautions against 
frequent confrontations with the political branches, and especially against aggressive 
efforts to overturn existing institutional arrangements.  It also suggests two more 
particular dangers that future developments in federalism ought to do their best to avoid.  
On the one hand, attempting to construct formal subject-matter categories in which either 
the States or the Nation would have primacy seems doomed to failure.  On the other, 
trying to manage a world of concurrent jurisdiction by direct application of values 
associated with federalism by political economy and democratic theory would almost 
surely embroil the judiciary in unmanageable policy judgments.  Given these lessons, one 
can understand how many judges and commentators have thrown up their hands and 
urged that federalism be left almost entirely to the political process.771  I explore the 
foundations and implications of that notion – that federalism ought basically to be “self-
enforcing” – in the next two Subsections. 
C. Process Failures and Judicial Review
Given the imperfections of both political and procedural protections for safe 
autonomy, one might advocate a more aggressive judicial role than I have just outline.  
That is, one might insist that the Court develop “hard” constitutional limits on 
congressional power.  The pre-1937 experience, of course, suggests that this would be 
difficult.    
There are good reasons to eschew hard constitutional rules that go beyond 
historical experience.  One is that national action sometimes loosens, rather than tightens, 
the constraints on state autonomy.  As David Barron has observed, sometimes national 
action is justified on the ground that values of uniformity or efficiency simply trump 
those associated with state-by-state diversity; other times, however, action at the national 
level is designed to help states overcome collective action problems and other 
impediments to realization of preferred policies at the state level.772  Much of the 
literature developing this latter argument deals with Europe, where individual nations 
769 See, e.g., [Darby; more recent cites]
770 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York [cite]
771 See, e.g., [Kramer; Souter in Morrison].
772
 Barron, supra note ___, at 382-90.
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have found themselves increasingly constrained in regulating a pervasively integrated 
market.  Those nations have thus chosen to cede certain forms of authority to the 
European Union as a means of achieving their substantive policy goals.773  The federal 
law at issue in New York v. United States,774 however, provides a domestic example.  
That law reinforced state-level efforts to agree on shared responsibilities for radioactive 
waste disposal by providing a federal enforcement mechanism.775  In this sense, federal 
action reduced constraints on state autonomy by removing collective-action impediments 
to state-level policymaking.
Outright constitutional prohibitions on certain forms of national action are 
relatively blunt instruments for distinguishing between national acts that undermine and 
those that enhance state autonomy.  Certainly the sort of doctrines the Court articulated in 
the past – such as that between valid federal regulation of “direct” effects and invalid 
federal regulation of “indirect” ones776 – fail to track these considerations in any 
meaningful way.  The obvious alternative is a far more flexible analysis that would focus 
explicitly on whether a given national initiative furthers or injures state autonomy.  But 
that sort of analysis would share all the institutional liabilities of the subsidiarity-type 
inquiries that I have already discussed.777
By and large, the constitutional rules that the Court has articulated avoid this 
hard-and-fast quality without wandering into outright policy judgments.  The most 
absolutist of these rules, as I have suggested, are the Court’s bright-line prohibitions 
against federal “commandeering” of state institutions and congressional abrogation of 
state sovereign immunity.   But Congress may avoid these prohibitions in any number of 
ways.  The States may always voluntarily implement federal programs, for example, and 
Congress may encourage such agreement by way of conditional spending or conditional 
preemption.778  Roderick Hills has argued convincingly that this regime of state-option 
commandeering will generally capture the potential benefits of state implementation 
without allowing Congress to exploit state institutions in ways detrimental to the system 
as a whole.779  Likewise, state governments may waive their sovereign immunity, and 
Congress can use similar tools to induce such waivers; Congress may also authorize suits 
by the United States itself to recover damages from state governments.780  While I do not 
773 See, e.g., [Moravcsik; De Burca or Nicolaidis?]
774
 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
775 See id. at 189-94 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
776 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
777 See supra TAN ___.
778 See New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68.
779 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 893-900 (1998).
780 See, e.g. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (noting that immunity waivers may be induced 
through the conditional spending power).  For a full – some might say exhausting – discussion of 
Congress’s options in getting around state immunities, see Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese, and 
Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida 
Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1037 (2001).
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argue here that this structure is optimal, it does allow Congress to overcome the states’ 
immunity in cases where it feels that the benefits strongly outweigh the costs.
The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence is similarly accommodating.  First 
of all, it is remarkably modest.  The cases appear to require only that Congress identify 
some aspect of the regulated activity that is “commercial” in nature.781    In most cases, 
that is not a very high barrier.782  The Court has, moreover, accepted the unity of the 
national market; it has defined “commercial” activity generously to include travel as well 
as non-profit activity; and it seems even to have accepted Wickard v. Filburn’s notion 
that Congress may regulate particular instances of non-commercial activity if most 
instances of the regulated activity are commercial in nature.783  Finally, the limits that 
have been imposed on the Commerce Power remain subject to evasion through 
conditional spending in much the same fashion as the anti-commandeering doctrine and 
state sovereign immunity.784
The Court’s “hard” limits on federal power are thus unlikely to unduly constrain 
federal authority; they are also unlikely to do much to protect state autonomy.  That 
brings us back to the prospects for process federalism.  As I have suggested, any judicial 
attempts to buttress the political and procedural safeguards of federalism should take 
heed of several criteria generated by the Court’s institutional experience and by Federalist 
political theory.  First, it should minimize the need for direct confrontations between the 
courts and the political branches.  Second, it should avoid rules that place too much 
weight on subject matter categories, on the one hand, or direct value-application, on the 
other.  Third, it should seek to guarantee and enhance three separate aspects of the 
constitutional structure:  the political representation of the of the States in Congress; the 
procedural hurdles and burdens of inertia that impede the creation of federal law; and 
underlying ability of the States to generate loyalty by providing meaningful services and 
regulation to their citizens.  Finally, we can add one more criterion to this list based on 
my discussion of the limits of hard constitutional restrictions on Congress’s power:  Any 
rules that the Court develops must be designed to operate in a world where state and 
federal power are largely concurrent.
781 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating 
the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far . . . our cases have upheld 
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”).
782 See, e.g., Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 476 (“[T]his is by no means a trivial limitation, 
but neither is it one that appears to threaten the great bulk of federal regulatory legislation.”)
783 See Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 159-60.  See also Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce 
Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325 (2001) (noting that Congress may regulate 
noncommercial activity so long as such regulation is part of an integrated regulatory scheme bearing on 
commercial activity); Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 432 (“Although the Court has imposed 
limits on Congress’s general regulatory powers, its decisions in that domain have displayed a cautious 
tentativeness.  Notably, the Court has not overruled a single case upholding congressional power to regulate 
commercial activities.”).
784 See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note ___, at ___.  I discuss the prospects for protecting state 
autonomy through Commerce Clause limitations further infra at TAN ___.
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The Rehnquist Court’s efforts on the process federalism front have taken two 
primary forms.  The Court has articulated a number of “clear statement rules” requiring 
that Congress legislate with particular clarity if it wishes to encroach on various aspects 
of state autonomy.  Such rules apply, for example, when Congress wishes to regulate the 
traditional operations of state government,785 subject the states to liability,786 impose 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds,787 or press the limits of its Commerce Clause 
authority.788  The Court has also (arguably) imposed a strong deliberation requirement, 
enforced through review of the legislative record, when Congress acts in certain ways.789
In particular, the Court has suggested that the validity of legislation enacted under 
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments will turn on the sort of 
findings made by Congress in support of such legislation.790
There may well be a place for both these strategies in a sound federalism 
jurisprudence.  But the first – the clear statement strategy – fits my criteria better.  It is, 
for instance, more likely to avoid confrontations with Congress, because clear statement 
cases are statutory construction cases while failure to supply adequate legislative findings 
generally results in invalidation of the statute in question.  While Congress may well 
disagree with the Court’s interpretation of a statute and, in some cases, acts to overrule 
the Court’s decision,791 these confrontations seem less, well, confrontational than where 
the Court issues a constitutional holding that the political branches perceive as 
illegitimate.  Indeed, the obvious option of simply amending the statute in question may 
divert political forces from more damaging forms of retaliation.792
Moreover, the Court has thus far applied deliberation rules primarily when 
Congress acts under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.793  In this context, such 
rules do little to safeguard the state regulatory autonomy that I have identified as crucial 
785 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
786 See Will v. Michigan Dept. of St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 
473 U.S. 234, 243  (1985).
787 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981).
788
 See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857-58 (2000); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 
(1971).
789
 We could also describe the anti-commandeering doctrine as a process rule, since its best justification is 
that it forces the federal government to internalize the financial and political costs of its actions.  See
Young, Two Cheers, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1360-61.  But cases of pure 
commandeering – as opposed to cooperative federalism programs induced by conditional spending or 
conditional preemption – are rare. 
790 See, e.g. Bd. of Trus. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, ___ (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  But see Young, Sky Falling, supra note 332, at ___ (arguing that neither the 
state of the legislative record nor the quality of Congress’s deliberations is actually critical in the Court’s 
Section Five cases).
791 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. J. 1361 (1988).
792
 These might include attacks on the Court’s operational funding or its jurisdiction, for example. [cites on 
calls for such measures in response to federalism decisions] 
793 Compare, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at ___; Kimel, 528 U.S. at ___, with United States v. Morrison [cite] 
(downplaying importance of congressional findings in Commerce Clause cases).
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to self-enforcement of federalism.  The reason is that power to regulate per se under 
Section Five is generally redundant with the Commerce Clause; in most instances, the 
only reasons that Congress wishes to use the Section Five power instead of the 
Commerce Power is that the former will allow it to abrogate the states’ sovereign 
immunity from private damages suits.794  The Section Five deliberation rules, then, 
primarily guard the states’ sovereign immunity; they do not limit the scope of Congress’s 
power to preempt state regulatory authority over private individuals.795
The clear statement strategy, on the other hand, is likely to minimize 
confrontations with Congress and avoid the need either to draw categorical lines or to 
apply federalism values directly.  These rules enhance the States’ political representation 
in Congress by providing notice when federalism values are threatened.  The ability of 
any interest group – including state governments – to protect its interests is powerfully 
affected by the costs of information, and, as Neil Komesar has observed, “one important 
form of information is the basic recognition of the existence of an interest.  The most 
dormant groups are those whose members do not even recognize a need for political 
action.”796  This difficulty increases with the complexity of governmental activity,797 and 
many important issues are mind-numbingly complex.798  Clear statement rules thus serve 
an important function by easing the States’ task of monitoring congressional activity for 
threats to state autonomy.  
Clear statement rules also raise procedural hurdles to intrusive federal enactments 
by imposing additional drafting or amendment costs on proponents.799  Rules requiring a 
clear statement by Congress, moreover, may be extended to further buttress political and 
procedural safeguards by demanding that particular sorts of decisions not be farmed out 
to other federal actors, such as administrative agencies and courts.  This is an important 
point, since the States have no direct representation in these bodies, and courts and 
agencies are often able to act more easily than Congress.
The remaining criteria highlight the importance of one particular clear statement 
rule – the traditional “presumption against preemption.”800  That presumption is the only 
794
 [cites]
795
 A further problem is that the deliberation arguably required by cases like Kimel and Garrett may impose 
unrealistic requirements on Congress. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the 
Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L. J. 1707 
(2002).  This problem is avoided if we read cases like Kimel and Garrett to turn on disparities in coverage 
between the statutes in question and the constitutional rules they are enforcing, see Young, Sky Falling, 
supra note ___, at ___, but in that instance we would be treating the Court’s limits on Section Five as 
substantive rather than process-based rules.
796 KOMESAR, supra note ___, at 71.
797 See id. (“The more complex the social issue the more difficult or expensive it is to recognize one’s 
position.”).
798 See [intergovernmental relations book – expand this part].
799 [cite Brudney]
800 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”).
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one of the Court’s pro-federalism doctrines that directly implicates the survival of state 
regulatory authority.801  It is therefore the doctrine most nearly relevant to Madison’s 
competition for loyalty between state and federal politicians.  Preemption is also the 
classic problem of concurrent power.  Preemption doctrine starts from the proposition 
that the States and the Nation share power in an area; its central preoccupation is the 
management of conflicts that inevitably arise in such situations.802  To the extent that 
virtually all regulatory authority is concurrent now – Lopez and Morrison
notwithstanding – then preemption ought to emerge as the central preoccupation of 
constitutional federalism.
Why it has not done so is something of a puzzle.803  Part of the problem may be 
that preemption cases do not seem to raise questions of high constitutional principle.  As 
Justice Breyer has pointed out, preemption doctrine emphasizes “the practical importance 
of preserving local independence, at retail, i.e., by applying pre-emption analysis with 
care, statute by statute, line by line, in order to determine how best to reconcile a federal 
statute’s language and purpose with federalism’s need to preserve state autonomy.”804
This “retail” federalism, however, may well be both more “doable” for the courts and 
more important for the states than the attempt to construct hard limits on national power.
D. Hard and Soft Rules
A focus on preemption also has the virtue of responding to a central question in 
the debate over federalism’s underlying values.  Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have 
claimed that all the values I have discussed – regulatory competition and 
experimentation, for example, or citizen participation – are products of decentralization, 
not federalism.  Both involve shifting decisions to the state and local level; under 
decentralization, however, the decision to do so lies in the policy discretion of the central 
authority, whereas under federalism at least some such shifts are mandated as a matter of 
constitutional principle.805  Most of the advantages usually ascribed to federalism, 
Professors Rubin and Feeley argue, stem simply from shifting authority downward, not 
from any constitutional rule requiring such a shift.806  Moreover, since regulatory 
diversity and citizen participation will be more helpful in some contexts than others, 
Rubin and Feeley argue that a constitutional rule forcing devolution without regard to the 
801
 Other federalism doctrines – most importantly, the dormant Commerce Clause – directly impact state 
regulatory authority.  But the dormant commerce doctrine has remained an effective tool for attacking state 
autonomy, even in the hands of the Rehnquist Court.  See, e.g., [Carbone; Camps Newfound].
802 See, e.g., Raeker-Jordan, supra note ___, at 1386 (“These preemption questions arise because Congress 
has sought to regulate to some extent in some field in which the states also regulate or attempt to 
regulate.”).
803
 I return to this puzzle infra TAN ___.
804
 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
805 See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 523, at 910-14 (explaining this distinction).
806
 Professors Rubin and Feeley concede that some values often associated with federalism – such as the 
diffusion of power and the promotion of local communities – are not secured by decentralization.  See id. at 
927.  They argue, however, that federalism does not really promote these values either.  See id. at 927-35 
(diffusion of power), 936-51 (community). 
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circumstances of particular policy areas frustrates the ability of national authorities to 
respond to these variations.807
A number of scholars have responded to Professors Rubin and Feeley.808 Vicki 
Jackson, for example, has argued that their critique “fails to appreciate the degree to 
which decentralization in the United States is a function of, and bound up with, 
federalism . . . .  [P]resent realities are conditioned by the existence of the states, and by a 
belief, shared by many, that their existence and functioning as governments are 
constitutionally secured.”809   One cannot simply assume that Texas or Oregon or New 
Hampshire would provide the same degree of viable regulatory diversity and citizen 
participation if they were transformed, from the standpoint of constitutional autonomy, 
into “Administrative Districts 1, 2 and 3.”  Thus, as Professor Jackson points out, 
“abandoning constitutional federalism has potentially high costs for values Rubin and 
Feeley attribute to mere ‘decentralization.’”810
I want to focus, however, on a somewhat different answer.  The dichotomy 
postulated by Professors Rubin and Feeley assumes a bright line between decentralization 
as a policy choice and federalism as a matter of constitutional right.  This assumption is 
evident in the definition of “federalism” that Professors Rubin and Feeley propose:  “[I]n 
a federal system, the subordinate units possess prescribed areas of jurisdiction that cannot 
be invaded by the central authority, and leaders of the subordinate units draw their power 
from sources independent of that central authority.”811  The first half of this definition –
focusing on “prescribed areas of jurisdiction” – seems to describe the old doctrine of 
“dual federalism” that I discussed earlier.  That doctrine, however, is long since dead.812
More modern forms of constitutional federalism rely considerably less on judicial 
definition and enforcement of mutually-exclusive spheres of regulatory jurisdiction.  The 
Court’s cases on anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity, for example, limit 
the means by which Congress may enforce federal law but do not confine that law to 
807 Id. at 914.
808 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 
HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2217-23 (1998) [hereinafter Jackson, Principle]; [others].
809
 Jackson, Principle, supra note 808, at 2217.
810 Id.
811
 Rubin & Feeley, supra note 523, at 911.  
812
 Some have argued that the Rehnquist Court’s recent Commerce Clause decisions have revived “dual 
federalism,” see, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”: What’s Right and Wrong with 
Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 215 (2000), and there is some language in the 
opinions to support this, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (“The Constitution 
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”).  My own view is that, stray 
language aside, the holdings and operative analysis of these cases do not attempt to define an exclusive 
sphere of state activity.  See Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 157-63; accord Pettys, supra note 
___, at 364 (“It would be easy – but a serious mistake – to confuse the modern Court’s 
economic/noneconomic and local/national distinctions with the ‘dual federalism’ of the ninteteenth-century 
Court.”).  If “dual federalism” survives in current constitutional doctrine, we are more likely to find it in the 
Court’s continuing solicitude for the principle of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs.  See Young, Dual 
Federalism, supra note 94, at 177-85.
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particular areas.813  These contemporary doctrines blur the bright line between federalism 
and decentralization by conceding a large – virtually unlimited, even – realm of 
concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.  Congress may regulate virtually any subject it 
chooses, so long as it does not require states to implement federal policy or subject them 
to private suits for money damages.  That means that the decentralization decision – that 
is, the decision to regulate at either the state or federal level that Professors Rubin and 
Feeley argue is critical – remains primarily a policy choice even under the Rehnquist 
Court’s constitutional doctrine.  
But to the extent we think decentralization is a good thing, we may want to foster 
it as a matter of interpretive policy in the construction of federal statutes.  Professors 
Rubin and Feeley provide little legal basis for doing this.  If decentralization is merely a 
policy question like any other, then courts engaged in statutory interpretation have little 
justification for construing statutes to protect regulatory diversity unless they can find 
evidence that the enacting legislature intended them to do so.  As I develop in Part III, 
however, viewing federalism as a constitutional imperative provides a legitimate basis for 
normative, decentralizing canons of construction.814  That is what the Court’s clear 
statement rules – and particularly the presumption against preemption – are designed to 
do.  
Process federalism thus can blunt much of the Rubin and Feeley critique by 
softening the dichotomy between federalism as a constitutional requirement and 
decentralization as a policy choice.  Process rules will often allow Congress to centralize 
policy in areas where the public interest seems to require it.  At they same time, they 
foster decentralization by strengthening the forces – both political and interpretive – that 
push against national uniformity.  Rubin and Feeley are right to seek more flexibility in 
federalism doctrine; they are wrong to the extent that they assume that constitutional 
values cannot be an important part of a flexible analysis.
VII. Strong Autonomy and the Future of Federalism Doctrine
Predictions from the legal academy about federalism doctrine have often bordered 
on hysteria.  Here is Mark Killenbeck, for example, writing just after the Court decided 
Alden v. Maine815 in 1999:
[The Rehnquist Court’s majority] has embarked on a course of 
constitutional reformation whose ultimate boundaries are becoming 
increasingly clear.  The opinions themselves speak in largely measured 
terms, stressing the need for “great restraint” and averring respect for 
“established federalism jurisprudence.”  There is, nevertheless, every 
reason to believe that in their single-minded quest to protect the 
“‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty’” of the states, these Justices 
813 See Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 154.  
814 See infra Section III.A.1.
815
 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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contemplate substantial revision, perhaps even wholesale reversal, of 
many of the assumptions that have guided American constitutional 
doctrine and public policy this century.816
Likewise, in a widely-noted book, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., asserted that the Court 
“has, by its own will, moved the middle ground [between federal and state authority] and 
narrowed the nation’s power.”817  Sandy Levinson and Jack Balkin even viewed Bush v. 
Gore818 as a sinister maneuver designed to perpetuate the current pro-States majority and 
allow it to wreak greater havoc on national authority.819
It is hard to square these predictions with actual results on the ground.  The Gun 
Free School Zones Act is no more820 – but it has been replaced with a nearly identical 
816
 Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 81-82 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44. 64 (1996); and Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (quoting, in turn, Federalist 39 (Madison)).
817 NOONAN, supra note 332, at 156.
818
 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
819
 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 
(2001).  The enormity of the charge requires a somewhat extended quotation to show I am not making it up.  
Professors Balkin and Levinson argue that “[i]n the past ten years, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has begun a systematic reappraisal of doctrines concerning federalism, racial equality, and civil rights that, 
if fully successful, will redraw the constitutional map as we have known it.” Id. at 1052-53.  Although 
Balkin and Levinson mention racial equality and civil rights, all of their primary examples come from 
federalism doctrine.  See id. at 1053 (discussing Bd. of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (11th Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (same); 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting Congress’s power under Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Commerce Clause); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (same)).  Balkin and Levinson then assert that “this same bloc of five conservatives 
[that prevailed in the federalism cases] handed the presidency to George W. Bush in Bush v. Gore. By 
doing so, they helped ensure a greater probability for more conservative appointments and more changes in 
constitutional doctrine. The conservative five are not through yet. They have selected a president to keep 
their constitutional transformation going.” Id.  In so doing, the Court has committed “flagrant judicial 
misconduct” amounting to a “constitutional coup.”  Id. at 1049-50.
     This is a spectacularly bold claim.  It doesn’t look so good now, of course, in light of the surprisingly 
liberal – but in some cases quite revolutionary – holdings at the end of the 2002 Term. See, e.g., Lawrence 
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (striking down the Texas sodomy statute and overruling Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding affirmative action 
policy at the University of Michigan law school); Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003) (invalidating 
death sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel); Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 
S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (upholding the Family Medical Leave Act’s provisions abrogating state sovereign 
immunity).  For a thoughtful assessment of some of these cases, see Sanford Levinson, Redefining the 
Center: Liberal Decisions from a Conservative Court, VILLAGE VOICE, July 2-8, 2003 (available at 
hettp://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0327/levinson.php).  In any event, perhaps the actual plausibility of 
charges made in a polemic like Balkin and Levinson’s is really beside the point.  Their fulminations do 
show just how revolutionary many legal academics have expected the Rehnquist Court’s “federalist 
revival” to be.
820 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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provision sporting legislative findings of a substantial effect on interstate commerce,821
and it was, in any event, redundant with state law in over forty states.822
Sylvia Law has asserted that “the Supreme Court has diminished the power of Congress 
to address national problems in ways that we have not seen since the Taft Court Era and 
the constitutionally disastrous period when the Court denied the New Deal Congress and 
president the power to adopt federal responses to the Great Depression.”823
A. The Centrality of Preemption
Preemption shifts the focus firmly back onto what state governments do.  Federal 
preemption eliminates state-by-state regulatory diversity and generally forecloses 
competition and experimentation.  By removing whole policy areas from the state 
governmental agenda, moreover, preemption reduces the importance of state 
governments as an arena for political participation and competition.  Doctrines limiting 
federal preemption of state law thus go straight to the heart of the reasons why we care 
about federalism in the first place.    
A jurisprudence that sought to limit federal preemption of state law, on the other 
hand, would address these concerns directly.  Preemption, as Candice Hoke has observed, 
“is inherently ‘jurispathic’; it kills off one line, perhaps even an entire scheme, of a 
particular community's law.”824  The whole point of preemption is generally to force 
national uniformity on a particular issue, stifling state-by- state diversity and 
experimentation.  And preemption removes issues within its scope from the policy 
agenda of state and local governments, requiring that citizen participation and 
deliberation with respect to those issues must take place at the national level.
“Given the broad range of issues over which Congress has undoubted power to regulate, 
the failure of the Court to apply preemption doctrine sparingly, and with real attention 
both to Congress's intent and the values of federalism, will in the long run prove 
disastrous to perpetuation of the very real values underlying the diffusion of power 
inherent in federalism.”825
821 See Act of Sept. 30, 1996 [Stat. Cite].
822 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at ___.
823
 Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil 
Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 371 (2002).
824
 Hoke, Preemption Pathologies, supra note ___, at 694 (borrowing the term from Robert M. Cover, The 
Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword -- Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983)). 
825
 Massey, supra note 318, at 508.
13-Jul-04 draft
151
B. Against Dormant Preemption
C. Other Process-Forcing Rules
1. Clear Statements
a. Regulation of Governmental Functions.
b. Private Causes of Action Against State Institutions.
c. Conditions on Federal Grants.
2. Anti-Commandeering
The anti-commandeering rule has been criticized as a formalism,826 and formal it 
is.  The question is whether that is such a bad thing.  Sometimes the adoption of a formal 
judicial rule can prompt functional analysis by the political branches.  In the 
commandeering context, for instance, the anti-commandeering rule simply forces 
Congress to consider whether its interests are sufficiently important to justify taking 
further action either to persuade state institutions to enforce federal law, or to override 
state resistance by mandating federal enforcement.  [maybe this goes later on]  There is 
no reason to think a court would do a better job of this analysis up front.
Critics of Printz are in the habit of accusing the Court of “ignoring” the relevant history.  
See, e.g., Werhan, supra note ___, at 1278. But Justice Scalia’s opinion in Printz
discusses the history for ___ pages; he simply reaches a different conclusion than the 
dissent and Printz’s critics do.  Perhaps that conclusion is wrong, but it does no one any 
good to “ignore” the extent to which the majority grappled with that history in reaching 
its decision.  This phenomenon in the commandeering debate seems representative of a 
broader pathology, whereby participants in legal debates seem driven to paint their 
opponents as completely mistaken, absolutely wrong, etc.  It is rarely the case, however, 
that something intelligent cannot be said on both sides of most of our constitutional 
debates, and that is certainly true of debates about federalism.
D. A Zone of Guaranteed Autonomy?
E. The Very Limited Utility of Immunity
[rebut Pettys, who thinks anti-abrogation enhances states’ ability to compete for popular 
affection]
826 See, e.g., Werhan, supra note ___, at 1281.
